

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

December, 1952

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THEME AND CHARACTER IN *HAMLET*

By BRENTS STIRLING

As the motion picture *Hamlet* opens, a disembodied voice is heard to say, "This is a play about a man who could not make up his mind." These words are the more mischievous when we recall that Mr. Olivier cut many of the lines upon which the Hamlet of pale thought has traditionally rested. Thus has the Coleridge Hamlet evolved into a mythic being who must be placated before maimed rites of a quite un-Coleridgean nature are performed; thus has the production of *Hamlet* become a ceremony which whimsically negates the incantation which begins it.

The fault is hardly Mr. Olivier's. The impasse he encountered arises from strong persistence of the Coleridge tradition with simultaneous awareness, derived from historical scholarship, that there is no foundation in the plot for what Coleridge and similar interpreters¹ had to say. It is now scarcely possible for a literary historian to look upon the feigned madness, or upon the elaborately contrived play, or upon the refusal to kill Claudius at prayer, as dramatic presentations of Hamlet's nicety or sensibility. Much historical scholarship, however, while denying that Hamlet exhibits such traits in the dramatic action, has granted that he expresses them in soliloquy. This tradition of ambivalence led T. S. Eliot, influenced by Robertson, to declare that Hamlet as a self-revelatory character lacked any "objective correlative" in the action.² But long before this C. M. Lewis reasoned that Shakespeare's refinements of inner conflict were imposed upon an inherited plot in which the conflict remained external.³ And if we follow this line but a step further, we are faced with a Hamlet who meets external obstacles with triumphant stratagem and dispatch, but who berates himself for inactivity. Had Eliot sensed this larger difficulty instead of the rather questionable one suggested by Robertson, he might have lamented not the failure of characterization to find a correlative in action, but an outright disagreement between character and action: in short, the presence of an "objective anti-correlative."

The usual way out of such dualism is to reflect that Shakespeare thrives on inconsistency, to look upon *Hamlet* as a great play but a failure in coherency, or in any of a dozen ways to celebrate Shakespeare as a dramatist unconcerned with cogency and unity. But it is axiomatic, I trust, that this view of *Hamlet* should be entertained only in the presence of facts which are inconsistent with other conclusions. Is there, after all, a character interpretation which squares not only

¹ T. S. Eliot, "Hamlet" (1919), *Selected Essays*, new edition (New York, 1950), pp. 121-26.

² C. M. Lewis, *The Genesis of Hamlet* (New York, 1907).

with the soliloquies but with episode and event within the play? Will this interpretation, moreover, suggest a central theme which ties together the main plot, the sub-plot, and such "digressive" features as the player scenes? And, above all, can such a theme be sensed from internal emphasis apparent to a perceptive spectator, whether Elizabethan or modern? Need we resort to externals or to anachronism in order to find unity?

In attempting to answer these questions I shall try to show that Hamlet's conflict within is one of sensing an incapacity for emotion, and of recoiling almost simultaneously from a capacity for over-emotion. Unlike the character interpretations which stem mainly from Coleridge, this conception of inner predicament is consistent with the outwardly decisive deeds of Hamlet throughout Shakespeare's inherited plot. A Coleridgean Hamlet unable to act, who yet acts supremely, will cause dramatic trouble, but a Hamlet unable to match his decisive deeds with an emotional equivalent will present no such incongruity. So if the interpretation here is valid, the dualism of character and action discerned by historical criticism can give way to a new historical view which sees Shakespeare adapting the older plot while superimposing characterization in no way inconsistent with it.

To state that Hamlet's difficulty is one of passion rather than of will is to advance nothing disturbingly new.³ Nor, above all, is it to deny that Hamlet's mind remains the most interesting element of his personality. Character interpretation here will stem simply from application of well-understood Elizabethan doctrine. Characterization will not, in fact, be our main problem; we shall be concerned with a psychological interpretation, but this will be subordinate to a view of the play as a whole in which the theme of emotive deficiency and excess dominates the main plot, the sub-plot, the soliloquies, and the player episodes. This theme, moreover, evolves dramatically and cumulatively from the beginning to its ironical conclusion in the grave scene. So much for formula. The responsible critic's question is whether such a scheme in *Hamlet* lies in the open before discerning readers or spectators. The answer to this depends upon analysis of essential parts of the play which, as I see it, run the following course.

I, ii. The theme is quickly established. Claudius and the queen present Hamlet's "unmanly" grief for his father as an excess of sensibility, and while their conception of him is a false one, it plainly introduces the note of emotional balance or decorum. The stage is now cleared for the first soliloquy, which is Hamlet's own projection of the theme in his familiar avowal that the world's "uses" seem "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable." From this state of barren emotion he proceeds, after the manner of later scenes, into great emotional in-

³ Nor unhistorical, as Professor Lily Campbell's well-known study of passion in Shakespearean tragedy shows. Miss Campbell's interpretation of *Hamlet*, however, bears little resemblance to the one developed here.

tensity and in so doing assails Gertrude's waning remembrance of his father—precisely the emotional lack which he will later find in himself.

I, iii. The Polonius-Laertes sub-plot is introduced; the theme, however, continues on a secondary level. Ophelia is warned of Hamlet's impulsive ardor, "a toy in blood, / A violet in the youth of primy nature, / Forward, not permanent, sweet, not lasting." This need not be taken literally as characterization, but it deserves recognition as a restatement of theme. Laertes, moreover, warns Ophelia: "And keep you in the rear of your affection." All of this advice is expanded by Polonius in turn, but only after he has delivered the well-known lines to his son which express the theme on still another secondary level. Every deft platitude, save the borrower-lender one, specifies an ideal of balance in emotion leading to decorum in action.

I, v. Here Hamlet encounters the ghost in what can be called the climax of Act I. His first affective response is one of dedication; he will "wipe away all trivial, fond records . . . all pressures past," that the ghost's command "alone shall live" in his consciousness. This, however, is immediately succeeded by an episode of hysteria (whether real or feigned), in which for the first time we hear the Hamlet of "wild and whirling words." The scene ends, however, on a note of emotional integration as the watchers are sworn by Hamlet to serve his ends. Thus has the staleness and flatness of I, ii, given away to concentration of feeling.

II, ii, 308 ff. From the dedicated mood of I, v, Hamlet has reverted to the emotional weariness of I, ii; to Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern he declares that he has lost his mirth, "foregone all custom of exercises; and indeed, it goes so heavily with my disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory."

II, ii, 453 ff. The omission of this sequence from the Olivier version was the more unfortunate when we realize that it presents skilled and lively variations upon the already established theme. Hamlet's lines thus avoid the usual charge of topical digression, for their sense is again affective balance and soundness. Hamlet remembers "an excellent play, well digested in the scenes, set down with as much modesty as cunning." In it there was "no matter in the phrase that might indict the author of affectation," and there appeared in it "an honest method, as wholesome as sweet." After such praise of controlled feeling on the plane of artistry, Hamlet now recites lines from this "restrained" play which, in their startling departure from his description, either reveal the slippery relation between his ideal of emotive balance and his repeated lapse into emotive extremes, or, on a less subtle level, simply emphasize his tendency to exploit sensibility. Objection can be entered, of course, that the rhetorical bombast of Hamlet's recitation is merely intended to satirize outmoded play-writing or to distinguish play-within-play from the play itself. As literary historians we should recognize, however, that playwrights

often have multiple motives for doing what they do, and that there is no reason why Hamlet's affinity here for the rhetoric of passion cannot have a function beyond the mechanical ones favored by skeptical tradition. Incidentally, to be a mechanist is not to be a skeptic, for the mechanist advances an exclusive claim which imposes a burden of proof.

After the First Player has picked up the passage begun by Hamlet and pushed it over the brink of passion, Hamlet turns the implied theme of emotive adequacy into direct expression with the "rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy. What would this player do—the player with "tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, a broken voice"—what would he do "had he the motive and the cue for passion that I have?" Yet Hamlet, dull and muddy mettled, peaks like John-a-Dreams, unpregnant of his cause. Self-shamed by inadequacy of feeling, he proceeds into the "bloody, bawdy villain" lines; then doubly shamed by hysteria which is worse than no feeling at all, he compares himself to a cursing drab, a whore, for unpacking his heart with words. At which he veers again, this time toward the world of affective reality: "The play's the thing."

Thus, instead of topical digression in the elaborate "player" lines of II, ii, there is a heightened repetition of the pattern which was presented gradually in the first act. In Act I the progress was from Hamlet's "weary, stale" state (I, ii) to the ideal of balanced affections expressed in introducing the sub-plot (I, iii), thence to Hamlet's emotional disintegration (I, v), and finally to his emotional integration and resolve at the end of I, v. In II, ii, from line 304 on, there is a similar but accelerated sequence which runs from Hamlet's "sterile" mood (the scene with Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern) to the ideal of affective decorum in artistry (the lines on the play), thence to Hamlet's emotional disintegration (his violent contrasting of himself and the player, with revulsion from this excess in lines on the cursing drab), and finally to his emotional integration and resolve (the mouse-trap decision). This parallel re-rendering of the earlier pattern not only echoes and reinforces the theme slowly commenced in Act I, but gives its development a quickened forward movement.

III, i, 56 ff. "To be or not to be." Hamlet moves again from emotion keyed for reality (the end of II, ii) into its polar opposite, a cancellation of living and feeling in which a universal impulse to suicide is inhibited only by the uncertainty of after-life.

III, ii. This scene also is considered a digressive one, an excursion into the topical, but like the player episode of II, ii, it is actually a meaningful variation on the theme. Addressing himself for a second time to the actors, Hamlet again voices his creed of affective balance: players, "in the very torrent, tempest, and . . . whirlwind of passion" must "beget a temperance that may give it smoothness," and the actor who tears passion to tatters is offensive to the soul. But, "be

not too tame neither." This strong episode is quickly succeeded by a "choral" piece, Hamlet's key lines to Horatio which express definitively both his ideal and the moral conception upon which the play rests:

and blest are those
Whose blood and judgement are so well commingled
That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart,
As I do thee.

As we have noted, historical scholarship has established a relationship between Shakespearean tragedy and Elizabethan conceptions of passion which shows that, whatever the faults of the present interpretation, it is not anachronistic. The "passion's slave" lines are central both to characterization and theme, and, as with similar passages in Shakespeare, the timing here is a major part of the emphasis: the speech to Horatio appears in a "calm" period just after Hamlet's statement, in actors' terms, of its equivalent, and just before the climactic trapping of Claudius.

The play within the play soon follows. It should be observed that the Player King (lines 204 ff.) dwells upon shallow and short-lived passion ("What to ourselves in passion we propose . . .") which is followed by the Player Queen's pledges of solid and enduring love, and the real queen's sensing of the emotionally spurious note: "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."

III, ii, 410 ff. The mouse-trap is sprung and Hamlet is thrown into great agitation. Yet, at the scene's end, he collects himself enough to resolve upon restraint in dealing with his mother: "Let me be cruel, not unnatural."

III, ii, then, projects in several forms the ideal of emotion suited to action or circumstance: Hamlet's lines to the players on decorum in acting, his lines to Horatio on slavery to passion, and his resolution of restraint toward Gertrude are all varied expressions of the same theme. And it is dramatically important that all this surrounds the structural climax of the play, the testing of Claudius; Hamlet's hour of decision and the multiple restatement of his affective ideal are thus nearly simultaneous. There could be no better dramatic preparation for the irony of later events.

The nature of this irony has been dramatically established in the player episode of II, ii; there Hamlet was shamed by the actor into emotive violence directed at his own deficient emotion, and shamed the more by this violence itself, from which he recoiled in self-contempt. Thus when measured by his tense ideal of balance (exemplified in Horatio), he is deficient; but he escapes deficiency only to become excessively and ignominiously verbal. If we watch for recur-

rence of this pattern, we shall find that it provides a tragic climax in the grave scene. It recurs prior to the grave episode, however, in another prominent scene which emerges from traditional confusion if the deficiency-in-excess irony is allowed to control its interpretation. This scene is III, iv, which may now be examined in the light of prior dramatic emphasis.

III, iv. Hamlet rebukes his mother for the false passion which accompanies carnality. The scene should be read to sense his flight or, as it turns out, his descent, into rhetorical emotion directed at her sin. Whether intended as "antic" hysteria, high indignation, prurience, or a combination of such qualities, it is at least memorable. Yet in the midst of this intensity the ghost appears to "whet" Hamlet's "almost blunted purpose." Here, those skeptical of Shakespeare's coherence ask, "What blunted purpose?" The necessary trap has been laid and has done its work; Hamlet has been a shrewd avenger in refusing to kill Claudius at prayer; and he is now at the point of redeeming his mother. Nor has the killing of Polonius at all deflected his resolve. The critics just mentioned will emphasize that while these events do delay the revenge, they scarcely are equivalents of a waning intent which the ghost needs to whet: there is nothing about them which could justify the ghost, Hamlet, or any one else in pointing to a dulled volition. Hence Shakespeare is alleged again to have adapted the old play in a confused manner. If this scene is considered in relation to what has gone before, however, Hamlet's blunted purpose is quite different from the pale delay assumed as Shakespeare's intention by those who then confess failure to find it in the dramatic action. At the ghost's very appearance here Hamlet has confessed himself a "tardy son . . . lapsed in time and passion." And if he is thus lapsed in passion, he cannot be so in the sense of having drifted into sickly thought or lack of conviction. Such a reading makes nonsense of the cogent emotion which accompanied both Hamlet's killing of Polonius and his verbal attack on Gertrude, events which immediately preceded the ghost's arrival. Shakespeare deserves to be interpreted coherently if the interpretation is consistent with dramatically established meaning, and on such a basis the tardy son lapsed in passion should be the son who has lapsed *into* passion, the transgression which caused him to turn in contempt upon his own hysteria in the "rogue and peasant slave" speech of II, ii. There he had fallen a-cursing like a very drab; here he has indulged himself in excoriating Gertrude. His "blunted purpose" at this point is again indignation or disgust cherished for its own sake, and indulged verbally and wastefully.

IV, iv. "How all occasions do inform against me, / And spur my dull revenge!" Sleeping, feeding, and bestial oblivion are Hamlet's lot, although examples gross as earth exhort him. There are lines about thinking too precisely on the event, but the complete passage

carries a context of emotional dullness, not one of mental nicety,⁴ and in dramatic interpretation the enveloping emphasis should govern; the snatched-at phrase or clue is the least reliable datum. The major context here is the theme of emotional deficiency, but Hamlet's concomitant fear of emotional excess is also restated in the strong lines beginning, "Rightly to be great / Is not to stir without great argument."

IV, v. Laertes of the sub-plot returns in a scene timed to follow the Fortinbras encounter of IV, iv, and thus one contrast device succeeds another. There are few better ways of determining Shakespeare's intent than by noting such antitheses. Readers of *Hamlet* are well aware that Laertes' appearance on the scene introduces fury and dispatch; above all, here is anger uninhibited by emotional lack on the one hand, or excess of anguish on the other. Scene vii, analysis of which follows, is a conscious development of this contrast, as well as a restatement of the play's theme.

IV, vii, 108 ff. As the sub-plot develops and Claudius urges Laertes to revenge, his lines dwell at first upon the theme of sensibility dulled by time.

KING. Laertes, was your father dear to you?
Or are you like the painting of a sorrow,
A face without a heart?

LAERTES. Why ask you this?
KING. Not that I think you did not love your father;
But that I know love is begun by time;
And that I see, in passages of proof,
Time qualifies the spark and fire of it.
There lives within the very flame of love
A kind of wick or snuff that will abate it;
And nothing is at a like goodness still;
For goodness, growing to a plurisy,
Dies in his own too much.

It should be noted that while deficient affections are treated simply here at first, Shakespeare ends with the familiar paradox of deficiency in excess of feeling—goodness growing to a "plurisy" (fullness) and dying "in his own too much." Claudius, moreover, continues,

that we would do,
We should do when we would; for this "would" changes
And hath abatements and delays . . .
And then this "should" is like a spendthrift sigh,
That hurts by easing.

⁴ It can be objected that, in addition to questioning his ability to feel, Hamlet here questions forthrightly his ability to act (lines 43-46), and that this finds no correlative in the plot. But this undeserved self-accusation on Hamlet's part is perfectly "normal" under conditions of enforced delay, and I question the dramatic necessity of events in the plot to reinforce its incidental appearance in soliloquy. If, moreover, the context of emotional dullness is admitted, I venture that Hamlet considers action unaccompanied by suitable emotion to be failure of action itself, but I should not insist upon this detail as essential to the present interpretation.

Again the stressing of dulled emotion alternating with "spendthrift" emotive catharsis, the "easing."

V, i, 1-240. The lines of Hamlet and the gravediggers can be viewed, of course, as simple comic relief, but any description of them is incomplete if it fails to include their likeness in tone to previous episodes which show Hamlet in moods of ironical melancholia. Nor are these passages functionally static, for their detachment induces a preparatory quality out of which Hamlet's leap into the grave (line 281) will come with great dramatic force.

V, i, 241 ff. Many view Hamlet's rash encounter with Laertes at the grave of Ophelia as a melodramatic legacy of *Ur-Hamlet* descent. It may come from the older tradition, but genetics are here secondary to Shakespeare's use of the incident for cumulative irony which caps the theme we have reviewed and seals Hamlet's failure. Here he confronts not only Laertes, his foil, but Claudius and the dead Ophelia, and amidst her "maimed rites" he is brought face to face with everything he has hated and the remnants of everything he has valued. His affective mettle, which has lapsed twice before (II, ii, and III, iv) into the shreds and patches of verbal anger, meets its last test, and the exactly parallel outcome is a dramatic shock.

HAMLET. I loved Ophelia: forty thousand brothers

Could not, with all their quantity of love,
Make up my sum. What wilt thou do for her?

KING. O, he is mad, Laertes.

QUEEN. For love of God, forbear him.

HAMLET. 'Swounds, show me what thou'lt do:

Woo 't weep? woo 't fight? woo 't fast? woo 't tear thyself?

Woo 't drink up eisel? eat a crocodile?

I'll do 't. Dost thou come here to whine?

To outface me with leaping in her grave?

Be buried quick with her, and so will I:

And, if thou prate of mountains, let them throw

Millions of acres on us, till our ground,

Singeing his pate against the burning zone,

Make Ossa like a wart! Nay, an thou 'lt mouth,

I'll rant as well as thou.

Although this outburst parodies Laertes' extravagant grief (lines 269-77), and although it expresses Hamlet's wry humor which often masks his sense of tragedy, it is much more than parody or macabre wit; it would be a simplified interpretation which did not relate these lines to previous characterization. Should it be remarked, however, that Hamlet's emotional waste in this scene simply continues his "antic disposition," the tragic climax remains basically unchanged. If the outburst is feigned, Hamlet is ironically the victim of his own craft which forces him into histrionics he has habitually thought contemptible. If, on the other hand, the passion here is real, Hamlet in his own phrase of II, ii, has indeed unpacked his heart with words. Finally, if his outcry is a blend of the real and the feigned, the irony

while more subtle is more acute: Hamlet's antic disposition has become a tragic habit, a form of emotive dissipation which has at last possessed him. Just as Macbeth was inwardly undone before Birnam Wood ever came to Dunsinane, so Hamlet is spent at this point. Playwriting modes of the time required that he undergo formal death in the ensuing scene, but within psychological limits there is really nothing left after this failure at the grave but Osric, the poisoned rapier, and silence. If the brawl in the grave is an indecorous catastrophe for Hamlet, we may recall simply and briefly the conduct of Antony, Lear, and Coriolanus, or that of Othello with Emilia's words, "fool," "gull," "dolt," ringing like a chorus. Shakespearean decorum in tragedy does not consist of an immunity from public folly on the part of his major characters.

I have no desire to make sweeping claims of unity in *Hamlet*. With those who feel that the play ends in accident, in a panoply of confusion and corpses which break the causal chain of motivation, I do not wholly disagree. With *Macbeth* again in mind it may be remarked, however, that Act V becomes less incongruous if Hamlet's catharsis of passion at the grave is viewed as a completion of his inner tragedy. Thus, from the grave scene onward it would be fitting that the "external" Hamlet achieve revenge in a vacant world of accident. But to say it would be fitting is not to insist that the play clearly carries the irony to such limits.

If the theme which unifies *Hamlet* is unnoted, the play will suffer both from looseness of structure and loss of forward movement through frequent digression. These elements will appear in II, ii, with the lengthy sampling of the players' wares which, if unconnected with the main action, induces a loss of unity and progress for some two hundred lines. Similarly, unless III, ii, is related to the central theme, this critical scene will begin with a long topical digression, Hamlet's advice to the players upon acting. The lengthy interval from IV, v, through V, i, moreover, is taken up with Ophelia's insanity and suicide, Laertes' arrival, the news of Hamlet's adventure with the pirates, Hamlet's return, and the grave scene. If this is viewed only as *Ur-Hamlet* plot, without attention to imposed thematic development, it becomes picaresque narrative which ends wanderingly in the burial of Ophelia. And shortly afterward the stage will suddenly be set for the duel, as though by a dramatist who considers that his play had better be concluded somehow, since the gathering of loose ends has approached completion.

Although this supposed lack of form cannot be reshaped to the unity of *Othello*, order and climax may yet take the place of confusion if we understand Shakespeare's efforts to express his theme, especially in the so-called digressive episodes just described. In II, ii, the world of drama calls up Hamlet's standards of affective restraint in the writing and staging of plays, and it then provides the setting for

his first lapse into excess of feeling as an escape from deficiency. Then III, ii, the second player scene, allows Hamlet again to restate his ideal of sensibility in terms of the actor's art, a restatement which he follows by direct assertion of that ideal in the speech upon passion to Horatio. In the long course from IV, v, through V, i, the same theme controls subordinate action (Laertes' return) through constant dramatic reference, in the Claudius-Laertes passages, to dulling of the affections by usage and excess. The "passion's slave" theme, moreover, removes the violent scene at Ophelia's grave from the limbo of noisy anticlimax, for Hamlet's emotive waste in challenging Laertes' emotive powers becomes fitting and climactic irony. It is the end of Hamlet's flight from under-response to over-response which begins as early as II, ii, and reappears in III, iv, the scene between Hamlet and his mother, in a form which clarifies that disputed episode. Thus may the tragedy be described in terms of a pervasive Elizabethan drama of passion and restraint; Hamlet's praise of Horatio becomes the key both to his standard of inner worth and his tragic failure to meet that standard. Just as significantly, moreover, the lines to Horatio provide a theme which unites the Hamlet of self-disclosure with the Hamlet of dramatic action, and consequently removes a dichotomy which arose from the clash between Coleridgean interpretation and historical scholarship. If emotive conflict is allowed to replace indecision as Hamlet's primary trait, the incisiveness of Hamlet's plans and deeds in the plot will not contradict the characterization; the action and sub-action will, in fact, liberally augment the self-revelation, and dramatic unity will be restored.

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SYMBOLIC NAMES IN JOHNSON'S PERIODICAL ESSAYS

By EDWARD A. BLOOM

One of the most deceptively simple of all literary practices is the metaphorical application of proper names for the delineation of typical character traits. Originally associated with classical epic and drama, the name-device has become an inevitable part of modern forms of literature. Best represented classically as a contrived technique in the works of Plautus and Terence, symbolic or metaphoric names, as they may be termed, are well exemplified in England in allegorical writings such as those of Spenser and Bunyan. But the name-device, for that matter, also makes its appearance in diversified literary media. Appellatives revealing character are to be found in novels, periodical essays, and especially in dramas. It is a short step from the naïve name-usage of the morality plays to the typically disarming practice of an Elizabethan like John Ford who prefaced *The Broken Heart* with the statement that he had given his "Speakers Names fitted to their Qualities." And writers in subsequent eras have given similar evidence of their familiarity with the literary value of significant names.

In the genre of periodical essays the most skillful practitioner of nominal application undoubtedly is Samuel Johnson. His technique is in the best classical tradition, and his general purpose often closely parallels that of Theophrastus, La Bruyère, and the English character-writers, with all of whose work Johnson probably was familiar.¹ He himself applies symbolic names to types in his essays with a simplicity that is paradoxically complex. Once analyzed, his fundamental yet ingenious practice offers a fresh understanding of his virtuosity as a familiar essayist. Johnson's method may be examined as a remarkable segment of a penetrating philosophical concept, for "the notion of giving something a name is the vastest generative idea that was ever conceived," according to Susanne K. Langer, who further comments, "The simplest kind of symbolistic meaning is probably that which belongs to proper names. A personal name evokes a conception of

¹ Johnson does not make direct reference to Theophrastus, although Boswell alludes to him, La Bruyère, and Overbury. Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, ed. G. B. Hill and L. F. Powell (Oxford, 1934, 1950), II, 76, V, 378. There is, however, frequent evidence of Johnson's familiarity with La Bruyère. *Rambler*, No. 143; *Letters of Samuel Johnson*, ed. G. B. Hill (New York, 1892), I, 184; "Addison," Johnson's *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. G. B. Hill (Oxford, 1905), II, 93, 95. Johnson's knowledge of Overbury is obviously induced from his discussion of Richard Savage's play *Sir Thomas Overbury* ("Savage," *Lives of the English Poets*, II, 338-41 *et passim*), which was performed in 1724. Johnson was honored in the prologue to the 1771 reenactment. Boswell has commented upon Johnson's skill and interest in characterization. *Life*, II, 48, III, 20, 238. Cf. *Adventurer*, No. 84, regarding diversity of character.

something given as a unit in the subject's experience, something concrete and therefore easy to recall in imagination." Related thus to a concept, the name may be treated as a "'conceptual sign,' an artificial sign which announces the presence of a certain idea."² Johnson himself anticipated this theory in more general terms when he said, "Language is only the instrument of science, and words are but the signs of ideas."³

Aligning this conceptual notion with Johnson's actual practice of name-giving, we see that his appellations are deliberate attempts to evoke from his readers experiential responses, to recall through specific signs empirical general truths. In no sense does Johnson depart from his theory of generality, for examination reveals that usually his are names pertinent to types and not individuals. Thus he is fulfilling his own premise that "the business of a poet [and, presumably, of the periodical essayist] . . . is to examine, not the individual, but the species; to remark general properties and large appearances."⁴ In his practical recognition of the metaphorical literary function of names, Johnson clearly intends a far grander purpose than the immediate identification of specific individuals. To derive the full meaning that Johnson wove into his names, it is essential that we consider the names as symbols or metaphors whose properties may be extended beyond the immediate contexts in which they appear, and that we interpret them broadly for their generic function. Well aware of the literary utility of metaphorical names, Johnson himself, in his life of Denham, said, "if there be any language which does not express intellectual operations by material images, into that language they cannot be translated."⁵ Only by fixing an immaterial concept (such as a personality trait) into a concrete, identifiable object of common experience could the writer hope to transmit his ideas to others. As a student of language and as a periodical essayist, Johnson was ever conscious of the need for communication stripped of vagueness. He saw metaphor as a characteristic and interesting method of relaying ideas: "And, Sir, as to metaphorical expression, that is a great excellence in style, when it is used with propriety, for it gives you two ideas for one;—conveys the meaning more luminously, and generally

² S. K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York, 1948), pp. 78, 49, 51. See also Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, 1944), p. 134. Miss Langer proposes a technical distinction between "symbol" and "sign" that I do not always observe. Johnson himself indicates no such distinction in his own theory or literary usage, which is both conceptual and connotative.

³ "Preface to the English Dictionary," *Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.*, Oxford English Classics (Oxford, 1825), V, 27.

⁴ *History of Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia*, ed. G. B. Hill (Oxford, 1887), Chap. X. At another time Johnson says, "Great thoughts are always general, and consist in positions not limited by exceptions, and in descriptions not descending to minuteness." "Cowley," *Lives of the English Poets*, I, 21. A fuller exposition of Johnson's theory of generality is stated by W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., *Prose Style of Samuel Johnson* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 93 ff.

⁵ *Lives of the English Poets*, I, 78.

with a perception of delight."⁶ Consequently, he carried his theory over to usage, applying such symbolic names as would synthesize and illuminate familiar general personality characteristics. Almost always managing to escape the commonplace in his revealing names, Johnson mingles in them philosophy and erudition, subtlety, sly humor, and satire, altogether fitting adjuncts to the varied themes of his periodical essays.

The names themselves reflect the range of his learning, classical, philological, historical, and literary. Of the hundreds of names which he uses, few are of his own coinage. Yet they are all pithily apt and show Johnson to be equally at home with derivations from the Latin, Greek, English, and frequently Oriental tongues. "During his sleepless nights," Boswell writes, "he amused himself by translating into Latin verse, from the Greek, many of the epigrams in the *Anthologia*."⁷ Johnson himself contended, "He that has long cultivated another language, will find its words and combinations crowd upon his memory."⁸ With consummate skill he manipulates a repertory of names which vary from broad comedy to high seriousness, each in conformity with the attitude that Johnson chooses to take toward the individual problem. For almost always, it must be recognized, Johnson uses symbolic designations to help him in the literary enforcement of value judgments. The most effective feigned proper names which he applies are those with an ironic or semi-comic intent, demonstrating his counterpoints of playfulness and didactic morality. As Johnson employs symbolic names, they help to bring into sharp focus the contemporary social foibles with which he concerns himself, giving to his generalized criticisms a remarkably specific, credible quality. As a result, the names which are introduced into the essays—both as signatures and as parts of the contents—are integrally related to his themes and leaven their didactic nature. And like the essays themselves, the names reveal Johnson's literary flexibility. Thus in the *Rambler* and the *Adventurer* he aims at a relatively high intellectual level of readers and uses classical names widely; in the *Idler* he recognizes the more humble learning of his readers and, consequently, emphasizes English names. In any event, Johnson enriches his periodical essays with a conventional device that forcefully impresses upon the receptive reader a recognition of his complete mastery of this literary medium.

Johnson's usage follows a long, though little-examined, tradition whose importance has been reflected upon by numerous commentators—philosophers, grammarians, essayists. Even Socrates, for instance, tested the propriety of Homeric names by examining their derivations. He concluded that "a name is an instrument of teaching and of dis-

⁶ Boswell, *Life*, III, 174. Certain of Johnson's poetic "assumptions about metaphor" have been explored by Allen Tate, "Johnson on the Metaphysicals," *Kenyon Review*, XI (Summer, 1949), 379-94.

⁷ Boswell, *Life*, IV, 384.

⁸ "Preface to the English Dictionary," *Works*, V, 48.

tinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web."⁹ Aristotle, who likewise examined the propriety of names, asserted that names in drama must be a just reflection of the characters of the persons named and that they must lend credibility to the actions of the actors.¹⁰ In Latin drama Plautus and Terence, to both of whom Johnson is indebted, are preëminent practitioners of the name-device, clearly revealing their awareness of its significance in character portrayal. Plautus, for instance, has his comic character Chrysalus (a name that Johnson borrows in one of the *Rambler* essays) explain to the Roman audience the significance of his designation.¹¹ Donatus considered Terence's usage of sufficient merit to warrant a study of his technique.¹² Representative of the ancient grammarians, Varro has left random comments upon the literary function of naming.¹³ Quintilian, another interested commentator, has shown an astute perception of the basic problem:

A really keen and intelligent teacher will inquire into the origin of names derived from physical characteristics, such as *Rufus* or *Longus*, whenever their meaning is obscure . . . of names derived from accidents of birth. . . . It will also be found that names are frequently derived from races, places and many other causes.¹⁴

⁹ "Cratylus," *Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York, 1937), I, 178.

¹⁰ *Poetics*, trans. S. H. Butcher (London, 1895), IX.3-7 and p. 350. In *De Interpretatione* Aristotle comments upon the symbolic function of nouns or names as tokens of actuality. *Aristotle Selections*, ed. W. D. Ross (New York, 1927), pp. 7-8. For examples of modern semantic interest in the application of symbolic names see: W. A. Becker, *Charicles*, trans. F. A. Metcalfe, 4th edition (London, 1874), Excursus, Sc. 1, p. 220; Otto Jespersen, *Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin* (London, 1928), p. 439; W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality* (New York, 1939), *passim*; Franz Boas, *Race, Language and Culture* (New York, 1940), pp. 234-36; Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York, 1944), p. 174; Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, trans. S. K. Langer (New York and London, 1946), pp. 44 ff., and *The Myth of the State* (New Haven, 1946), pp. 21-22; C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 8th edition (New York, 1946), *passim*.

¹¹ *The Two Bacchises*, IV.iv.703 ff.: "But just apply to me for gold, as much as you like: I'm your man. What's the advantage of my being named Chrysalus, unless I live up to it?" Plautus, trans. Paul Nixon (London and New York, 1928).

¹² "Donatus' Commentary on Terence," cited by J. C. Austin, *The Significant Name in Terence*, University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, VII (Urbana, 1921), No. 4. Austin has examined name values in Terence. For Johnson's interest in Terence, see his *Letters*, II, 1. Johnson's personal library is a good indication of his extremely close attention to the classical authors referred to in the body of this essay. See *Catalogue of the Valuable Library of Books, of the late learned Samuel Johnson, Esq; LL.D. . . . Sold by Auction . . . By Mr. [James] Christie . . . February 16, 1785. . . .*

¹³ Varro, *On the Latin Language*, trans. R. G. Kent (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1938), V.52, VIII.82-83; *On Agriculture*, trans. W. D. Hooper (Cambridge and London, 1934), III.6-10.

¹⁴ Quintilian, *The Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler (London and New York, 1933), Liv.25-26. Quintilian's commentary parallels Johnson's more general contention in the "Preface to the English Dictionary," *Works*, V, 28: "It is of great importance, in examining the general fabrick of a language, to trace one word from another, by noting the usual modes of derivation. . . ." For classical commentaries on names derived by physical characteristics, cf. *Herodotus*,

Writing in the same period of time, Pliny the Younger has considerable praise for the obscure dramatist Vergilius Romanus, an imitator of Menander and others of the age. It is Pliny's pleased observation that Vergilius Romanus "represents Virtue in the fairest colours, at the same time that he lashes vice; he makes use of feigned names with great propriety, of real ones with much justness."¹⁵

One of the fullest expositions of the practice and theory of symbolic names may be found in William Camden's *Remaines*, in which the antiquarian makes a detailed analysis of the device and includes a long list of names for illustration.¹⁶ In approaching the eighteenth century, we discover increasing emphasis upon signification. Steele, for example, proclaims his intention of shunning

Names significant of the Person's Character of whom I talk; a Trick used by Playwrights, which I have long thought no better a Device than that of under-writing the Name of an Animal on a Post, which the Painter conceived too delicately drawn to be known by common Eyes, or by his Delineation of its Limbs.¹⁷

Yet Steele in the actual writing of his periodical essays departed from his own strictures, continuing instead the popular practice of his contemporaries and predecessors. The collaborations of Addison and Steele are notable for their employment of symbolic names, a number of which Johnson borrowed directly. And by allusion and practice Addison indicated his belief that signification of names is an important branch of literary invention.¹⁸ Another periodical writer, Edward Moore, discourses briefly and generally upon the significance of names,¹⁹ while John Hawkesworth, a journalistic associate of Johnson, has recorded his representative eighteenth-century attitude toward names.

trans. A. D. Godley (London and New York, 1921), IV.155 (note also IV.45, VI.98); Tacitus, *The Annals*, trans. John Jackson (London and New York, 1931), I.xli, III.lxx; Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, trans. J. C. Rolfe (London and New York, 1924), IV.ix, IV.xxxv.2, VIII.xvii.

¹⁵ Pliny the Younger, *Letters*, trans. William Melmoth, rev. W. M. L. Hutchison (London and New York, 1915), VI.xxi.

¹⁶ William Camden, *Remaines Concerning Britaine* (London, 1636), pp. 47 ff. Camden pays much attention to onomantia—divination through names—and various attendant superstitions, anthropological matters that have engaged the attention of numerous modern students: Jespersen, *Mankind, Nation and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View* (Oslo, 1925), pp. 160 ff.; Sir J. A. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 3rd edition (London, 1911-1915), III, 318 ff.; Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, pp. 44-62; Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff.; Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Note also: *Herodotus*, IX.92; Cicero, *De Divinatione*, trans. W. A. Falconer (London and New York, 1931), XXIII.1; Laurence Sterne, *Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman*, ed. George Saintsbury (London and Philadelphia, 1894), Book IV, Chaps. VIII ff.; *Thraliana*, ed. K. C. Balderston (Oxford, 1942), p. 993. Mrs. Thrale was much interested in the derivations of names; e.g., pp. 144, 431, 743, 979.

¹⁷ *Lover*, No. 1.

¹⁸ See Addison on the rebus device, which a reading of Camden called to his attention. *Spectator*, No. 59, noted by the editor, Henry Morley (London and New York, n. d.).

¹⁹ *World*, No. 187.

Though the characters of men have, perhaps, been essentially the same in all ages, yet their external appearance has changed with other peculiarities of time and place, and they have been distinguished by different names, as new modes of expression have prevailed; a periodical writer, therefore, who catches the picture of evanescent life, and shows the deformity of follies which in a few years will be so changed as not to be known, should be careful to express the character when he describes the appearance, and to connect it with the name by which it then happens to be called.²⁰

It is in this tradition that the melancholy Walter Shandy discourses upon the efficacy of names, hoping that such a philosophical identity as Trismegistus will be a happy portent for his son, and inversely, that the infant will be able to adjust his character to the profound connotations of the name.²¹ It is thus evident that Sterne, like many of his contemporaries, recognized the symbolically extensible properties of the name-sign. There inheres in all language, according to students of the matter, a characteristic "mobility of signs, the tendency of a sign to transfer itself from one object to another."²² The metaphorical significance of names, then, as employed by Johnson and others is not a mere literary idiosyncrasy, but a solidly grounded linguistic-philosophical concept with a literary application. The value of Johnson's specific usage becomes intensified through cognition of the broad principle of naming. As Urban summed it up:

It may not be true that, as Parmenides said, "Name is everything, everything that mortals have established in confidence that it is the truth," but it is true that until something has been fixed by names there is little if anything of which either true or false, or even meaning, can be predicated.²³

II

The names most representative of Johnson's ingenuity are to be found in the *Rambler* essays; but corollary examples are also available, if to a lesser extent, in the *Adventurer* and *Idler* papers. Although his theory of the name-device is best explained through his practice, Johnson makes a few comments that help to elucidate his attitude and that serve as a transition to an analysis of his technique. In a semi-serious vein Johnson at one time attacks the affectation of disguising true character traits by names that do not typify their holders. Such,

²⁰ *Adventurer*, No. 100. References to the *Rambler*, the *Adventurer*, and the *Idler* are based upon the edition of Alexander Chalmers, *British Essayists* (Boston, 1856-1866).

²¹ *Tristram Shandy*, Book IV, Chaps. VIII, IX, XIV, XVIII. In *Tristram Shandy* and *A Sentimental Journey* Sterne shows a marked proclivity for significant if comic names. In the latter work note Smelfungus (Smollett) and Mundungus (Dr. Samuel Sharp). The significance of these names has been observed by W. L. Cross in *Life and Times of Laurence Sterne*, 3rd edition (New Haven, 1929), p. 461. Smollett makes use of comically symbolic names, especially in *Roderick Random* and *Peregrine Pickle*. Also note Goldsmith's tacit endorsement of the problem in *Letters of a Citizen of the World*, Letter No. XLVIII.

²² Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 109; Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

²³ Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

he says, is a practice of those who write "under characters which they cannot support" (*Rambler*, No. 20). To illustrate his point, Johnson lists stock names used deceptively by his alleged correspondents: Ajax Telamonius proves to be a "puny ensign," Penthesilea a mild son of a stock-jobber, Sesostris a gamester, and so forth.²⁴ For similar reasons, on another occasion, Johnson censured Isaac Watts. One of the many eighteenth-century writers who made use of symbolic type designations and a literary creditor of Johnson, Watts was rebuked because "He is particularly unhappy in coining names expressive of characters."²⁵

Although the immediate purpose of this study is a technical examination of Johnson's symbolic name-device, it should also direct added attention to the well-known attitudes and prejudices that fill the pages of his periodical essays. Since the names are so thematic a part of the essays, it appears useful and expeditious to departmentalize the names selected for analysis under subjects familiar to every student of Johnson. Among the most numerous metaphorical names are those related in a broad sense to the petty social manners of his day and the incidental philosophical speculation which they evoked from him. Another predominant category is that associated with essays on the subjects of legacy-hunting, marriages of convenience, parasitism,

²⁴ The classical origins of the names help to intensify Johnson's ironic purpose: Ajax was one of the heroes of the Trojan War; Penthesilea was a queen of the Amazons. See Virgil's *Aeneid*, trans. H. R. Fairclough (Cambridge and London, 1946), I.491, XI.662. Penthesilea was a name used familiarly in English literature; e.g., Congreve, *The Way of the World*, II, 39; *World*, No. 187. Smollett in *Ferdinand and Count Fathom* refers to Ferdinand's embattled mother as "Our English Penthesilea" (Chap. IV). Sesostris was a dynastic name for generations of triumphant Egyptian kings. The name is listed frequently in sources familiar to Johnson, among them: *Herodotus*, II.102-04, 106, 107, 1037; Pope, *Temple of Fame*, line 113; Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (New York, 1886), "Democritus to the Reader," I, 227. It is likely that Johnson was familiar with Sir Isaac Newton's allusion to Sesostris in *The Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended*. Note *Rambler*, Nos. 42, 46, 52. My secondary sources for classical and mythological references have been *Harper's Dictionary of Classical Literature and Antiquities*, ed. Harry T. Peck (New York, 1898), and Charles Anthon, *Classical Dictionary* (New York, 1883). For etymologies I have used *Harper's Latin Dictionary*, ed. E. A. Andrews (New York, 1907), and *Greek-English Lexicon*, comp. H. G. Liddell and Robert Scott (Oxford, 1940).

²⁵ "Watts," *Lives of the English Poets*, III, 311. Of Watts's work (*The Improvement of the Mind* [London, 1741]), Johnson wrote, "Few books have been perused by me with greater pleasure" (*ibid.*, III, 309). Another moral writer who influenced Johnson in the use of the name device was William Law, *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*, 6th edition (London, 1753). See *Thraliana*, p. 421.

Not all of Johnson's names were meant to be expressive of character. Frequently he adapted Oriental themes and names, following the popular eighteenth-century convention, merely to enhance moralistic topics. So used, the names have no further significance than that they invited by their exotic appeal. The lure of strange names has been commented upon by Johnson himself: "Imlac in 'Raselas,' I spelt with a c at the end, because it is less like English, which should always have the Saxon k added to the c." Boswell, *Life*, IV, 31. Addison likewise suggests the romantic appeal of classical names. "A Discourse on Ancient and Modern Learning," *Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Addison*, ed. A. C. Guthkelch (London, 1914), II, 461-62.

flattery, and kindred topics that were popular essay subjects in the eighteenth century. A third category is dedicated to Johnson's unremitting and well-known campaign against patronage and the uncertainties of authorship. Yet in connection with the entire problem of names those in the last group have relatively little emphasis, a scant handful being significant in the sense defined above. To express the gravity of his attitude toward patronage Johnson is generally wont to forsake subtlety and to employ the more forceful method of straightforward exposition or even obvious allegory. It may be suggested that by such direct methods he hoped to achieve the most complete fulfillment of his end and to evoke from his readers the greatest degree of serious, sympathetic response.

As a self-appointed censor of contemporary manners, Johnson is especially pungent in his condemnation of social pettiness and frivolity. He takes an intense delight in excoriating those who, lacking proper qualities of seriousness, occupy themselves with idle pastimes. The names which he applies to such types are illuminating. For example, he sharply reduces those who have set themselves up as professional wits, people who derive some imponderable satisfaction from provoking the members of their cliques to pointless laughter. Such a type appears in *Rambler*, No. 174, under the name of Dicaculus to complain of the folly of his occupation. As he confesses his own barbed wittiness:

Whatever error of conduct I could discover, whatever peculiarity of manner I could observe, whatever weakness was betrayed by confidence, whatever lapse was suffered by neglect, all was drawn together for the diversion of my wild companions, who, when they had been taught the art of ridicule, never failed to signalize themselves by a zealous imitation, and filled the town on the ensuing day with scandal and vexation, with merriment and shame.

The name Dicaculus is a brilliant example of Johnson's intensive knowledge of classical Latin. Through familiarity with the nuances of the tongue he was enabled to project a symbolic value that the common lexicon definition fails to reveal. Hence, the adjectival form of *dicaculus* bears the meanings of "loquacious, facetious, witty." Yet, despite its relationship to Johnson's name, this adjective barely suggests his subtle intention. Actually, the potential derivation may be traced to the adjective *dicax* (from *dico*) "talking sharply, satirical, witty," etc. But the penetrating symbolism of Dicaculus relies very clearly upon the technical interpretations of both Cicero and Quintilian, whose discussion of the noun form *dicacitas* ("biting wit, railery, banter") reveals the direct origin of Johnson's usage. Quintilian, for example, writes: "*Dicacitas* is no doubt derived from *dico*, and is therefore common to all forms of wit, but is specially applied to the language of banter, which is a humorous form of attack." Railery and banter, of course, are the substance of Johnson's type. Johnson, moreover, evinces through Dicaculus an attitude of displeasure toward

such a trivial means of pastime as raillery and banter. And it is the explication of Cicero that appears to have given Johnson an even more immediate inspiration for his own usage. Thus Cicero explained:

For, there being two sorts of wit, one running with even flow all through a speech, while the other, though incisive, is intermittent, the ancients called the former "irony" and the latter "raillery" [*haec altera dicacitas nominata est*]. Each of these has a trivial name, but then of course all this business of laughter-raising is trivial.²⁶

To prove the triviality of Dicaculus' activity of satirical laughter-raising is Johnson's major purpose in the essay.

Equally effective is the caricature that Johnson has drawn of Gelasimus (*Rambler*, No. 179), a misguided scholar who comes to believe in his middle age that buffoonery is the means to attainment of social success. The name is derived from *gelasimus* < *γελαισινος* "dimple in cheek, produced by smiling"; and *gelasianus* "buffoon, jester." In the character of Gelasimus, Johnson typifies the perils of lack of moderation, for this serious, middle-aged student, trained only in abstractions, fails to see the incongruity of his attempts to draw laughter by "gross buffoonery" from the most commonplace and unamusing events. Hence, he laughs at everything and attempts wittiness, wondering "that his wit was so little understood." By such a meaningful symbol, then, Johnson here, as in the name Dicaculus, cleverly establishes his attitude and simultaneously defines the nature of that kind of wit. But the name and the type are not original, a parallel, for instance, appearing in the *Stichus* of Plautus who has a comparably named character, a jester by profession, reveal himself to his audience: "I got the name Gelasimus from my father as a youngster, for even since I was a little shaver I've been a (*smirking*) jolly ass."²⁷

Some of Johnson's most forceful detestation of the entire breed of idlers is concentrated in the depiction of Papilius (*Rambler*, No. 141), a praenomen clearly significant of the type. Papilius, derived from *papilio* "butterfly," appears to be the coinage of Johnson, and he lives the fragile, flighty existence that the name suggests. He, like Dicaculus, condemns himself that others may profit. Papilius recognizes the difficulty of his position, for "the hapless wit has his labour always to begin, the call for novelty is never satisfied, and one jest only raises expectation of another." On the same level of social uselessness con-

²⁶ Quintilian, *op. cit.*, VI.iii.21; Cicero, *De Oratore*, trans. E. W. Sutton and completed by H. Rackham (Cambridge and London, 1942), II.liv.218-19. In the *Dictionary* Johnson defined raillery as "slight satire; satirical merriment," and banter as "ridicule; raillery." Another of Johnson's professional wits is Hilarius (*Rambler*, No. 101).

²⁷ *Stichus*, monologue of Gelasimus, I.iii.175 ff. At another time (III.ii.454-55) Gelasimus comments: "I'm absolutely sure I can hold my patron, I'll be so comical." In the *Dictionary* Johnson defines a buffoon as "a man whose profession is to make sport by low jests and antick postures; a jack-pudding; a man that practices indecent raillery."

demned by Johnson is the trifler designated as *Nugaculus* (*Rambler*, No. 103). He is a student of human nature but is interested only in trivial unimportant details without purpose and even pries into the secrets of others. Thus, considerable interest attaches to the pertinent appellation, a coinage based by Johnson upon the adjective *nugar* "jesting, trifling, frivolous." The diminutive is characteristic of Johnson's application of names with transitive symbolic meaning when he wishes to express contemptuous disregard. As in this instance, the diminutive has a cognoscible grammatical function that is inseparable from his philosophical attitude. A related form of idleness is compressed into the specious personality of *Aliger* (*Rambler*, No. 201), whose name means "bearing wings, winged." In one sense this symbol transfers a pleasant irony, for *Aliger*, far from exhibiting the speediness suggested by "winged," is always late to appointments. But in a literal sense *Aliger* is winged, his idle inquisitiveness prompting him to flit from one social group to another. "His curiosity incited him to range from place to place."²⁸

Antiquarian research designed to supplement historical knowledge of the past, Johnson considered a useful endeavor.²⁹ He detested, however, aimless antiquaries and collectors of trivia, types whom he classifies under a number of metaphorically significant names. Very appropriately, the man who has carried to a ridiculous extreme his hobby of collecting antiques and rarities of nature is dubbed *Quisquilius* (*Rambler*, Nos. 82, 177).³⁰ Derived from *quisquiliae*, it means "the waste or refuse of anything," and has also a number of parallel connotations which are as completely derogatory. Several other equally aimless collectors make their appearance in *Rambler*, No. 177. *Chartophylax*, for instance, is notable for collecting all kinds of

²⁸ Parallel types illustrate degrees of superficiality and social wastefulness: *Polyphilus* (*Rambler*, No. 19), "loving many" occupations, destroys his own precocity through uncontrolled diversity of interests. *Florentulus* (*Rambler*, No. 109), from *floreo* "shining, glistening, glittering," has been reared to be a fop. Cf. *Florentius* (*Rambler*, No. 18), from the same root; a naïve person in this instance. For contrast Johnson delineates the serious character of *Eumathes* (*Rambler*, Nos. 132, 194, 195), *eumathēs* "quick at learning," the unhappy teacher of a fop. The same name in *Rambler*, No. 181, refers to a wise, learned clergyman. *Prosapius* (*Rambler*, No. 18), from *prosapia* "stock, race, family." *Prosapius*, in order "that the family might not be extinct, married his housekeeper." *Gustulus* (*Rambler*, No. 40), from the diminutive *gustus* "a small dish of food, a snack, relish," values "himself upon the nicety of his palate." Cf. *Gulosulus* (*Rambler*, No. 206), a gourmet and parasite, from *gulosus* "gluttonous, luxurious, dainty." (Note Boswell, *Life*, I, 541, n. 2.) *Pertinax* (*Rambler*, No. 95), a disputatious skeptic, from *pertinax* "that holds fast, clings firmly, very tenacious." Cf. Ben Jonson's gamester *Pertinax* Surly, in *The Alchemist*. (Johnson had ready access to Jonson's works; see item 123 in the *Sale Catalogue*.) The military virtue of stubbornness made *Pertinax* a popular name for soldiers. L. R. Dean, *A Study of the Cognomina of Soldiers of the Roman Legion* (Princeton, 1916), p. 65.

²⁹ Boswell, *Life*, III, 333.

³⁰ Cf. the collector types in the *Tatler*, Nos. 158, 216 (Tom Folio, Nicholas Gimcrack). "Life," says Johnson, "is surely given us for higher purposes than to gather what our ancestors have wisely thrown away. . . ." *Rambler*, No. 121.

gazettes, so that the name is aptly derived from *chartophylax* < χαρτοφύλαξ "a keeper of archives."⁸¹ An interesting parallel is that of Chapman's *Bussy d'Ambois*, in which appears Chartophylax, the spirit-guardian of papers, as one of the actors. Another slyly appropriate designation in the same essay is that of Cantilenus, who dedicated himself to the collection of old ballads, "for he considered them as the genuine records of the national taste." This satirical portrait, identified by Mrs. Thrale as Bishop Percy's, typifies Johnson's distinctive ability to establish a value judgment through his remarkable knowledge of Latin. The derivative noun *cantilena* offered Johnson the means of a happy improvisation. In classical usage the word had attached a disparaging connotation to its literal meaning of "an oft-repeated song, an old song or air." Cicero, for example, thought of *cantilena* as something no better than a "jingle," or as a verse meant for childish mentalities, an "old sing-song out of the schools." It is these Ciceronian implications that Johnson undoubtedly intends in his own adaptation of *cantilena*. For a full understanding of the name Cantilenus it becomes necessary to examine briefly Johnson's personal relations with Bishop Percy. Theirs was a frictional association compounded of mutual admiration and animosity. Although Johnson held Percy to be better than a "mere antiquarian," he could apparently find no great value in the crude ballad forms that commanded Percy's literary attention. Consequently, the derogatory *Rambler* name mirrors Johnson's estimate of Percy's literary judgment in anticipation of the *Reliques* (1765) and his own parodic version of Percy's ballad "The Hermit of Warkworth."⁸² Almost equally subtle is the name *Hirsutus*, applied to the person who "had very carefully amassed all the *English* books that were printed in the black character." From the secondary and figurative meaning of *hirsutus* "rude, unpolished," it becomes apparent that Johnson is making fun of those who value books only for their age; the collectors, probably, of rude examples of printing such as incunabula and primitive Gothic. But at the same time he is exposing his mild contempt for the rude unpolished age with which black-letter volumes are identified.⁸³

Frequently in his periodical essays Johnson engaged in philosophical

⁸¹ Chartophylax was perhaps the inspiration for Warton's designation of Palaeophilus < παλαιός "old"—φίλος, i.e., loving antiquity or what is old, in the *Adventurer*, Nos. 89, 105.

⁸² *Thraliana*, pp. 398-99; Cicero, *Letters to his Friends*, trans. W. G. Williams (London and New York, 1928), XLxx.2; *De Oratore*, I.xxiii.105; Boswell, *Life*, *passim*; *Poems of Samuel Johnson*, ed. D. N. Smith and E. L. McAdam (Oxford, 1941), pp. 156-59. It should not be overlooked, however, that despite any surface displeasure, Johnson aided Percy with the dedication to the *Reliques*. W. P. Courtney and D. N. Smith, *Bibliography of Samuel Johnson* (Oxford, 1915), p. 111. The identities of other living models for Johnson's satirical sketches are suggested in *Thraliana*, pp. 161-62, 766.

⁸³ It is notable that Johnson himself was interested in early examples of printing, though not for purposes of collecting. Boswell, *Life*, V, 459; and cf. *Life*, II, 120.

speculation on the subjects of human failings and discontent. He liked to discourse in serious or semi-serious tones about manifested maladjustments to the social status quo, and on such broad subjects as toleration, injustice, unwarranted expectations, carping complaints, and shyness. To each spokesman of these thoughts Johnson applies an appropriate name that exemplifies the problem under censure. He has little patience, for example, with those who fail to adapt themselves to their occupations and who seek, instead, a happiness derived by divorce from the familiar patterns of existence. Prototypes of this attitude are Misocapaelus (*Rambler*, Nos. 116, 123) and Mercator (*Adventurer*, No. 102).⁸⁴ Misocapaelus discovers that wealth earned in trade does not bring him the prestige of a gentleman. When he retires with the hope of achieving gentility, he cannot rid himself of the fancied stigma of his mercantile associations. His discontent is crystallized in the straightforward name *μισο-κάπηλος* "hating the hawker or peddler," or less literally, one who hates trade. Johnson reverses his technique in the name Misargyrus (*Adventurer*, Nos. 34, 41, 53, 62), giving an ironic mobility to the sign so that it becomes connotative of his detestation of indebtedness and money-lending. Originally, the name Misargyrides was formed comically by Plautus from *μισαργυρία* to delineate a usurer. But its specific meaning is "money-hater," and it is this ironic signification that Johnson applies to Misargyrus, a debtor who writes from Fleet Prison about the evils of indebtedness. Fielding employs a similar name and technique in the character of Misargurus, who writes from Bedlam (April 1, 1752) to suggest the elimination of social and economic inequalities through the elimination of money.⁸⁵

Borrowing from Terence, Johnson applies the name Thraso to a correspondent who writes seriously and rationally of fear, a popular eighteenth-century periodical subject, as a universal condition which must not be judged as cowardice (*Rambler*, No. 126).⁸⁶ Since Ter-

⁸⁴ Mercator, whose protest parallels that of Misocapaelus, is of clear enough etymology to obviate discussion. Note the like-named types in Plautus' *Asinaria*, Jonson's *Volpone* (the three Mercatori), and Richard Bathurst's *Adventurer*, No. 25.

⁸⁵ Plautus, *Mostellaria*; Fielding, *Covent-Garden Journal*, No. 35. Associated in prison with Johnson's Misargyrus are Serenus, who has a naive belief in friendship, and Candidus, a spendthrift.

It is now reasonably certain that Johnson wrote all four of the Misargyrus papers. For the evidence see L. F. Powell, "Johnson's Part in *The Adventurer*," *RES*, III (1927), 420-29; also Courtney and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 39; and Sir John Hawkins, *Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.*, 2nd edition (London, 1787), pp. 294, 309. Cf. Boswell, *Life*, I, 252.

⁸⁶ *Rambler*, No. 126, is a retort to the acrid complaints of Tranquilla in *Rambler*, No. 119, about feminine behavior in men. A similar marriage theme occurs in the *Tatler*, Nos. 79, 85, 104, 184, 270, with Tranquillus as the lover. Chalmers has suggested the popularity of this and allied themes in eighteenth-century essay serials. Preface to the *Tatler*, Vol. I of *British Essayists*. Thraso is a stock figure who may be likened to the Miles Gloriosus of Plautus and Bias of Menander's *Κολαξ*. The name Thraso also occurs in classical history. John Lempriere, *Bibliotheca Classica*, 10th American edition (New York, 1838), p. 634.

ence's braggart soldier Thraso in *The Eunuch* has inspired the well-known adjective Thrasonian for anyone given to braggadocio, the literal meaning of Thraso in the *Rambler* is obvious enough. The Johnsonian correspondent Thraso, however, is not a braggart. Rather, he is a level-headed psychologist who pleads with his readers for toleration and examination of the facts concerning accusations of fear and cowardice. He urges an awareness of the contradistinctions between fear and caution, between bravery and foolhardiness. Then he argues,

Thus, Sir, though cowardice is universally defined too close and anxious an attention to personal safety, there will be found scarcely any fear, however excessive in its degree, or unreasonable in its object, which will be allowed to characterize a coward. Fear is a passion which every man feels so frequently predominant in his own breast, that he is unwilling to hear it censured with great asperity; and, perhaps, if we confess the truth, the same restraint which would hinder a man from declaiming against the frauds of any employment among those who profess it, should withhold him from treating fear with contempt among human beings.

The subscription in this instance affords a familiar as well as paradoxical channel of identification. Since the popular Terentian figure was so well known in the eighteenth century, his name would be associated readily with the problem of fear and cowardice. Johnson, therefore, found it convenient and apt to assign to this figure known only as a coward the dialectical repudiation of the very condition of cowardice. In a more jocular tone but with a similarly serious purpose, Johnson draws "Suspirius the screech-owl" (*Rambler*, No. 59), typical of an entire species who complain about everything; "their only care is to crush the rising hope, to damp the kindling transport, allay the golden hours of gayety with the hateful dross of grief and suspicion." The type, if not the name, is founded upon classical precedent. Traditionally the screech-owl is a bird of ill-omen; so Johnson is well advised in transferring specialized symbolic properties through a name that connotes woe. It is of interest, hence, to note the significant derivation from *suspirium* and the meaning that is closest to Johnson's—"a sighing, a sigh." In short, Suspirius constantly sighs despondently about troubles real or imagined.⁸⁷

Frequently Johnson assumes a thoroughly sober philosophic attitude which is revealed as clearly in the metaphorical designations that he uses as in the actual contents of the periodical essays. Three of his typical observations are on prostitution, servitude, and immortality. Among his most earnest condemnations of society is that embodied in *Rambler*, Nos. 170 and 171, in which he tells the story of Misella, who was forced into a life of prostitution. Without subtlety, Johnson identi-

⁸⁷ Note the myth of Ascalaphus, who was transformed into a screech-owl as a bird of ill-omen. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, trans. F. J. Miller (London and New York, 1922), V.539 ff., X.452-53. Cf. *Spectator*, No. 46. Goldsmith patterned Croaker in *The Good-Natured Man*, which Johnson praised, after Suspirius. Boswell, *Life*, I, 213, II, 48.

fies the sufferer by a derivation from the adjective *misellus* "poor, wretched, unfortunate."²⁸ Johnson's compassion is again evident in the appellation *Zosima*, the signature of a maiden who relates her unhappy experiences after her arrival in London to take domestic service (*Rambler*, No. 12). There is an obvious relationship between this name and one that appeared in his "Essay on Epitaphs" a decade earlier. At that time he had written of an unknown slave, translating her epitaph from Greek into Latin and then into English: "*Zosima*, who, in her life, could only have her body enslaved, now finds her body, likewise, set at liberty."²⁹ Johnson's bitter view of English domestic service thus becomes self-evident. In a comparably serious mood Johnson sets down the reflections of *Athanatus* (*Rambler*, No. 54) which have been inspired by a visit to the deathbed of a friend. *Athanatus* is concerned with the temporal nature of human conduct and the gravity induced by the approach of death. "It seems to me remarkable," he writes, "that death increases our veneration for the good, and extenuates our hatred of the bad." Such sober thoughts on the transitory matters of existence are properly expressed by one whose very designation is a reminder of eternity; for *Athanatus* is drawn directly from *ἀθάνατος* "immortal."

Sharing a widespread eighteenth-century opposition to pedantry, Johnson makes a metaphorical extension of his own distaste through the portrayal of *Gelidus*, an abstract philosopher (*Rambler*, No. 24). This recluse, who is exemplified as "of a temper naturally cool and equal," is further described as follows: "He has totally divested himself of all human sensations: he has neither eye for beauty, nor ear for complaint; he neither rejoices at the good fortune of his nearest friend, nor mourns for any public or private calamity." Unlike *Gelasimus*, *Gelidus* makes no concessions to the outer world. To give full flavor to the frigid aloof temperament of this type, Johnson turns to the suitably literal translation of *gelidus* "icy cold, icy, frosty," and derives a name that typifies such abstraction and reflects his own attitude of disapproval. But the word has another, more intensified value which suggests a comparable quality in Johnson's figure. *Gelidus* may also mean "icy cold or still with death," a condition that fits the *Rambler* character. His, to be sure, is intellectual rather than physical suspension or death. Yet in Johnson's usage the two degrees of meaning (that is, the first literal meaning and the second specialized meaning) are collaterally implicit. *Gelidus* is totally lacking in human

²⁸ Boswell, *Life*, I, 223: "Johnson's language . . . must be allowed to be too masculine for the delicate gentleness of female writing. His ladies, therefore, seem strangely formal, even to ridicule; and are well denominated by the names which he has given them. . . ." The relatively obvious but pertinent name of *Misellus* is the tag that Johnson has given to a depressed, humiliated author in *Rambler*, No. 16.

²⁹ Johnson's *Works*, V, 266; *Poems of Samuel Johnson*, pp. 114, 212. The epigram was included with Johnson's translations from the *Greek Anthology*. Cf. Betty Broom, *Idler*, No. 26.

sensitivity and in social worth; hence he is "dead." And he is totally lacking in animate warmth; hence he is "icy." Apparently Johnson drew the sketch of Gelidus from real life, models having been ascribed as either the Reverend John Colson, a mathematician of Cambridge and Rochester, or a Mr. Coulson, an Oxford contemporary of Johnson.⁴⁰

The opprobrium inherent in such an epithet as Altilia (*Rambler*, No. 182) is reflective of Johnson's special view of old maids. At the same time, however, the transitive meaning of the symbol conveys a conventional derisive notion that Johnson shared with his contemporaries. Indeed, it has always been popular to depict these unattached women as fat and rich, and Johnson holds to the tradition, suggesting in the name Altilia both of these levels of meaning. In its original usage the derivative adjective *altilis* had the meanings of "fattened, fat, full, large." Then Plautus enlarged the word beyond its modification of strictly physical properties, giving to it a figurative connotation in association with a dowry—*prohibet divitiis maximis, dote altili atque optima* ("the quantities of money, the fat, rich dowry she stands in the way of!").⁴¹ It is this latter figurative meaning that has particular value for Johnson, whose Altilia is identified primarily by her substantial legacy. She is an aging spinster with a comfortable accumulation of wealth, "for whose favour fifteen nephews and nieces were in perpetual contention." Simultaneously, then, the name Altilia suggests a traditional combination of old-maid traits, wealth and stoutness of body. By comically dramatic irony, Johnson associates with Altilia the male opportunist Leviculus, who offers to her his "vows and sighs, and flatteries and protestations." The characteristic diminutive derived from *levis* is again expressive of Johnson's attitude toward a particular form of sycophancy and should be examined etymologically for two equally pertinent meanings. The adjective *leviculus* means: (1) "very small, trivial, insignificant"; (2) "somewhat light-minded, vain." The original adjective *levis* also has intensified figurative meanings of "capricious, fickle, untrue," and so forth, that contribute to the delineation of Leviculus. For dramatic contrast, consequently, Johnson uses the foil-name of this errant lover to ridicule a type marked by social triviality and vanity, representing Leviculus as physically minuscular in the shadow of the buxom Altilia. And concurrently he exposes Leviculus as a hypocritical toady and legacy-hunter whom he considers both base and inconsequential.

⁴⁰ *Thraliana*, p. 162, n. 3. A pedant Johnson defines in the *Dictionary* as "a man vain of low knowledge; a man awkwardly ostentatious of his literature." Pedantry is "awkward ostentation of needless learning." Johnson further illustrates his impatience with social aloofness and incompatibility in his delineation of Verecundulus, who because of his early secluded life is painfully shy in society (*Rambler*, No. 159). The name is a diminutive founded on *verecundia*, *verecundor*, pert. to shyness or aloofness.

⁴¹ *Cistellaria*, fragments, II.306. Cf. *Altilis* in *Adventurer*, No. 74, whom Johnson identifies simply as "an old maid."

Brief note of other exemplars of the *Leviculus* genre adds emphasis to Johnson's scorn. *Philotryphus*, as one instance (*Rambler*, No. 39), is "a man vain, glittering and thoughtless." The Latin term has a symbolically apt Greek derivation *φιλότροφος* "love of luxury, daintiness." The name *Fungoso* (*Rambler*, No. 119) finds its amusing precedent in Jonson and Pope.⁴² Stemming from *fungosus* "full of holes, spongy, fungous," its transitive application is to a species of parasites. One of the dreary suitors complained of by *Tranquilla* in answer to *Hymenaeus*, *Fungoso* has marked limitations, "for having been bred in a counting-house, he spoke a language unintelligible in any other place." He is as absorptively parasitic as a sponge since his sole interest is accumulation. So, for that matter, is he spongelike in his intellectual life, drawing information from others without bestowing any in return. There is happy irony in the name *Dentatus* in the same essay, with its literal meaning of "toothed, having teeth." According to Seneca, the name in classical times was applied to persons of fierce and warlike nature, the teeth of course representing weapons. But as Johnson sardonically identifies *Dentatus*, his teeth are merely tools of mastication; for this suitor's ferocity is limited to the cuisine.⁴³

Parasitism evokes some of Johnson's most fecund and contemptuous metaphors. His opinion in the *Dictionary* is expressive, when he defines a parasite as "one that frequents rich tables, and earns his welcome by flattery." Representative of his most meaningful names are those applied to legacy-hunters; and especially symbolic because of its classical precedent is the name *Captator* (*Rambler*, Nos. 197, 198), with its literal meaning of "one who eagerly reaches after, endeavors to obtain, or strives for something." In its most specific application as in the *captatores* of Juvenal, Horace, and Petronius, *Captator* is "one who strives for an inheritance, a legacy-hunter."⁴⁴ Johnson himself offers the clue when he has his correspondent admit:

I am, Mr. *Rambler*, a legacy-hunter; and, as every man is willing to think well of the tribe in which his name is registered, you will forgive my vanity, if I remind you that the legacy-hunter, however degraded by an ill-compounded appellation in our barbarous language, was known, as I am told, in ancient Rome, by the sonorous titles of *Captator* and *Hæredipeta*.

⁴² *Every Man Out of His Humour* (Jonson also refers to "some idle Fungoso" in *Cynthia's Revels*, IV, i); *Essay on Criticism*, line 328.

⁴³ Seneca, *Moral Essays*, trans. J. W. Basore (London and New York, 1932), II.155, 233, 329; *Epistles*, trans. R. M. Gummere (London and New York, 1917), CXX.19. A type as vapid as *Dentatus* is *Flosculus* in *Rambler*, No. 119. The name denoting his foppishness is taken from a rare diminutive meaning "little flower." Cf. *Floscula* in Lyly's *Endymion*.

⁴⁴ Juvenal, *Satires*, trans. G. G. Ramsay (London and New York, 1918), p. 76, n. 2, VI.38-42; Horace, *Satires*, trans. H. R. Fairclough (London and New York, 1926), II.iii.142-57, II.v; Petronius *Arbiter*, *Satyricon*, trans. Michael Heseltine (London and New York, 1925), p. 141. The parasite is a classic stock figure; e.g., Plautus' *Asinaria*, *The Two Bacchises*, *The Captives*. See Johnson's *Vanity of Human Wishes*, lines 275-90.

Two closely related names are Chrysalus (*Rambler*, No. 112) with its Plautine antecedent,⁴⁵ and Chrysophilus (*Rambler*, No. 35), both characters being versions of legacy-hunters. Both are derived from Latin indirectly through Greek etymology: *chrysos* < χρυσός "gold," χρυσοφίλος "one who loves gold." Identifiable in this same category is Vafer (*Rambler*, No. 162), from the adjective *vafer* "sly, cunning, crafty, artful, subtle." Vafer is a notably unctuous satellite who seeks his master's fortune by acceding to his constant demands for flattery. Again, in this successfully transitive symbol, Johnson leans upon the usage of predecessors, especially Steele (*Tatler*, No. 56).⁴⁶

Misocolax (*Rambler*, No. 126) lives up to his identity by his hatred of flattery, objecting strenuously to the pressure that vain people put upon him to admire their possessions.⁴⁷ Johnson's employment of this name has a substantial classical foundation. *Colax* < Κόλαξ "The Flatterer" is a popular title in the comedies of Menander, Naevius, and Plautus.⁴⁸ Johnson himself leaves few doubts about his attitude when in the *Dictionary* he defines a flatterer as "a fawner; a wheedler; one who endeavours to gain favour by pleasing falsities." Johnson prefaces Κόλαξ with μωο to objectify one who very literally hates enforced flattery. As he concludes.

To please is a laudable and elegant ambition, and is properly rewarded with honest praise; but to seize applause by violence, and call out for commendation, without knowing, or caring to know, whether it be given from conviction, is a species of tyranny by which modesty is oppressed and sincerity corrupted.

By an adept ironical turn Johnson makes the historically classic name of Thrasybulus a clever part of *Rambler*, No. 162. The character so named is an old man who glories in the bought adulations of Vafer and tyrannically exacts the fulfillment of his own whims. As Johnson writes: "All contrariety to his own opinion shocked him like a violation of some natural right, and all recommendation of his affairs to his own inspection was dreaded by him as a summons to torture."

⁴⁵ See note 11.

⁴⁶ Steele's parasite is Will Vafer, an "easy gentleman." Conventional aspects of cupidity are synthesized in the name Avaro (*Rambler*, No. 18). Cf. *Tatler*, No. 25, and Molière's *L'Avare*, which Johnson knew. Boswell, *Life*, V, 277. Johnson once expressed his attitude when he said, "You despise a man for avarice, but do not hate him." Boswell, *Life*, III, 71. And again: "No man was born a miser, because no man was born to possession. Every man is born *cupidus*—desirous of getting; but not *avarus*—desirous of keeping." Boswell, *Life*, III, 322.

⁴⁷ Females who seek out the flattery of Misocolax are Calista (a conventional, mythological name for a maiden), Melania (μελάνια "blackness, black spots"), Fulgentia (from *fulgeo* "to flash or glitter"). Cf. his contemptuous attitude toward flattery in *Vanity of Human Wishes*, lines 335 ff.

⁴⁸ The authority for the ascription to Naevius and Plautus is Terence, although there is now only fragmentary evidence of the *Colax* plays. Terence, trans. John Sergeant (London and New York, 1926). See *The Eunuch*, Prologue, lines 25 ff. Terence borrowed the character of Gnatho the flatterer and Thraso the boastful soldier from Menander. Menander, Κόλαξ, fragment, trans. F. G. Allinson (London and New York, 1921), p. 382. Plautus, *Colax*, fragment, V.357.

Combining as he does two distinct personalities under one appellative, Johnson makes it possible to interpret the name as either a straightforward or a satirical usage. In one sense the *Rambler* type may be related to the original Thrasybulus of ancient times who liberated Athens from the thirty tyrants. Taken thus as a refraction of the Athenian statesman, Johnson's figure becomes in satirical transition a powerful indictment of blandiloquence. But the name Thrasybulus provides another kind of mobile sign when the type is associated with the Milesian despot of like name, making possible a direct connection with the *Rambler* despot's name. The name recurs frequently in classical writings, in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Quintilian, for instance, who perhaps provided Johnson with his information.⁴⁰

Extremely uncomplimentary portraiture is given to two companion types, unattractive women who press the advantage of their wealth. Like Altilia, they are old maids. Turpicula (*Rambler*, No. 189), an heiress, is singularly ugly, a fact well supported by her symbolic name, which is drawn from the adjectival diminutive *turpiculus* "ugly, foul, deformed." And the obvious justness of the designation is again borne out by her description.

Turpicula had a distorted shape and a dark complexion; yet, when the impudence of adulation had ventured to tell her of the commanding dignity of her motion, and the soft enchantment of her smile, she was easily convinced, that she was the delight or torment of every eye, and that all who gazed upon her felt the fire of envy or love.

The appellative, moreover, is to be associated with the related adjective *turpis*, which bears the figurative meanings of "base, shameful, dishonorable," and the like. For it is Johnson's implication that Turpicula is deformed not only physically but intellectually and ethically as well. As a result of such malformation: "She, therefore, neglected the culture of an understanding which might have supplied the defects of her form, and applied all her care to the decoration of her person; for she considered that more could judge of beauty than of wit, and was, like the rest of human beings, in haste to be admired." Similarly unappealing is the metaphorical image of Tetrica (*Rambler*, No. 74), who externalizes a peevishness to which she thinks her fortune entitles her.

No disease of the mind can more fatally disable it from benevolence, the chief duty of social beings, than ill-humour or peevishness; for though it breaks not out in paroxysms of outrage, nor bursts into clamour, turbulence, and bloodshed, it wears out happiness by slow corrosion, and small injuries incessantly repeated. It may be considered as the canker of life, that destroys its vigour and checks its improvement; that creeps on with hourly depredations, and taints and vitiates what it cannot consume.

⁴⁰ Herodotus (I.20-23, V.92) records the despotism of Thrasybulus. References to Thrasybulus the liberator are available in many sources, among them Thucydides, trans. C. F. Smith (London and Cambridge, 1935), VIII. *passim*; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, trans. C. L. Brownson (London and New York, 1918), *passim*; Quintilian, *op. cit.*, III.vi.26, VII.iv.44.

Endowed with such enervating qualities, peevish Tetrica lives according to "a principle of disapprobation" and complaint. The transitive appellation goes back primarily to the adjective *tetricus*, whose meanings of "forbidding, harsh, crabbed" are especially applicable to Tetrica. The harsh crabbed qualities predominate clearly enough. But she is also forbidding in her adamant fixity. There is about her a rocklike stubbornness that invites further comparison with the hill in the Sabine territory that has been recorded classically as "*Tetrica rupes*" and "*Tetrica mons*." Johnson may well have been thinking of the forbidding hill when he drew the repellent lady to typify his notion of adamant peevishness. There was, indeed, a tradition of identification with the mountain, according to the observation of Lempriere. He noted that "*Tetrica . . . was very rugged and difficult of access, whence the epithet *Tetricus* was applied to persons of a morose and melancholy disposition.*"⁵⁰ The evidence aims patently at Johnson's familiarity with this tradition.

With heartfelt consistence Johnson intensified his detestation of patronage through the application of pertinent epithets. Thus, in one of his typical allegories (*Rambler*, No. 27) he relates the unhappy adventures of Eubulus,⁵¹ who seeks preferment from a group of extremely uncertain friends. Each in this little fable represents one of the many vagaries of patronage. Of perhaps most interesting symbolism is the name Hippodamus. In the *Rambler* essay his constant attendance at the Newgate horse races always interferes with his aiding Eubulus. Now the name is clearly based upon the classical myth of Castor, who was famous for training and managing horses, and whose poetical epithet is Hippodamus or ἵπποδάμος "horse-tamer." Another form of inconstancy is synthesized in the metaphorical name Vagario, from the verb *vagor* "to roam, range, rove," etc. This would-be benefactor, having promised to introduce Eubulus to an important individual for patronage, promptly departs on a journey. Charinus, like the others in the group, finds social matters more pressing than Eubulus' future. The extreme foppishness of his character is denoted by the Greek derivation *Xapivos* from χάρις "grace, favor, gratitude," meanings that are quite in keeping with the nature of Charinus. There are classical precedents for this name in the *Lady of Andros* of

⁵⁰ *Aeneid*, VII.713, "*Tetricae horrentis rupes*"; Silius Italicus, *Punica*, trans. J. D. Duff (London and Cambridge, 1934), VIII.417, "*Tetrica rupes*"; Varro, *On Agriculture*, II.i.5, "*Tetrica mons*." Johnson parallels the usage of these writers to the extent of employing the same feminine form. Lempriere, *op. cit.*, p. 302. Bathurst, in *Adventurer*, No. 25, utilizes the name Tetrica to identify a type similar to Johnson's.

⁵¹ Eubulus is a common name in classical history. One person so identified was an opponent of Demosthenes at Athens; another was a comic poet of Athens (ca. 375 B.C.). Camden (*op. cit.*, p. 127) has cited Eubulus as a typical Greek surname. See the characters by this name in *Gorboduc* and *Spectator*, No. 49. A "Letter on Du Halde's History of China," signed *Eubulus*, has been ascribed to Johnson by John Nichols (*Gentleman's Magazine*, LVI [January, 1785], 6 n.). It appeared in *Gentleman's Magazine*, VIII (July, 1738), 365-66.

Terence and the *Pseudolus* of Plautus.⁸² The name Demochares (*Rambler*, No. 101) is meant to transmit the notion of great wealth and gives further evidence of Johnson's erudition. As Johnson delineates him, Demochares is a wealthy patron and, at least in affluence, is reminiscent of the like-named personality in one of the tales of Apuleius.⁸³

A fluent command of languages coupled with an ethological perception enabled Johnson to use symbolic names with an acumen matched by no other English writer. The list of practitioners who followed Johnson includes many distinguished names, among them: Scott, Dickens, Thackeray, George Eliot, Hardy, H. G. Wells,⁸⁴ Aldous Huxley, T. S. Eliot. Their use of symbolic names has varied in degrees of success and intensity. But none has made so excellently operative a literary vehicle of the device as has Johnson. He caused his names to objectify his own experiences decisively and at the same time to reflect many standard eighteenth-century attitudes. Only a few of Johnson's most representative names have been examined in this study, and there has been no attempt at all to analyze the obvious English names, which are especially predominant in the *Idler*, or the conventional classic and Oriental names like Phyllis, Belinda, Chloris, Hamet, Omar, Raschid, and numerous others. These names are such common property that exegesis would fail to profit Johnson or any other individual writer. The mobility of Johnson's nominal symbols, in the significant sense discussed in this essay, demonstrates his learning and literary flexibility and, concurrently, exemplifies the remarkable fluidity of language inherent in a conventional device. Tacitly Johnson acknowledged the tendency of metaphoric names to transfer ideas meaningfully from one entity to another, and, as a result, he made them an effective part of his periodical essays.

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⁸² Cf. Mrs. Carter's Chariessa in *Rambler*, No. 99. The original *χαρίσσα*, a Theban statuette, also has the root *χαρίς*.

⁸³ Lucius Apuleius, *The Golden Ass*, trans. W. Adlington, rev. S. Gaselee (London and New York, 1935), pp. 163 ff. An account of Demochares, Athenian orator and historian, is recorded by Cicero, *De Oratore*, II.95. The statesman who desires to hold office by pleasing his constituents is designated in this essay as Eutyches, a name defined by Camden (*op. cit.*, p. 51) as "Happyman." Note the subscription Hypertatus (*Rambler*, No. 117) for a writer who lives in a garret. The epithet is obvious, coming from *υπερτατος* "uppermost, highest."

⁸⁴ C. O. Parsons, "Character Names in the Waverley Novels," *PMLA*, XLIX (1934), 276-94.

CHARLES LAMB TO JOHN BRITTON
AN UNPUBLISHED LETTER

By GEORGE L. BARNETT

In 1937 John H. Birss pointed out the existence of an unpublished letter from Lamb to John Britton that had been offered for sale in 1902 by Edwin A. Denham, of New York.¹ He printed only the single sentence quoted in the sales catalog. On February 28, 1944, this letter was presented to the New York Public Library by its last private owner, Charles Scribner. The one-page, small quarto is addressed to "John Britton, Esq. / 10 Tavistock Place / Russel Square." The complete text of the letter, here published for the first time, follows:

Dear Sir,

I am glad that you approve my speculations, and thank you very sincerely for the mark of your approbation. I did not know the extent of Malone's atrocity; had I been churchwarden of Stratford, I would have set the knave in the stocks. I shall take an early opportunity of calling in Tavistock Place.

Believe me,

Dear Sir,

Your obliged,
C Lamb

20 Russell St
25 Nov 1818

As you are curious in such things, perhaps you would be gratified with seeing a portrait of Milton which my brother has pick'd up. Any time that you come so far eastward as the India house, I shall be happy to accompany you to see it.²

The reference made by Lamb in his postscript to his Milton portrait is the reason that Mr. Scribner selected the New York Public Library as the recipient of this interesting letter. The bulk of his large accumulation of Lamb manuscripts and books is housed in a special collection bearing his name at Princeton University; but since Lamb's Milton portrait now hangs in the Bibliographical Room of the New York Public Library, it is fitting that this letter should have gone to that institution.

Gerald D. McDonald has collected Lamb's epistolary references to this picture in which he took so much pride and has traced the progress of the painting through its various owners from Lamb to its final resting place.³ The first reference, in a letter to Wordsworth dated April 7, 1815, tells us that it is Lamb's brother John who has "picked up an undoubtable picture of Milton. He gave a few shillings for it . . . and

¹ John H. Birss, "A New Letter of Charles Lamb," *N&Q*, CLXXIII (Oct. 16, 1937), 278.

² This item is reproduced by permission of the New York Public Library.

³ Gerald D. McDonald, "Charles Lamb as a Collector," *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, XXXVIII (September, 1934), 707-12.

you need only see it to be sure that it is the original of the heads in the Tonson Editions, with which we are all so well familiar." Later in the same month, Lamb's enthusiasm again shows itself in another letter to Wordsworth. It is at this place, chronologically, that our present letter comes, although Mr. McDonald, writing before the Library had acquired it, was not apparently aware of the Milton reference. After John Lamb died on October 26, 1821, and all his property, including the Milton, was bequeathed to Charles, we meet numerous references to the picture in letters from Lamb to Wordsworth, Robert Southey, Bernard Barton, and John Dibdin. Finally, in 1833, when his adopted daughter, Emma Isola, married his friend and publisher, Edward Moxon, the Milton served as Lamb's wedding present. Mr. McDonald relates how the portrait disappeared after Moxon's death until it was purchased at auction by Bernard Quaritch in 1881, in which year it was sold to Robert Lenox Kennedy, president of the Board of Trustees of the Lenox Library, who presented it that fall to the Lenox Library.

The letter under present consideration is the only known letter from Lamb to John Britton. We have no record of Lamb's ever visiting him, as he proposes, nor do we know whether Britton ever viewed the Milton portrait. Yet there is evidence that Britton knew Lamb as well as his work. In his *Autobiography*, published in 1850, he mentions Lamb as one of the writers who made the *London Magazine* popular.⁴ And in an appendix to that publication he writes: "Amongst his [Shakespeare's] modern *Literary Commentators and Biographers*, of whom all have been, and some still are, personally known to and respected by me, I may especially mention . . . Edmund Malone, James Boswell, S. T. Coleridge, Wm. Hazlitt, Chas. Lamb . . . J. P. Collier. . . ."⁵ In another work he refers to "the two brilliant intellectual planets in the hemisphere of talent, Coleridge and Lamb."⁶

John Britton (1771-1857) was a well-known antiquary and "one of the most continuously productive writers and editors of his time."⁷ Among his writings was a pamphlet entitled *Remarks on the Monumental Bust of Shakespeare*. According to Britton:

In the year 1814, I incited Mr. George Bullock to make a cast of the Monumental Bust of the Poet, and afterwards obtained reduced copies of the head for the gratification of many Shaksperians. From the same Bust, I also caused a very beautiful and truthful picture to be painted by my late valued friend, Thomas Phillips, Esq., R.A., and had an equally faithful copy in mezzotint, engraved from that picture; the plate of which has long since been destroyed. To promote

⁴ *Autobiography of John Britton* (London, 1850), I, 297.

⁵ *Appendix to Britton's Auto-biography* (London, 1850), p. 43.

⁶ *Reminiscences of Literary London from 1779-1853 by Dr. Thomas Rees, with extensive additions by John Britton, F.S.A., edited by a Book Lover* (New York, 1896), p. 150.

⁷ *DNB*, VI, 361. His best-known works are *Architectural Antiquities of Great Britain*, 4 vols. (1805-1814); *Cathedral Antiquities of England*, 14 vols. (1814-1835); and *Beauties of Wiltshire* (1825).

respect for, and confidence in the original Bust and its graphic representations, I wrote an Essay to present to each purchaser of the print, and therein endeavoured to justify my firm conviction that the Stratford Effigy was the most authentic and genuine Portrait of the Bard.⁸

The engraved representation of the Bust was issued with the *Remarks* on April 23, 1816.

Which of Lamb's "speculations" it was that prompted Britton's "approbation" is a matter of conjecture. Perhaps it was Lamb's *Works* as a whole, published several months earlier that same year, or one of the essays in those two volumes. Since Britton's communication, in part at least, concerned Shakespeare, it may have been the essay entitled "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare," in which Lamb may be said to have *speculated* on the comparative unfitness of the Bard's plays for stage representation. Certainly, Lamb's epistolary reference to "Malone's atrocity," following immediately his expression of thanks for "the mark of your approbation," leaves little doubt that Britton had sent him a copy of his recent *Remarks*; for in the course of this essay Britton says that in 1793 "Mr. Malone caused it [the Bust] to be covered over with one or more coats of white paint; and thus at once destroyed its original character, and greatly injured the expression of the face."⁹ It is just possible that Lamb's choice of the word *mark* was a characteristic attempt at a pun.

The story of Malone's "atrocity" impressed Lamb so deeply that, in his "Detached Thoughts on Books and Reading," published almost four years later, he again prescribes the stocks for "the wretched Malone" and for the sexton as well, even though as Lamb now tells the story it was Malone himself who applied the whitewash:

he bribed the sexton of Stratford church to let him white-wash the painted effigy of old Shakspeare, which stood there, in rude but lively fashion depicted, to the very colour of the cheek, the eye, the eye-brow, hair, the very dress he used to wear—the only authentic testimony we had, however imperfect, of these curious parts and parcels of him. They covered him over with a coat of white paint. By —, if I had been a justice of peace for Warwickshire, I would have clapt both commentator and sexton fast in the stocks, for a pair of meddling sacrilegious varlets.¹⁰

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⁸ *Appendix*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14; the *Remarks* are reprinted in the *Appendix*.

¹⁰ *Works of Charles and Mary Lamb*, ed. E. V. Lucas (London, 1903), II, 174.

MACAULAY'S THEORY OF POETRY IN *MILTON*

By FREDERICK L. JONES

The origin of Macaulay's well-known theory of poetry as set forth in paragraphs 10-19 of the famous *Essay on Milton* has never, I believe, been examined in detail. Though I regard the theory as absurd, it has honorable antecedents and has been taken seriously by later generations, and would therefore seem worthy of an inquiry as to its sources.¹

"We think," Macaulay wrote, "that, as civilization advances, poetry almost necessarily declines" (p. 4).² And again: "In an enlightened age there will be much intelligence, much science, much philosophy, abundance of just classification and subtle analysis, abundance of wit and eloquence, abundance of verses, and even of good ones; but little poetry. Men will judge and compare; but they will not create" (p. 7).

The best poetry, he says, is produced by primitive or semibarbarous people because their imagination, like that of children, is stronger, having a wider scope for stimulus and operation in that exact knowledge has not banished the constant state of wonder and fear in which they live. Though they are adults, they think and feel like children; as Little Red Riding-hood and the wolf are realities to the civilized child, so are the dryads, nymphs, monsters, and innumerable divinities to primitive man. Moreover, the uncivilized man thinks and expresses himself in definite, concrete terms, which are essential to poetry. His everyday language is in itself poetical. As civilization advances with the slow accumulation of knowledge, man's thought processes change. The mind becomes more analytical, philosophical, abstract; it deals with general terms rather than with particulars. "Hence the vocabulary of an enlightened society is philosophical" (p. 5), not fitted for the requisite concreteness of poetry. The production of poetry therefore becomes increasingly difficult, as does also the power of civilized man to enjoy poetry. Indeed, "Perhaps no person can be a poet, or can even enjoy poetry, without a certain unsoundness of mind" (p. 6).

If great poetry is produced in an age of advanced enlightenment, the poet labors under tremendous difficulties. He must throw off the customary modes of thought, discard the superincumbent burden of learning, find a new vocabulary, and become again even as a child.³

¹ P. L. Carver's article, "The Sources of Macaulay's *Essay on Milton*," *RES*, VI (1930), 49-62, suggests only that for this part of his essay Macaulay's source was Hazlitt. How inadequate this is, the present article will, I trust, illustrate.

² All references to Macaulay are to the Oxford edition of his *Literary Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review*.

³ "He who, in an enlightened and literary society, aspires to be a greater poet, must first become a little child. He must take to pieces the whole web of his mind. He must unlearn much of that knowledge which has perhaps constituted hitherto his chief title to superiority" (p. 8).

It is for this reason that Milton's achievement was so great. He overcame the handicaps of an enlightened society, vast stores of knowledge, and a variety of remarkable talents. Milton's success was greater than that of semicivilized writers because it was achieved under far greater disadvantages.

The roots of this interesting but mistaken theory of poetry are, of course, to be found in the eighteenth-century idealization of primitive man. But William Hazlitt appears to be the first to bring it above ground as a flourishing young plant. In his hands, however, it remained small and constant in size. The idea was, in fact, one of Hazlitt's pet notions, and was repeated many times, and usually in the same words. His central idea is that though in mechanical things constant improvement can be expected with the progress of science and the accumulation of knowledge, such is not the case with the arts, which depend upon individual genius and are not susceptible of improvement through repetition and increased knowledge. This thought is first expressed by Hazlitt in three short articles, the first two of January 11 and 15, 1814, in the *Morning Chronicle*, and the third of September 11, 1814, in the *Champion*. Some passages from these were used to make up the last two paragraphs of his *Edinburgh Review* (XXV, June, 1815) article on Sismondi's *Literature of the South*; and some passages from the same original articles were combined to make up the last *Round Table* (1817) essay on "Why the Arts Are not Progressive: A Fragment." We again find some of these identical passages in the first and third of the *Lectures on the English Poets*, namely, "On Poetry in General" and "On Shakespeare and Milton." The lectures were delivered in January-February, 1818, at the Surrey Institution, and published later in the same year. Hazlitt's article on the Fine Arts in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1816) also contains an exposition of the topic. With Hazlitt the idea was fully developed early in 1814; subsequent repetitions add little if anything.

In the history of Macaulay's theory of poetry Hazlitt's writings are important. Since the following extracts represent virtually everything Hazlitt had to say on the subject, they will, I trust, justify the space which they require. The first, from the lecture on Shakespeare and Milton, illustrates Hazlitt's central idea:

The greatest poets, the ablest orators, the best painters, and the finest sculptors that the world ever saw, appeared soon after the birth of these arts, and lived in a state of society which was, in other respects, comparatively barbarous. Those arts, which depend on individual genius and incommunicable power, have always leaped at once from infancy to manhood, from the first rude dawn of invention to their meridian height and dazzling lustre, and have in general declined ever after. This is the peculiar distinction and privilege of each, of science and of art:—of the one, never to attain its utmost limit of perfection; and of the other, to arrive at it almost at once.⁴

⁴ *Complete Works of William Hazlitt*, ed. P. P. Howe, Centenary Edition (London and Toronto, 1930-34), V, 45.

The ensuing paragraphs from "On Poetry in General" represent Hazlitt's full development of the topic in that lecture:

It cannot be concealed, however, that the progress of knowledge and refinement has a tendency to circumscribe the limits of the imagination, and to clip the wings of poetry. The province of the imagination is principally visionary, the unknown and undefined: the understanding restores things to their natural boundaries, and strips them of their fanciful pretensions. Hence the history of religious and poetical enthusiasm is much the same; and both have received a sensible shock from the progress of experimental philosophy. It is the undefined and uncommon that gives birth and scope to the imagination; we can only fancy what we do not know. As in looking over the mazes of a tangled wood we fill them with what shapes we please, with ravenous beasts, with caverns vast, and drear enchantments, so in our ignorance of the world about us, we make gods or devils of the first object we see, and set no bounds to the wilful suggestions of our hopes and fears.

And visions, as poetic eyes avow,

Hang on each leaf and cling to every bough.

There can never be another Jacob's dream. Since that time, the heavens have gone farther off, and grown astronomical. They have become averse to the imagination, nor will they return to us on the squares of the distances, or on Doctor Chalmers's Discourses. Rembrandt's picture brings the matter nearer to us. —It is not only the progress of mechanical knowledge, but the necessary advances of civilization that are unfavourable to the spirit of poetry. We not only stand in less awe of the preternatural world, but we can calculate more surely, and look with more indifference, upon the regular routine of this. The heroes of the fabulous ages rid the world of monsters and giants. At present we are less exposed to the vicissitudes of good or evil, to the incursions of wild beasts or "bandit fierce," or to the unmitigated fury of the elements. The time has been that "our fell of hair would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir as life were in it." But the police spoils all; and we now hardly so much as dream of a midnight murder. Macbeth is only tolerated in this country for the sake of the music; and in the United States of America, where the philosophical principles of government are carried still farther in theory and practice, we find that the Beggar's Opera is hooted from the stage. Society, by degrees, is constructed into a machine that carries us safely and insipidly from one end of life to the other, in a very comfortable prose style.

Obscurity her curtain round them drew,

And siren Sloth a dull quietus sung.⁸

It should be immediately apparent that Macaulay's theory goes far beyond Hazlitt's; it is more positive, more fully developed. As far as poetry is concerned, Hazlitt really says nothing more than that "the progress of knowledge and refinement has a *tendency* to circumscribe the limits of the imagination, and to clip the wings of poetry." More exact knowledge has unquestionably made a great number of superstitions untenable, but it has not banished the human imagination and the human heart. Hazlitt does in no way intend to contradict his own earlier statement in the same lecture that "Poetry is the language of the imagination and the passions. It relates to whatever gives immediate pleasure or pain to the human mind. . . . Poetry is the universal language which the heart holds with nature and itself."⁹ Hazlitt has

⁸ *Complete Works*, V, 9-10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, V, 1.

nothing to say about a change in human thought processes and about language becoming more abstract and philosophical and thus less suitable for poetry, or about a modern poet having to become a child again. In fact, he says much that is quite the opposite of such opinions.

Macaulay may, of course, have read Hazlitt's lectures. It seems impossible, however, that he could have read them and selected this one thought for the development of a theory which is completely at odds with Hazlitt's real view of poetry, which is expressed so eloquently in the remainder of "On Poetry in General" and elsewhere.

A theory of poetry which agrees with Macaulay's in almost every detail and is more elaborately presented was available when the *Essay on Milton* was written, and it is more than likely that Macaulay drew his theory almost in toto from this source. This was Thomas Love Peacock's essay *Four Ages of Poetry*, published in the first and only number of Ollier's *Literary Miscellany* in 1820. As is well known, it was this essay which aroused Shelley in Italy to write his famous *Defence of Poetry*, unfortunately unavailable to Macaulay before its publication in 1840. How Macaulay came to read the single number of a relatively obscure periodical, I cannot say; but that he did so is a virtual certainty. That Peacock and Macaulay should independently have developed theories which are in almost every respect identical is extremely improbable.⁷

It is to be regretted that Macaulay took Peacock's essay as a serious development of a theory of poetry instead of what it is: a very clever satire with a sting in its tail, directed against contemporary poetry.⁸ Shelley had sagacity enough to detect its satirical purpose, but at the same time it seemed to him to present too seriously and logically a monstrous view of poetry.

Peacock divides classical poetry into four ages and modern poetry into a corresponding four ages: "The iron age of classical poetry may be called the bardic; the golden, the Homeric; the silver, the Virgilian; and the brass, the Nonnic" (p. 11).⁹ The iron age "is that in which rude bards celebrate in rough numbers the exploits of ruder chiefs, in days when every man is a warrior" (p. 3). In this age the language is unwritten and "unformed," but inherently poetical. "The savage indeed lisps in numbers, and all rude and uncivilized people

⁷ In *Peacock's Four Ages of Poetry, &c.*, ed. H. F. B. Brett-Smith (Oxford, 1945), Percy Reprints, No. 3, the editor has the following footnote to p. ix of his Introduction: "An interesting comparison with Peacock's view is afforded by the well-known paragraphs (the tenth to the eighteenth) of Macaulay's essay on Milton, beginning 'We think that as civilization advances, poetry almost necessarily declines.'" Brett-Smith does not suggest, as I do, that Macaulay derives his whole theory from Peacock.

⁸ Hazlitt had also used his theory partially as a means of introducing abusive remarks on contemporary poetry. It can hardly be doubted that Peacock took his central idea from Hazlitt, with the deliberate purpose of developing it into an elaborate satire.

⁹ All references to Peacock's *Four Ages of Poetry* are to the edition cited in note 7.

express themselves in the manner which we call poetical" (p. 4). The imagination of the poet is entirely unhampered; it is stimulated by the mystery and dangers of nature and creates innumerable divinities and monsters.

"The golden age of poetry finds its materials in the age of iron" (p. 6). The subject is still the heroes of the age of iron, but the greater knowledge of language, forms, man, and the world enables the poet to produce poetry of the highest quality.

The silver age is "the poetry of civilized life" (p. 8). The poet either gives higher polish to the subjects and forms of the golden age or produces "comic, didactic, or satiric" verse. "The poetry of this age is characterized by an exquisite and fastidious selection of words, and a laboured and somewhat monotonous harmony of expression" (p. 8). The poet is hampered by the "inflexibility of civilized language." Poetry requires "ornamental and figurative language," but in civilized society "reason and understanding" prevail, and these "are best addressed in the simplest and most unvarnished phrase" (p. 9).

... as the sciences of morals and of mind advance towards perfection, as they become more enlarged and comprehensive in their views, as reason gains the ascendancy in them over imagination and feeling, poetry can no longer accompany them in their progress, but drops into the background, and leaves them to advance alone. (p. 9)

In the age of brass the poet "by rejecting the polish and the learning of the age of silver, and taking a retrograde slide to the barbarisms and crude traditions of the age of iron, professes to return to nature and revive the age of gold. This is the second childhood of poetry" (p. 10).

In modern poetry the iron age was the Dark and Middle Ages; the golden age was the Renaissance; the silver age was the Restoration and Eighteenth Century; and the age of brass was the early Nineteenth Century.

Peacock concludes with a savage attack upon contemporary poetry, in which he lashes by name Wordsworth, Coleridge, Scott, Byron, Southey, Campbell, and Moore, as well as "the degenerate fry of modern rhymesters, and their olympic judges, the magazine critics" (p. 19) in general. He also attacks poetry itself with what appears to be genuine bitterness, predicting that

when we consider that the great and permanent interests of human society become more and more the main spring of intellectual pursuit; that in proportion as they become so, the subordinacy of the ornamental to the useful will be more and more seen and acknowledged; and that therefore the progress of useful art and science, and of moral and political knowledge, will continue more and more to withdraw attention from frivolous and uncondusive, to solid and conducive studies: that therefore the poetical audience will not only continually diminish in the proportion of its number to that of the rest of the reading public, but will also sink lower and lower in the comparison of intellectual acquirement. ... (pp. 18-19)

It is in the concluding portion of his essay that Peacock overshoots the mark. As a thoroughgoing classicist Peacock forgets himself; his tone changes from the lightness necessary for satire to that of righteous indignation, scorn, and invective. His wrath against contemporary poetry carries over into his final statement about poetry and leads him to be almost brutal in asserting the inutility of it and in predicting as a good thing its final disappearance from civilized society. It is for this reason that many, including Macaulay, have thought that Peacock meant what he said. That he could have been completely serious, it is impossible to believe. Peacock was himself a poet long before and after he wrote *Four Ages of Poetry*.

It should be apparent that Macaulay's and Peacock's theories are almost identical, except for the artificial classification of poetry into ages, which Macaulay rightly disregarded. Macaulay was interested only in the application of a general principle, and was necessarily treating the subject in about one-fourth of the space used by Peacock. Macaulay and Peacock are alike in these main points: (1) semi-civilized people are by their nature and conditions of life poetical; (2) their language is crude but poetical (Macaulay says it is concrete and vivid; Peacock that it is ornamental and figurative); (3) language loses its poetical character with the advance of civilization; (4) poetry is essentially contrary to truth and cannot be produced in a cultivated age unless the poet somehow assumes a semisavage point of view; (5) increasing knowledge stifles the imagination and makes poetry more and more useless.

Macaulay is not a mere copyist. He has developed some points which Peacock left unelaborated. His most distinct addition is his insistence that advancing science and knowledge change the very thought processes from the particular and concrete to the general and abstract, and that language goes through a corresponding change. He also differs from Peacock in admitting the possibility of the production of great poetry in a highly civilized age, insisting, however, like Peacock, that the poet must assume the childlike attitude of a primitive adult. Macaulay explains Milton as a stupendous genius who was able to throw off the shackles which civilization puts on the poet. Peacock accounts for him more naturally:

The greatest of English poets, Milton, may be said to stand alone between the ages of gold and silver, combining the excellencies of both; for with all the energy, and power, and freshness of the first, he united all the studied and elaborate magnificence of the second. (p. 13)

Verbal echoes of Peacock in Macaulay's essay are few. At least one, however, appears to be fairly close.

[Peacock] The philosophic mental tranquillity which looks round with an equal eye on all external things, collects a store of ideas, discriminates their relative value, assigns to all their proper place, and from the materials of useful knowledge thus collected, appreciated, and arranged, forms new combinations

that impress the stamp of their power and utility on the real business of life, is diametrically the reverse of that frame of mind which poetry inspires, or from which poetry can emanate. (pp. 16-17; italics mine)

[Macaulay] The fact is, that common observers reason from the progress of the experimental sciences to that of the imitative arts. The improvement of the former is gradual and slow. *Ages are spent in collecting materials, ages more in separating and combining them.* Even when a system has been formed, there is still something to add, to alter, or to reject. Every generation enjoys the use of a vast hoard bequeathed to it by antiquity, and transmits that hoard, augmented by fresh acquisitions, to future ages. . . . But it is not thus with music, with painting, or with sculpture. Still less is it thus with poetry. The progress of refinement rarely supplies these arts with better objects of imitation. (pp. 4-5; italics mine)

It might be added that Macaulay concludes the exposition of his theory of poetry by speaking disparagingly of contemporary poetry: "We have seen in our own time great talents, intense labour, and long meditation, employed in this struggle against the spirit of the age, and employed, we will not say absolutely in vain, but with dubious success and feeble applause" (p. 8).

Macaulay's adoption of Peacock's theory shows us not only his misunderstanding of Peacock's satirical intent, but also the state of his knowledge and understanding, in 1825, of the achievements of the great romantic poets and critics who flourished during his childhood and early youth. He had unquestionably read some of their works, but his knowledge must have been relatively meager. He seems wholly unaware of the critical work of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Hazlitt, who were the true interpreters of the spirit of the age and the master spirits who reestablished the preëminence of the imagination as the primary instrument, not only of poetry but of truth. The similar pronouncements of Keats and Shelley were available in their prefaces, but Keats's letters and Shelley's *Defence of Poetry* were not yet in print.

In justice to Macaulay it should be added that his ignorance of the great poets of his early years was rapidly dissipated, and that he came soon to have, for his time, a remarkably just appreciation and understanding of the poets, the age, and poetry itself. A single passage from his essay on *Moore's Life of Byron* (1830) will serve to show the revolution in his views:

The heart of man is the province of poetry and of poetry alone. . . . Thus the objects of the imitation of poetry are the whole external and the whole internal universe, the face of nature, the vicissitudes of fortune, man as he is in himself, man as he appears in society, all things which really exist, all things of which we can form an image in our minds, by combining together parts of things which really exist. The domain of this imperial art is commensurate with the imaginative faculty. (p. 174)

Except for the style, this might have been written by Hazlitt himself.

University of Pennsylvania

MARK TWAIN'S "ROW" WITH GEORGE CABLE

By GUY A. CARDWELL

The lecture tour which Mark Twain made in company with George W. Cable beginning on November 4, 1884, and ending on February 28, 1885, was of considerable importance to Cable in advancing his reputation as a lecturer and was one of the best publicized and most remunerative tours ever made by Twain.¹ At this time Twain's reputation as a writer and his success as a publisher were still magnificently crescent²—except that the "crudeness" of *Huckleberry Finn* gave offense in certain refined quarters.³ Cable, too, was a person of note. He had printed all of his best fiction: *Old Creole Days*, *The Grandissimes*, and *Madame Delphine*. New England, approving him as a properly reconstructed Southerner, had taken him to its bosom. William Dean Howells considered his books "delicious."⁴ Twain admired him.⁵

But Twain's attitude towards Cable as a person was inconstant. If Twain ever attained equilibrium of any kind, it was a labile equilibrium upset by frequent explosions. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that friction developed between the two men during the enforced intimacy of four months on the lecture circuit. Without accepting their more extreme conclusions, we may readily understand why writers have been positive that, contrary to what the "official" lives say on the topic,⁶ Twain disliked Cable violently.

¹ I have a book, much of it about the tour, ready for publication. Partial information is now available in several places. See, especially, Fred W. Lorch, "Cable and His Reading Tour with Mark Twain in 1884-1885," *American Literature*, XXIII (1952), 471-86; Lucy L. C. Bikle, *George W. Cable* (New York, 1928); Albert Bigelow Paine, *Mark Twain* (New York, 1912); Fred W. Lorch, "Lecture Trips and Visits of Mark Twain in Iowa," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XXVII (1929), 521-34; and E. F. Pabody, "Mark Twain's Ghost Story," *Minnesota History*, XVIII (1937), 28-35.

² Paine says that his "fortunes were at flood-tide" in 1885. *Mark Twain*, II, 831.

³ See Arthur L. Vogelback, "The Publication and Reception of *Huckleberry Finn* in America," *American Literature*, XI (1939), 260-72. Both the English and the American editions of *Huckleberry Finn* were released while Twain and Cable were on tour.

⁴ For praise of Cable by Howells, see Mildred Howells, ed., *William Dean Howells* (Garden City, N. Y., 1928), I, 301-02, 312.

⁵ See Albert Bigelow Paine, ed., *Mark Twain's Letters* (New York, 1917), I, 426-27; William Dean Howells, *My Mark Twain* (New York, 1910), pp. 99-100; *Life on the Mississippi*, repeated references.

⁶ Twain's biographer and Cable's relatives who have mentioned the connection (Mrs. Bikle and Mary Cable Dennis) do not intimate that the relationship was ever anything but cordial, although Paine prints the letter of Feb. 27, 1885, from Twain to Howells that I quote later in this article. And Major J. B. Pond, the impresario who managed the lecture tour, wrote: "He [Twain] and Cable were always friends, but the novelist never could resist the temptation to lengthen the

Clearly, and as one would expect, Twain found Cable's piety amusing or annoying or both. In the official biography (and in an editorial note in his edition of the Twain letters) Paine says that Twain requested Cable to desist after Cable had read selections from the Bible to him for several nights.⁷ Cable himself in a letter home acknowledges with perfect good humor that, on an earlier occasion, Twain made polite fun of his puritanism.⁸ Several scholars have indicated that Twain's differences with Cable extended beyond a mild distaste for extraordinary devotional zeal. Bernard DeVoto mentions Twain's impatience with Cable's piety and adds the information that Twain thought he overpaid Cable for his services on the lecture tour and held a grievance against him for coming down ill while visiting in the Clemens home in Hartford.⁹ Edward Larocque Tinker presents more vehemently phrased evidence of animosity. He writes that the relationship between the two men was sometimes strained and that on one occasion, after fruitlessly begging Cable to travel on Sunday, Twain called Cable "a Christ-besprinkled, psalm-singing Presbyterian," almost breaking up the tour. W. W. Ellsworth and Clarence Buel gave Mr. Tinker "lurid accounts" of Twain's disagreements with Cable, and Major J. B. Pond's son informed him that he had a letter in which Twain told of referring to Cable in the above characteristically Twainian language.¹⁰

reading of his selections, and this made a constant friction, because it necessarily curtailed the time left for 'Mark,' sensitive ever to the obligation he felt to the audiences." See *Eccentricities of Genius* (London, 1901), p. 227. Mark fully appreciated a good speaker and was sharply critical of a poor one. He made the same complaint of Howells that Pond says he made of Cable: "I was never able to teach him to rehearse his proposed reading by the help of a watch and cut it down to a proper length. He couldn't seem to learn it. He was a bright man in all other ways, but whenever he came to select a reading for one of these carousals his intellect decayed and fell to ruin." See Paine, ed., *Mark Twain's Autobiography* (New York 1924), II, 148-49.

⁷ *Mark Twain*, II, 784; and *Mark Twain's Letters*, II, 447.

⁸ Bikle, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.

⁹ *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (New York: The Limited Editions Club, 1942), p. x. Mr. DeVoto, in a personal letter dated July 5, 1949, says that he depended on unpublished materials in notebooks and letters for his information. The late Dixon Wecter, who succeeded Mr. DeVoto as literary editor of the Mark Twain Papers for the Mark Twain Estate, was unwilling for me to check the unpublished papers to identify Mr. DeVoto's sources. Twain's irritation because of Cable's illness could not have been profound, for Cable was ill in the Clemens home for about ten days in January-February, 1884, and Twain made many friendly overtures after that time. As for the matter of Cable's pay, this does not seem significant. Mr. DeVoto, who knows Twain better than anyone else, writes: "Throughout his life Mark nourished violent animosities against those who he thought had taken advantage of him, and after the disasters of the 90's this trait became obsessive." See *Mark Twain in Eruption* (New York, 1940), p. x. Twain nearly always felt that he paid too much and received too little.

¹⁰ Mr. Tinker gives the above account in a short version in his Prologue to *Old Creole Days* (New York: The Limited Editions Club, 1943), p. xiv, and in an annotated version in "Cable and the Creoles," *American Literature*, V (1934), 321-22. The incident to which he refers must have taken place at Davenport, Iowa, on January 31, 1885. Twain went to Chicago after the eve-

Finally, Twain's recently published letters to his wife¹¹ contain damning references that would be much more damaging than they are if they had been written by almost any one other than Twain. On January 18, 1885, more than ten weeks after the start of the joint tour, Twain entered with Livy his first complaint about Cable. He explained a new lecture arrangement. Cable would begin talking to the assembling audience at the very stroke of the hour, thus decreasing the time the two men were on the stage: "(And privately, *another* thing—only half the house hear C.'s first piece—so there isn't too much of C any more—whereas heretofore there has been a thundering sight too much of him.)"¹²

After this Twain relieved his mind often by scathing reports on Cable, particularly on his parsimony and piety.

I speak but the truth when I say I like K [Cable] better & better; but his closeness is a queer streak—the queerest he has got. (p. 234)

I do not believe that any vileness, any shame, any dishonor is too base for Cable to do, provided by doing it he can save his despicable Sabbath from abrasion. In him this superstition is lunacy—no, idiotcy—pure & unadulterated. Apart from this & his colossal self-conceit & avarice, he is all great & fine: but *with* them as ballast, he averages as other men. . . . (p. 234)

I have modified Cable's insulting & insolent ways with servants, but have not cured them; may-be they cannot be cured. Pond says the servants of the Everett House all hate him. Says that when C. is paying his own expenses, he starves himself; & when somebody else is paying them his appetite is insatiable. (p. 235)

This pious ass allows an "entirely new program" to be announced from the stage & in the papers, & then comes out without a wince or an apology & jerks that same old Night Ride on the audience again. (p. 236)

He has never bought one single sheet of paper or an envelop in all these 3½ months—sponges all his stationery (for literature as well as stationery) from the hotels. His body is small, but it is much too large for his soul. He is the pitifulest human louse I have ever known. (p. 237)

ning lecture there, but Cable stayed in Davenport on Saturday night and Sunday because of his scruples against traveling on the Sabbath. Twain may have been particularly out of sorts because Ozias Pond, who had been accompanying the tour, was ill at Milwaukee, and J. B. Pond, Ozias' brother, had not left New York to take over the business affairs of the troupe. For a report of the visit to Davenport (minus any mention of a quarrel), see Fred W. Lorch, "Lecture Trips and Visits of Mark Twain in Iowa," pp. 531-34. The Ellsworth and Buell [Buell] whom Mr. Tinker mentions would have known Cable and Twain (but probably not intimately) because of their editorial connections with the *Century Magazine*.

William W. Ellsworth (1885-1936) was secretary of the Century Company, 1881-1913, and president, 1913-1916. Ellsworth published a volume of recollections entitled *Golden Age of Authors* (Boston, 1919), but he writes nothing of interest about Twain's relationship with Cable.

Clarence Clough Buell (1850-1933) worked for the *Century* in an editorial capacity from 1881-1914. I have not found that he wrote anything about either Twain or Cable.

¹¹ Dixon Wechter, ed., *Love Letters of Mark Twain* (New York, 1949).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

New evidence, of a sort, may be added to what has already been cited on differences between Cable and Twain. This new evidence, unmentioned anywhere in the Twain-Cable scholarship, may well have some bearing on stories that have been circulated orally about difficulties or alleged difficulties arising between the two men.

On May 15, 1885, two and one-half months after the end of their joint tour, Cable sent a telegram to Twain from Simsbury, Connecticut: "All intimations that you and Pond are not my Beloved Friends are false and if you can say the same of me do so as privately or as publicly as you like."¹³

On the next day, Cable sent an explanatory letter:

Dear Clemens:

Telegd. you last even'g & have not got reply; but without waiting to see if you are replying by letter, I write. For I see now that if you have not seen the newspaper and telegraphic slanders printed against us you will not understand, and if you have then my telegram hardly covers the main point. So I add this to assure you that all statements that I have either openly or covertly intimated anything unpleasant about you to my friends or anybody else are false from beginning to end. If you care to know it, I esteem you more highly since our winter's experience than I ever did before & should deeply regret if scandal mongers were to make an estrangement between us.

Of course I do not believe that you have said ought against me that was not intended as a friend's fair criticism among friends. Nor do I think Pond has said a word that was meant in unkindness about either of us.

I have privately called for an immediate explanation from the Boston Herald—where the thing seems to have started—and they write they have demanded as much of their New York correspondent & will report without delay.¹⁴

Twain dispatched a comforting message immediately:

My Dear Cable—

Your letter came yesterday evening, your telegram about noon. My dear boy, don't give yourself any discomfort about the slanders of a professional newspaper liar—we cannot escape such things. I do assure you that this thing did not distress me, or even disturb the flow of my talk (got it at breakfast some days ago), for one single half of a half [*sic*] of a hundredth part of a second; in the same length of time it went out of my mind & was forgotten. To take notice of it in print is a thing which would never have occurred to me. Why, my dear friend, flit it out of your mind—straight off.¹⁵

This advice is not necessarily what might have been expected of Mark. He had a notoriously low boiling point and was not always indifferent to newspaper slander.¹⁶ It is entirely possible that he may

¹³ From the Mark Twain Papers.

¹⁴ From the Cable Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University. The original of this letter is supposed to be in the Mark Twain Papers, but it is reported as not to be found at present.

¹⁵ From the Cable Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University.

¹⁶ Paine shows that Mark could reply with crushing violence to newspaper attacks. See *Mark Twain*, II, 719-22. Paine also makes the following pertinent observation: "Mark Twain was likely to be peculiarly sensitive to printed innuendos. Not always. Sometimes he would only laugh at them or be wholly indifferent. Indeed, in his later years, he seldom cared to read anything about

have had uncomfortable or guilty memories of exaggerated, half-meant expressions now seized upon, inflated, and perverted by reporters.

These "slanders" must have appeared in a number of newspapers, but an extensive search¹⁷ has uncovered only three printed references: one is a brief notice in the *World* (New York), for Sunday, May 17; the others, much more important, are apparently comprehensive and almost identical stories in the *Sunday Herald* (Boston) and in the *Times-Democrat* (New Orleans), both on Sunday, May 10.

The note in the *World* referred back to stories of a row as though they would be well known to the newspaper's readers:

As Mark Twain admits having netted \$35,000¹⁸ from his recent reading tour, and George W. Cable is presumed to have made the same,¹⁹ it's a pity that the profitable Twain-Cable Combination Company should have been dissolved, as alleged, on so trivial a question as Cable's charging his champagne and bootblack to the general expense fund of the concern. (p. 4)

The stories objected to by Cable, made light of by Twain, and referred to by the *World* seem to be well summed up in a "Special Dispatch to the Herald" published with a "New York, May 9" date-line under the heading "Twain, Cable & Pond":

Rumors of a triangular row have gone out from the Everett House and thence penetrated the remotest corners of the literary metropolis. The story grew as it spread, until it told of personal conflict, even fisticuff, between Mark Twain, Maj. J. B. Pond and George W. Cable; but when inquiry was today made as to whether two of the named notables had fallen upon the third, or each of the three had assaulted the two others, tremendous exaggeration was disclosed. There had been no physical encounter, and only a business disagreement so private and intangible that few particulars can be ascertained. It is certain, however, that the tour which Twain and Cable lately made as readers of their own works, under the management of Pond, resulted in profit and ill-humor equally large. Twain was the originator of the scheme, and he invited Cable to his home in Hartford, where the details of the proposed entertainment were arranged. It is Pond's business to manage lecturers and other lyceum performers,

himself, one way or the other, but at the time of which we are now writing—the period of the early eighties—he was alive to any comment of the press." *Ibid.*, p. 720.

¹⁷ Among New York papers I have examined the *Times*, *Tribune*, *Sun*, *Herald*, *Evening Post*, and *Dispatch*; among Boston papers the *Evening Transcript*, *Post*, *Evening Journal*, *Daily Advertiser*, *Commonwealth* (issues of May 9 and May 16), and *Traveller* (issue of May 10); *L'Abeille* (New Orleans); and *Courant* (Hartford).

¹⁸ This figure is mentioned also in the *Evening Journal* (Boston), May 14, 1885, p. 1.

¹⁹ Twain paid Cable flat sums and expenses for his assistance and paid Pond, the manager, a commission. Paine states that Twain paid Cable \$450 a week and his expenses. See *Mark Twain*, II, 784. The figure of \$450 is also given in the letter that Twain wrote to Charles L. Webster asking him to draw up a contract with Pond. See Samuel Charles Webster, ed., *Mark Twain, Business Man* (Boston, 1946), pp. 268-69. Katy Leary, the Clemens maid, thought that Twain paid Cable "as high as \$500 a week sometimes." See Mary Lawton, ed., *A Lifetime with Mark Twain* (New York, 1925), p. 78. Pond says Mark paid Cable "\$600 a week and his travelling and hotel expenses." See *op. cit.*, p. 231. Twain himself remembered that he gave Cable \$600 a week. See DeVoto, *Mark Twain in Eruption*, p. 216.

and he was offered a partnership in the enterprise. The contract provided that the "travelling expenses," added to the costs of advertising and halls, should first be deducted from the receipts, and the remainder divided into three equal shares for the partners. They did not follow the common practice of engaging with local societies, but trusted wholly to the dual strength of the humorist and the novelist, to draw audiences independently at theatrical prices. When they returned from the successful venture, and put up at the Everett, where Pond and Twain lived a considerable part of their time, it was observed that amicability had departed from the midst of the trio. Cable talked vaguely to his friends of hoggishness on the part of Twain in getting a disproportionate share of the glory, and Twain vowed, in seeming acrimony, that he would never, never go on the platform again; but Pond's plaint was less sentimental, for it related to the nature of the charges which his companions made as "travelling expenses." Cable was the chief offender in that way. His theory was that so highly luxurious a thing as champagne and so lowly a one as the blacking of his boots properly belonged to the partnership account, and Pond declares that the bills rendered by Cable are greater curiosities of literature than the best of his creole dialect. All three admit that the firm of Twain, Cable & Pond is permanently dissolved.²⁰

This story is bloated by rather patent untruths. The chief departures from fact are easy to detect and once removed from the story leave little residue of any importance. Twain was the only begetter of the tour. It was his show from first to last, and the receipts were not divided into three equal shares. In view of Cable's abstemiousness at this period of his life the suggestion (made in the *World*, *Sunday Herald*, and *Times-Democrat*) that he charged champagne up to general expenses is possibly a perversion of Twain's complaint that Cable saved his dirty linen during a visit home in order to have it washed at Twain's expense.²¹ Cable was meticulously careful in all things, and he may have entered small items on his expense account as a matter of principle. And of course there could not have been an open row about which one of the alleged participants knew nothing.

It would be obviously indiscreet to derive serious inferences from the gossip in the *Sunday World* and the *Times-Democrat* about a quarrel that never took place. We must, however, weigh the remarks on the Twain-Cable relationship offered by Mr. DeVoto and by Mr. Tinker, and we must consider Twain's impassioned outcries in his letters to Livy. Without intending to discredit the evidence from unpublished documents referred to by Mr. DeVoto or the evidence from oral reports cited by Mr. Tinker, we should note that this evidence, when taken out of the general context of the Twain-Cable relationship, facilitates a misleading exaggeration of Twain's serio-comic complaints about Cable. Evidence of antagonism must be considered in proper

²⁰ *Sunday Herald* (Boston), May 10, 1885, p. 6. I am indebted to Herman E. Spivey for searching this paper and making a transcript of the article. The almost exact duplicate referred to above appeared in the *Times-Democrat* (New Orleans), May 10, 1885, p. 4.

²¹ The champagne story may have been a standard one with Pond. He claimed that Winston Churchill, when lecturing under his management, "drank a pint of champagne for breakfast every morning" and charged it to expenses. See Ellsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 252. Twain referred bitterly to the saved-up linen in a letter to Livy. See *Love Letters of Mark Twain*, p. 234.

perspective, that is, in the light of the considerable evidence for an altogether friendly regard for Twain by Cable and for a generally friendly attitude towards Cable by Twain. This friendship began in 1881 and lasted, so far as I can determine, until Twain's death in 1910.

Mark Twain was suspicious of nearly all of his business associates and blackguarded most of them at one time or another.²² Although Mark thought he paid Cable too much, it does not appear that he ever put Cable's name down on the long list of associates who, he thought, deceived or cheated him. Undoubtedly Cable did irritate Mark. He read the Bible, attended church services, and eschewed profanity. He was careful of his money. He neither smoked, drank, played billiards, nor told bawdy stories. Except that he sang spirituals and Creole slave songs willingly and well, there was little health in him. Moreover, Twain disliked the annoyances of travel and was exceptionally irritable while on a speaking tour. He had to try to control himself in public, and Cable was conveniently and irritatingly at hand in private. It was his habit, too, to ease his bilious attacks by composing documents intended for Livy's private, censoring eye. Thus Mark dissipated his choler without doing what would frequently have been a great injustice to the object of his wrath.

As an ex-pro prospector and ex-pilot, Twain took some pride in the variety and richness of his expletive resources. His epithets applied to Cable are full-bodied but need not be interpreted as expressing special or permanent hostility. Colorful language was his tool and his great joy. He sometimes found symptoms of religiosity hard to digest even in his close friend Twichell and in his beloved wife Livy, but he was merely playful when he amazed Livy and the children by breaking in upon a godly reading and chanting: "By the humping, jumping Jesus, what the hell is that to you?"²³ And he was no more than fretful over dribbling milk from a pitcher when he exclaimed: "That hell-fired thing; one might as well try to pour milk out of a womb!"²⁴

If Twain spoke with unrelieved or malicious unkindness of Cable, it seems safe to say that Cable did not know it. Not long after the end of the tour with Twain, he tried giving a few readings; but his daughter writes that "he found this irksome, lacking his recent companion, and wrote home, 'It comes hard reading alone—without Mark, I mean.'"²⁵ All available evidence indicates that Cable was Twain's consistent admirer, enduring his profanity with anguished admiration,²⁶ rising to tell of his love for him during the famous ceremonies

²² See, especially, Webster, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 153 and *passim*.

²³ Clara Clemens, *My Father, Mark Twain* (New York, 1931), p. 26. Clara observes that a "strange sound burst from Mother's lips."

²⁴ Paine, ed., *Mark Twain's Notebook* (New York, 1935), p. 397.

²⁵ Bikle, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

²⁶ Paine, *Mark Twain*, II, 784.

celebrating Twain's seventieth birthday,²⁷ and preaching "a nice sermon in Carnegie Hall" for his anniversary.²⁸

Probably the best summary statement concerning Twain's mixed feelings about Cable as a person is contained in the letter that he wrote from Philadelphia on February 27, 1885, to his intimate friend William Dean Howells. This letter was written one day before Twain and Cable concluded their four-months tour—a time when Twain was fatigued and his nerves undoubtedly at their most exacerbated:

To-night in Baltimore, to-morrow afternoon and night in Washington, and my four-months platform campaign is ended at last. It has been a curious experience. It has taught me that Cable's gifts of mind are greater and higher than I had suspected. But—

That "But" is pointing toward his religion. You will never, never know, never divine, guess, imagine, how loathsome a thing the Christian religion can be made until you come to know and study Cable daily and hourly. Mind you, I like him; he is pleasant company; I rage and swear at him sometimes, but we do not quarrel; we get along mighty happily together; but in him and his person I have learned to hate all religions. He has taught me to abhor and detest the Sabbath-day and hunt up new and troublesome ways to dishonor it.²⁹

There is no reason to think that this was not a completely honest letter expressing quite fully and with an objectivity rare for Twain what he felt at the moment. He probably said hard things of Cable more than once, as he did of most of his friends; nevertheless, he seems to have had a genuine liking for the bearded novelist. On June 25, 1895, ten years after their tour, he replied in unequivocally friendly tones to a note of praise from Cable:

Dear Cable:

You make me feel ever so proud & pleased. I wrote the story from love, & one particularly likes to have one's pets praised.

Yes *sir*! I liked you in spite of your religion; & I always said to myself that a man that could be good & kindly with that kind of a load on him was entitled to homage—and I *paid* it. And I have always said, & still maintain, that as a railroad-comrade you were perfect—the only railroad-comrade in the world that a man of moods & frets & uncertainties of disposition could travel with, a third of a year, and never weary of his company. We *always* had good times in the cars, & never minded the length of the trips—and my, but they *were* sockdolagers for length!

I was right-down glad to hear from you again.³⁰

That Twain did not see much of Cable after the conclusion of their joint tour was natural. He had seen enough of him: he had a fretful

²⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 1252.

²⁸ Mary Lawton, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁹ *Mark Twain's Letters*, II, 450. Paine is careful to explain that the letter must be read "only in the clear realization of Mark Twain's attitude toward orthodoxy, and his habit of humor. Cable was as rigidly orthodox as Mark Twain was revolutionary. The two were never anything but the best of friends."

³⁰ From the Cable Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University. This letter is printed almost in its entirety in Bikle, *op. cit.*, p. 197 n.

and suspicious attitude towards his business associates; and he had a strongly anti-religious, mechanistic bias. Yet Cable did well if he followed his friend's advice and flirted distressing newspaper gossip out of his mind. Even a hard-swearing, spendthrift, atheistical billiard player might have considered himself fortunate to have traveled for four months with Mark and to have suffered nothing worse than half-intended, half-regretted verbal assaults.

Washington University

FRANZ KAFKA'S "A REPORT TO AN ACADEMY"

By WILLIAM C. RUBINSTEIN

Kafka's story, "A Report to an Academy," has never aroused much enthusiasm among his critics. To Charles Neider, "'A Report to an Academy' . . . aside from its bright satirical tone and its empathy for the ape, is merely an exercise, whose function is to satirize the spiritual in man. The education of the ape, his transformation into a human being, depends upon a system of repression and destruction of memories. Kafka, like Swift, implies that man is a beast."¹

The comparison with Swift is implicit also in Brod's brief comment: "Or, what is still more horrible [than the degradation of *Metamorphosis*], he lets the animal be raised to the level of a human being, but to what a level of humanity, to a masquerade at which mankind is unmasked."² This interpretation, that the ape is in some way a satire of humanity, is approved of by Herbert Tauber, who writes that the ape "is really a picture of the everyday man who expands himself in the superficial, who cannot fulfil his being and realize it in freedom, but whose first commandment is to adapt himself."³

Now there is no doubt that in general the story supports these explanations, but this reader feels that there must be some more specific object of the satire than humanity. There seems to be a precision in the choice of the symbols which is not reflected in the analyses of the critics, possibly because they have not considered the story worthy of a full-length treatment. Then too, the "bright satirical tone" reveals an underlying savage bitterness, an almost personal anger, which suggests that the story is more than "merely an exercise" in reversing *Metamorphosis*.

The interpretation put forward in this paper will, possibly, seem extravagant and even outrageous to many of Kafka's admirers. It is intended merely as a suggestion to be considered tentatively until some more satisfactory explanation of the symbols is made. If it sends old readers back to the story and inspires others to read it for the first time, it will have performed its function.⁴

Since many of the readers of the novels are not familiar with "A Report to an Academy," a brief summary of it is given here.

An ape is lecturing to an academy on his life before he transformed himself into a human being. Unfortunately he can tell the academy very little about it, for, since his transformation, he has forgotten the past. He was captured in

¹ Charles Neider, *The Frozen Sea* (Oxford, 1948), p. 81.

² Max Brod, *Frans Kafka* (New York, 1947), p. 135.

³ Herbert Tauber, *Franz Kafka* (New Haven, 1948), p. 71.

⁴ Franz Kafka, *Penal Colony*, tr. by Willa and Edwin Muir (New York, 1948), pp. 173-84.

Africa, and his first clear recollections are of the cage in which he was confined on the boat to Europe. Here he suffered numerous abuses. The members of the crew spit in his face, laughed at him, prodded him with sticks, and burned him with their pipes. He soon realized that the only way for him to get out of his cage was to become a human being. With great effort he succeeded in doing this. The climax of his efforts came the day he was able to drink "schnapps," a feat which repeatedly nauseated him, but one on which the members of the crew placed the greatest importance—the ape could not understand why. After that his progress was very rapid, although marred once by the fact that one of his teachers, as a result of his contact with him, almost became an ape himself. Today he has a smug satisfaction in the thought that he has reached the intellectual level of an average European. He is very tactful about mentioning the abuses he suffered as an ape and obsequiously goes out of his way to excuse human beings for having inflicted them. In the evenings, he goes home to his mistress, a half-human, partially crazed ape.

The key to the interpretation of the story is the symbolic significance of the ape. In order to determine precisely what he represents, it might be well to begin with the most trying experience in his transformation and the one to which the most space is devoted in the story.

"My worst trouble," the ape tells the academy, "came from the schnapps bottle. The smell of it revolted me; I forced myself to it as best I could; but it took weeks for me to master my repulsion. This inward conflict, strangely enough, was taken more seriously by the crew than anything else about me."

One of the crew members considers it his special duty to teach the ape to drink from the bottle. "He could not understand me, he wanted to solve the enigma of my being." Very patiently, this human being repeats before the cage the ceremony of drinking the schnapps. The ape describes himself as "enchanted with my gradual enlightenment," but this "theoretical exposition" exhausts him so that he hangs limply to the bars of his cage.

Of course there is obvious irony in describing the spectacle of a man drinking a bottle of whiskey as an enlightening or theoretical exposition, but the very obviousness of it should put the reader on his guard. Kafka does not usually work for such crude effects. It is, therefore, quite possible that some deeper meaning is intended, a double irony of some kind.

In spite of his "theoretical instruction," it is a long time before the ape can drink from the bottle. Each time he is about to do it, revulsion seizes him, and he throws the bottle from his lips. His teacher alternately tortures and cajoles him. The ape cannot understand his revulsion, and both he and the teacher try to conquer it, for "we were both fighting on the same side against the nature of apes."

Finally, "one evening before a large circle of spectators—perhaps there was a celebration of some kind, a gramophone was playing, an officer was circulating in front of the crew—" the ape succeeds in drinking the schnapps. Instantly his transformation, in spite of a few subsequent lapses, is made. He breaks into human speech, "and with

this outburst broke into the human community." He now feels the previously mocking and hostile faces of the crew "like a caress over my sweat-drenched body."

What is the significance of this strange episode at the climax of the story? Why does the crew place such great importance on the ape's drinking the schnapps—an emphasis which the ape is unable to understand? Why does drinking instantly make the ape a human being?

It may be that in accordance with the usual interpretation Kafka considers drinking the most characteristic symbol of human degradation, and, therefore, the ape is accepted as soon as he has learned to drink. But such an interpretation seems rather weak. The ape's teacher is not a drunkard, and intoxication does not seem to be the aim of his drinking. The drinking is rather a ritual, for the ape must learn not merely to drink, but to follow every movement and gesture of his teacher in doing it.

This ritual drinking on which such great emphasis is placed, which must be preceded by theoretical instruction, which is given during "a celebration of some kind," and which instantly transforms the ape into a human being accepted by the crew, is far more likely, it seems to this writer, to be a symbol for the sacrament of Communion, which is itself a symbolic act denoting the acceptance of Christ. By drinking the schnapps, the ape, or whatever he represents, becomes a Christian and is welcomed joyously by the assembled celebrants of the rite. If this interpretation is correct, the story is really about a conversion.

But who is the convert? Obviously his conversion is not a sincere one. He wants to be a human being only so that he will not be spit on, burned, or kept in his cage. Although the schnapps bottle revolts him to the last, he drinks it in order to be accepted as human. His obsequiousness before the *real* human beings of the academy, even after his transformation, makes him a despicable figure. He is quite possibly a Jew who has allowed himself to be converted to Christianity in order to escape persecution.

Is the symbolism of the rest of the story consistent with this interpretation? The ape tells the academy that he could never have accomplished what he has, "had I been stubbornly set on clinging to my origins. . . ." He is satisfied that the "strong wind that blew after me out of my past" has slackened. He is very angry at the people who point out his resemblance to another ape. He tells his audience that he cannot remember his life as an ape, but this turns out to be a lie, for he remembers quite vividly the various torments he endured.

The motivation for the lie is his craven reluctance to accuse the members of the audience of having persecuted him. He can hardly avoid doing this if he remembers his past in any detail. Thus when he does mention some of these torments, he is careful to excuse his tormentors. His teacher burned him, but the ape now realizes that he

did it with the best of intentions. The scar he bears was made—"let me be particular in the choice of a word for this particular purpose, to avoid misunderstanding—the scar made by a wanton shot." Although he was intolerably cramped in his cage, that is apparently the way apes are kept and that is all there is to it. As a matter of fact, he could not "risk" talking about his past at all "if I were not quite sure of myself and if my position on all the great variety stages of the civilized world had not become quite unassailable."

The ape comes from the Gold Coast, but he has no personal recollection at all of his life before his capture. "For the story of my capture I must depend on the evidence of others." His "own memories gradually begin—between decks in the Hagenbeck steamer, inside a cage." Here he must "stay motionless with raised arms, crushed against a wooden wall." Although it may seem extravagant, the early life of the ape is probably that portion of pre-European, Jewish history for which he must rely on the Old Testament, the evidence of others. All he can remember personally is his life in the cage (the ghetto, specifically, but more generally the whole situation of European Jews at this time).

Since life in the cage is unbearable, the ape must find some way to get out of it. Two courses are open to him: to attempt an escape to freedom (Zionism), or to become a human being (assimilation and conversion). The dangers of the first course prevent the ape from ever considering it seriously. He is afraid he will drown in the ocean, and even if he does manage to get back to his home, what is there to prevent his recapture?

Actually he does not want freedom, but merely "a way out" of the cage. So he decides to become a human being "even though these men in themselves had no great attraction for me." After his conversion, he has several lapses, and, in order to avoid being put into the zoological gardens, on his arrival in Hamburg he embarks on a strenuous program of training. He engages teachers for himself and puts them into five communicating rooms. "By dint of leaping from one room to another" he takes lessons from all five at once. Who these five teachers are it is difficult to say. Possibly they are the four apostles and Paul, but this is only a desperate guess.

At the end of his lecture, the ape again congratulates himself on his transformation. "In itself that might be nothing to speak of, but it is something insofar as it has helped me out of my cage. . . ." But in spite of his progress, he goes home in the evening to "a half-trained little chimpanzee . . . [with] the insane look of the bewildered, half-broken animal in her eyes," a look which the ape "cannot bear."

There is some interesting bibliographical evidence which may have a bearing on the interpretation of the story. According to Angel Flores, "A Report to an Academy" first appeared in the collection,

A Country Doctor,⁵ Brod, however, without giving any details, mentions that there was an earlier publication in a magazine called *Der Jude*.⁶ The story first appeared in the eighth number of the second volume of this magazine. It was the second part of a pair called "Two Animal Stories," the first part of which was the short piece, "Jackals and Arabs."⁷

Der Jude was conceived and published by Martin Buber, a leading Zionist. In the opening number (April, 1916), there was a declaration of purpose: to spread and promote knowledge of Judaism. Throughout the eight years of the magazine's history, it dealt exclusively with Jewish problems, usually from a Zionist viewpoint. While there is not the slightest reason to suppose that Buber would not have published a story by a friend of his friend Brod, unless it explicitly furthered the views of the magazine, the appearance of "A Report to an Academy" in *Der Jude* does add, however little, to the probability that the story dealt with the problems of European Jewry.

The Jew who, for some ulterior motive, allowed himself to be converted was a popular villain in the Yiddish literature of Europe. Kafka mentions in his diary, for example, seeing a play, *Der Meshumed* (*The Apostate*), in which Seidemann, a converted Jew, is also the murderer of his own wife and the would-be murderer of his daughter's fiancée.⁸ Bad as the play was, it made a profound impression on Kafka, for he devoted several pages of the diary to a summary and analysis of it. It probably furnished him with the first sketchy outlines for the two "assistants" in *The Castle*,⁹ and after being transmuted in his artistic consciousness might very well have emerged as "A Report to an Academy."

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⁵ Angel Flores, *Franz Kafka: A Chronology and Bibliography* (Baltimore, 1944), p. 8.

⁶ Max Brod, "Epilogue," in *Kafka's Penal Colony*, p. 318.

⁷ Franz Kafka, "Zwei Tiergeschichten: Schakale und Araber; Ein Bericht für eine Akademie," *Der Jude* (Berlin: October and November, 1917), II, 488, 559-65.

⁸ Franz Kafka, *Diaries* (New York, 1948), I, 80-86.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 328. This suggestion is made by Brod in the notes to the diaries.

IPHIGENIE UND DIE GÖTTER

Von ERNST MORITZ MANASSE

Goethes *Iphigenie auf Tauris* ist das Drama eines glückhaften Geschehens. Solch glückhaftes Geschehen ist unterschieden von den Werken blinden Zufalls wie von denen blinder Notwendigkeit. Es ist bewirkt durch die verstehende Anteilnahme von Göttern, die das aus reinem Herzen kommende Gebet erfüllen, und ohne selbst allmächtig zu sein, den Bedrängten von dem ihn bedrohenden Verhängnis befreien.

Aber ist *Iphigenie* nicht die Dichtung der Humanität? Gewiß; doch ist zu bedenken, daß die Humanität als die Menschlichkeit des Menschen gebunden ist an die Göttlichkeit der Götter.

Hat denn aber Goethe an die Götter geglaubt? Waren Diana und Apollo Mächte, die er erfahren hatte, oder gehören sie einfach als mythologischer Apparat zum Stoffbereich, den er übernahm? Im *Tasso*, der der *Iphigenie* in vielfacher Hinsicht verwandt ist, greifen die Götter nicht in die Handlung ein. Ist das nicht ein Zeichen dafür, daß die Humanität doch auch ohne die Götter zu verstehen ist? Oder ist es vielleicht so, daß gerade der Gegensatz von *Iphigenie* und *Tasso* dazu angetan ist, das Wesen der Götter zu verdeutlichen? Die *Iphigenie* nannten wir das Drama eines glückhaften Geschehens. Im *Tasso* bleibt die glückliche Wendung aus. Heißt das vielleicht auch, daß da die Götter ausbleiben? Wenn wir den Wahrheitssinn von Goethes Götterglauben untersuchen, wird dies zu bedenken sein.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung zerfällt in zwei Teile: Zunächst gilt es, ein Verständnis vom Wesen der Götter aus der *Iphigenie* selbst zu gewinnen. Danach wird es an der Zeit sein, das Blickfeld zu erweitern und die aus der Analyse der *Iphigenie* gewonnenen Resultate mit anderen Äußerungen Goethes in Verbindung zu bringen.

I

Im Mittelpunkt der Goethischen *Iphigenie* stehen Gebet und Gebetserhörung. Um die Bedeutung dieses Faktums zu ermessen, bedienen wir uns des oft geübten Vergleichs des Goethischen Werks mit seinem euripideischen Vorbild. Da ist gleich am Anfang zu bemerken, daß es bei Euripides solch einem Mittelpunkt wie bei Goethe nicht gibt. Es ist, als ob bei Euripides das Geschehen auf zwei verschiedenen Ebenen stattfindet. Den metaphysischen Hintergrund bildet die Erfüllung des göttlichen Orakelspruches. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint sich das menschliche Handeln nach eigener Gesetzmäßigkeit zu vollziehen. Aber diese scheinbare Gesetzmäßigkeit ist doch nur ein Trugbild, hervorgerufen durch menschliche Blindheit

und menschliches Vergessen, die am Ende in ihrer Nichtigkeit offenbar werden. Eine wirkliche Kommunikation findet nicht statt.

Es gibt zwei Höhepunkte in Euripides' Drama. Wie sich Iphigenie und Orest wiedererkennen, das ist der dramatische Abschluß des ersten Hauptteils. Werden Bruder und Schwester einander erkennen, bevor es zu spät ist und Iphigenie den Fremdling opfert? Das ist die bange Frage, die die Zuschauer zunächst bewegt und in Spannung hält. Sie wird durch einen kunstvollen, von Aristoteles besonders gerühmten, *Anagnorismos* gelöst. Allerdings nur für einen Augenblick. Denn sofort steigt eine neue Angst auf. Werden die Wiedervereinigten aus dem Taurierland entkommen und das Gebot des Gottes, der die Heimbringung des Artemisbildes befahl, ausführen können? Wieder steigert sich die Spannung. Ein neuer Höhepunkt ist erreicht, wenn der Bote die Entdeckung des Fluchtplanes meldet und es so scheint, als ob der König und seine Leute die Ausführung verhindern können. In diesem Augenblick erscheint Athene und verkündet den Willen der Götter: Iphigenie soll mit ihrem Bruder heimkehren; sie sollen das Artemisbild mitführen, um es in Griechenland aufzustellen und einen neuen Kult zu begründen. Ohne Zaudern beugt sich der König dem Willen der Götter. Da sie es beschlossen haben, findet er sich mit einem Geschick ab, das ihm doch sonst als äußerstes Unrecht und als vollständige Niederlage erscheinen müßte.

Im Goethischen Drama scheint sich die Spannung ebenfalls zuerst auf die Wiedererkennung und in der zweiten Hälfte auf das Entkommen zu richten. Aber beide Male findet eine merkwürdige Akzentverschiebung statt. Die Wiedererkennung wird überschattet von der Heilung Orests und das Entkommen von Thoas' Umstimmung zu freiwilligem Verzicht.

Statt des dialektischen Hin und Hers von Frage und Antwort, wobei die Entdeckung der Wahrheit wie durch einen Zufall geschieht, geben bei Goethe Orest und Iphigenie einander offen zu erkennen. Die Erkennung wird so ein Zeichen des Ethos und erfolgt aus einem sinnvollen Handeln. Freimütige Offenheit ist ein Wesenszug der Humanität. Ihre Bedeutung wird noch dadurch verstärkt, daß Orests Bekenntnis durch Pylades' listvolle Vorsicht retardiert wurde. Aber wenn dann das offene Sich-zu-erkennen-geben die weitere Entwicklung solcher äußerlichen Spannungsmomente unterbindet, ergibt sich eine ganz neue Verwicklung. Die Leidenschaften, die doch durch die Erkennung gestillt werden sollten, werden dadurch gerade von neuem gesteigert. Orests Bekenntnis hat nicht zur Folge, ihn von einer inneren Last zu befreien. Im Gegenteil, je mehr er von seinem Verhängnis enthüllt, umso mehr ergreift es ihn wieder. Selbst die schwesterlichen Trostworte Iphigeniens scheinen ihn nur noch tiefer in seinen Wahn zu verstricken, und er bricht aus in jähe Raserei.

Dennoch wird er geheilt. Die ersten Worte, die er nach jenem Ausbruch spricht, geben zu erkennen, daß nicht nur der Anfall

sondern daß das Übel selbst überkommen ist: "Es löset sich der Fluch, mir sagt's das Herz."¹

Wenn sich Orests Wahnreden zum äußersten steigern, wendet sich Iphigenie an Apollo und Diana und fleht sie bei ihrer geschwisterlichen Liebe füreinander an, sich ihrer und ihres Bruders zu erbarmen. Der Augenblick und die Inbrunst ihres Gebetes lassen keinen Zweifel zu: dies ist nicht mythologisches Beiwerk, dies gehört zum Kern des Geschehens. Dem für seine Heilung dankenden Orest erscheint selbst das Kommen der Krise als von den Göttern gesandt: so wie ein Gewitterregen, der durch seine Sturmgewalt erschreckt, "doch bald der Menschen grausendes Erwarten in Segen auflöst" (III, 4).

Die eigentlich bewegende Kraft ist das Gebet. Man muß dabei nicht nur an die Worte denken, die die Angst Iphigenien eingt. Von der ersten Szene des Stückes an ist sie die Betende, in Einem dankend, vertrauend, bittend. Als sie in dem Fremden den Bruder findet, da geht ihr das Herz über. Erst in der endgültigen Fassung des Stückes hat Goethe ihr das Wort gegeben, das den ganzen Sinn der Handlung in sich birgt:

So steigst du denn, Erfüllung, schönste Tochter
Des größten Vaters, endlich zu mir nieder. (III, 1)

Jetzt erst weiß sie, was göttliches Gewähren bedeutet. Aber noch ist das Ganze der Erfüllung gefährdet. Obwohl sie gerade nun erfahren hat, daß nur die Götter selbst wissen, wann es die rechte Zeit ist zu gewähren, kann sie nicht anders als mit neuer Bitte enden:

O laßt das lang erwartete,
Noch kaum gedachte Glück nicht, wie den Schatten
Des abgeschiednen Freundes, eitel mir
Und dreifach schmerzlicher vorübergehen! (III, 1)

Das Gebet ist Iphigeniens eigentlichstes Tun und schwingt mit in jedem Versuch, durch die Wahngebilde zu Orests wirklichem Selbst vorzudringen. Seine Erfüllung ist wie göttliche Antwort auf ihre Menschlichkeit.

Aber bedarf es denn des Gebets? War denn der Erfolg nicht schon im Orakel vorgegeben? Der Gott hatte Orest Genugtuung verheißen, wenn er seinen Auftrag ausführen würde. Als Pylades Orest aus seiner Ver zweiflung reißen wollte, berief er sich auf diese Verheißung. Als Stimme der Gottheit ist das Orakel für Goethe durchaus bedeutend, und er hat es durch eine originelle Ausdeutung mit seiner Auffassung der Göttlichkeit in Verbindung gebracht. Aber Orests Heilung ist dennoch Folge des Gebets ohne direkten Bezug aufs Orakel. Der Betrachter mag in seiner Phantasie weitere Zusammenhänge ausspinnen: etwa daß die Verheißung an Orest

¹ *Iphigenie auf Tauris*, III, 4.

selbst schon im Hinblick auf Iphigeniens ständiges Gebet geschah. Die Handlung im Drama entspräche dann einer Wiederholung und Vergegenwärtigung der göttlichen Entscheidung. Diese Entscheidung wäre zu wiederholen, weil die Götter immer wieder darin zeigen, wer sie sind: nicht Mächte der Dunkelheit, Dämonen eines unausweichlichen Verhängnisses wie die Erinyen, sondern Lichtbringer, Helfer, Erfüller.

Bei Euripides ist es anders. Er verlegt Orests Heilung in die Zeit, wenn er wirklich Apollos Auftrag beendet haben wird: die Heilung wird erst nach Ablauf des Dramas erfolgen. Durch Athenes Vorausschau wird der Zuschauer dieses Ausgangs versichert. Das ist in gewisser Weise folgerichtiger als die Vorverlegung der Heilung bei Goethe. Es ist aber wohl der tiefere Grund für die geringere Betonung dieses Momentes bei Euripides, daß für ihn die Heilung nur negativ, Befreiung von der Qual, das heißt von den verfolgenden Gottheiten ist. Vom Menschen her gesehen ist dies aber nur zufälliges Glück, nicht Erfüllung.

Und was bedeutet es für die Götter? Athenes Schlußworte bestätigen, was das Orakel schon längst verkündet hatte. Nur begannen die Menschen dem Götterspruch zu mißtrauen, als der Ablauf des Geschehens ihm nicht mehr zu entsprechen schien. Im Schwanken zwischen Glauben und Zweifel waren dann die Leidenschaften gewachsen. Nun war es für die Menschen gar nicht mehr möglich, an der verkündeten Wahrheit festzuhalten. Es ist der Sinn der Gotteserscheinung, des *deus ex machina*, die Kurzsichtigkeit der von den Leidenschaften getriebenen Menschen zu enthüllen, die vergessen haben, wer sie sind.

Derselbe Ablauf, der den Menschen als Zufall erscheint, ist also von den Göttern her gesehen vorbestimmt und insofern notwendig. Was fehlt, ist die eigentliche Kommunikation zwischen Menschen und Göttern. Kein Gebet scheint wirklich zu den Göttern zu dringen. Für ein solches kommunikationsloses zufällig-notwendiges Geschehen aber ist die aus dem dialektischen Spiel erfolgende Wiedererkennung ein treffendes Symbol. Indem sie auf den glücklichen Ausgang des Dramas vorausdeutet, bildet sie den passenden Abschluß des ersten Spannungsanstieges bei Euripides. Wo es dagegen um göttliche Antwort und Erfüllung geht, da fehlt dem bloßen Erkennen die symbolische Bedeutung. Aus diesem Grund verschiebt sich bei Goethe der Akzent auf Orests Heilung. Der von den Furien erregte Wahnsinn ist Getrenntheit von den guten Göttern. Euripides hatte daran ein pathologisches Interesse, wie aus dem ausführlichen Botenbericht über Orests Wahnsinnsanfall hervorgeht. Bei Goethe geht es nicht so sehr um das Pathos wie um das Ethos. Die Krankheit befällt Orest nicht nur als äußeres Schicksal sondern ist mit seinem Charakter zusammengewachsen. Die Gottverlorenheit ist nicht nur grausige Qual sondern gefährdet Orests Menschlichkeit. Daß Orest

aus dieser Gottverlorenheit befreit werde, darum betet Iphigenie, und Orestes Heilung ist Erfüllung in dem doppelten Sinne der Gewährung ihrer Bitte und der Versicherung der göttlichen Gegenwart.

So wenig wie das bloße Erkennen konnte Goethe das bloße Entkommen als symbolhaftes Geschehen erscheinen. Bei Euripides wird die Nichtigkeit besonders sinnfällig dadurch, daß die Ereignisse gegen Ende des Stückes eindeutig auf den Untergang der Geschwister hinzuführen scheinen, bis dann Athenes Worte alles Bisherige außer Geltung und den göttlichen Beschluß an dessen Stelle setzen. Bei Goethe entkommen die Geschwister durch Thoas' freiwilligen Entschluß. Aber gerade dieser freie Entschluß ist Symbol göttlicher Erhörung und Erfüllung. Thoas' Großmut ist Zeugnis seiner Menschlichkeit nicht nur sondern ebenso des göttlichen Wesens der Götter.

Auch für Euripides ist es nicht gleichgültig, wie das Wesen der Götter zu denken ist. In seinem Stück lehnt sich Iphigenie dagegen auf, daß man den gleichen Göttern das Verlangen nach kultischer Reinheit und nach Menschenopfern zuschreibe. Im aufklärerischen Sinn beschuldigt sie die Menschen, daß sie den Göttern die Verantwortung für ihre eigenen Missetaten zuschieben: "Denn keiner der Unsterblichen, mein' ich, ist böse" (v, 391).

Aber wenn hier die Reflexion das Wesen der Götter mit menschlicher Sittlichkeit in Einklang zu bringen versucht, bleiben Götterwelt und Menschenwelt dennoch wesentlich voneinander geschieden. Ist auch die Kunde über die Götter durch Mißdeutung verdunkelt, so offenbart sich doch auch ihr wahres Wesen vor allem in ihrer Übermacht. Gerade der Schluß des Stückes bestätigt das, und es klingt darum auch nicht in einer Feier der göttlichen Gerechtigkeit aus sondern in dem Freudenhymnus des Chores über das "unerhoffte" Glück.

Goethes Iphigenie sagt ähnlich der euripideischen:

Der mißversteht die Himmlischen, der sie
Blutgierig wähnt: er dichtet ihnen nur
Die eignen grausamen Begierden an. (I, 3)

Aber dies sind nicht eingeschobene Reflexionen sondern Argumente, die die Handlung beeinflussen, Glaubenssätze, auf die hin Entscheidungen getroffen werden und deren Wahrheit selbst noch wieder erprobt wird. Die Erfüllung, um die es geht, ist die Bewährung des Glaubens als Wahrheit. Der Segen, den Iphigenie den Tauriern gebracht hat, ist der augenscheinliche Beweis dafür, daß die Götter keine Menschenopfer wollen, die Heilung Orestes, daß sie nicht unversöhnlich auf Rache bestehn. Aber das eine wie das andere bleibt letztlich in Frage gestellt, solange Iphigeniens Konflikt mit Thoas nicht gelöst ist. Da Iphigenie sich Thoas' Werben widersetzt, scheint auch der göttliche Segen nicht mehr zu wirken, und die Drohung neuer Menschenopfer wird laut. Wenn Iphigenie nur durch

List und Verrat, also nicht ohne selbst schuldig zu werden, dem greulichen Befehl zuwiderhandeln kann, scheint der Tantalidenfluch neu aufzuleben. So kommt es, daß Iphigenie, die doch schon beim Wiederfinden des Bruders an Erfüllung glaubte, in ihrem Glauben zurückgeworfen wird und daß die schreckliche Kunde von grausamen und unheimlichen Gottheiten ihr plötzlich aus der Vergessenheit wiederaufsteigt. Zwingen die Olympier sie nicht, mit dem Erbe des Tantalidenfluches auch Erbin des Tantalidenhasses zu werden? In dieser Qual entringt sich ihr das Angstgebet um die äußerste Gewährung: "Rettet mich / Und rettet euer Bild in meiner Seele" (IV, 5).

Der Segen über dem Lande, Orests Kommen, seine Heilung, alles das konnte so lange als ein Zeichen göttlicher Gunst, der Erhörung und Gewährung gelten. Aber das, worum Iphigenie nun bittet, ist doch erst die eigentliche Sicherstellung dessen, was vorherging.

Wenn Iphigenie noch glaubt, Thoas hintergehen zu dürfen und dem Arkas ausweichend erklärt, sie habe das Schicksal der Fremden in die Hand der Götter gelegt, entgegnet ihr Arkas: "Sie pflegen Menschen menschlich zu erretten" (IV, 2).

Das wird wahr in einer Tiefe, wie es Arkas gar nicht vermuten konnte. Er hatte, nichtsahnend, geglaubt es genüge, daß Iphigenie Thoas' Werbung nachgebe, um alle Verwirrung zu enden. Iphigenie weiß, daß eine Rettung nur durch einen Akt der Großmut von Thoas' Seite möglich ist, der selbst nichts anderes als ein göttliches Wunder wäre. Aber wie darf sie, in Unwahrheit verstrickt, auf solch ein Wunder hoffen? Nicht anders als indem sie sich selbst aus der Verstrickung befreit. Damit aber setzt sie nicht nur ihre eigene Rettung sondern auch die des Bruders und des Freundes aufs Spiel. In der letzten Bewährung muß der Glaube an die Erfüllung, an das göttliche Gewähren des Guten, nicht nur sich selbst sondern auch das eigene Schuldigwerden zum Einsatz bringen. Das Gebet wird Opfer.

Solange Iphigenie noch schwankt, noch nicht zu diesem Einsatz bereit ist, sieht sie nur das unmögliche Wunder einer Rettung mit übermenschlichen Mitteln: "Ruf ich die Götter um ein Wunder an" (V, 3). Noch erscheint es wie eine Alternative hierzu, wenn sie fortfährt: "Ist keine Kraft in meiner Seele Tiefen" (V, 3).

Als aber ihr Entschluß gefaßt ist, fühlt sie, daß sie sich nun den Göttern anheimgegeben hat wie nie zuvor und daß, was nun geschieht, das göttliche Wesen zum letzten offenbaren muß:

Wenn
Ihr wahrhaft seid, wie ihr gepriesen werdet,
So zeigt's durch euren Beistand und verherrlicht
Durch mich die Wahrheit! (V, 3)

Werden die Götter antworten oder wird die "taube Not" regieren? Ist das Opfer der Wahrhaftigkeit und Menschlichkeit umsonst, oder wird es angenommen und der Fluch gesühnt, das Verhängnis

abgewendet? Darum geht es nun statt um des bloßen Entkommens. Ein nur äußerliches Eingreifen der Götter wie bei Euripides, ein nur augenblickliches Aufleuchten ihrer im Ganzen und undurchsichtigen Schlüsse wäre hier ein zu geringes Wunder. Das größere Wunder ist das Wunder der Götter im Menschen, ist, daß Thoas sich rühren läßt. Dadurch wird das Gewähren, die Befreiung, die Erfüllung, und damit das Wesen der Gottheit, erst eigentlich offenbar. Wenn in der Heilung Orestes noch ein Rest äußerer Wirkung spürbar blieb, so zeigt sich hier die Gegenwart des Göttlichen im Menschen selbst: "Sie pflegen Menschen menschlich zu erretten."

Wohl noch jede Interpretation der *Iphigenie* hat sich auf die Verse berufen, in denen der alte Goethe den Sinn seines Werkes noch einmal zusammenzufassen scheint: "Alle menschlichen Gebrechen / Sühnet reine Menschlichkeit."² Dabei hat man aber meist übersehen, was hier nicht ausgesprochen aber doch mitzudenken ist. Die sühnende Wirkung der reinen Menschlichkeit ist doch nicht möglich ohne die Teilnahme der frei handelnden, gewährenden oder versagenden Götter.³ Vielleicht ist es ein Hinweis darauf, daß Goethe die Verse erst als Glaubensbotschaft einführt und dann doch nur als Hoffnungsbekenntnis gelten läßt (Vgl. "Was der Dichter diesem Bande *Glaubend, hoffend* anvertraut . . ."). Glauben, das hieße innere Gewissheit, hoffen hat genug im zuversichtlichen Bewußtsein der Möglichkeit: da gibt es Gelingen sowohl wie Mißlingen. Hat man diese Einschränkung übersehen und das Menschliche Iphigeniens als rein durch sich wirkend aufgefaßt, dann hat dies wohl gelegentlich zur Mißdeutung der Widmung sowohl wie des Dramas geführt. Man meinte etwa, daß Goethe als moralisch-metaphysisches Gesetz verkünden wolle, was doch nur als göttliche Gunst wahr ist. Von dem Wissen um diese Wahrheit gibt aber Goethes Lebenswerk immer von neuem Zeugnis.

II

Im Homer reflektiert sich die Menschenwelt noch einmal im Olympe und schwebt wie eine Fata Morgana über der irdischen. Diese Spiegelung tut jedem poetischen Kunstwerk wohl, weil sie gleichsam eine Totalität hervorbringt und wirklich ein Menschenbedürfnis ist. . . . In den Nibelungen ist ein eherner Himmel, keine Spur von Göttern, von Fatum. Es ist bloß der Mensch auf sich gestellt und seine Leidenschaften.—Schon dies ist Goethen ein Hauptbeweis, daß es eine nordische und heidnische Fabel ist.⁴

So berichtet Riemer über ein Gespräch mit Goethe aus dem ersten Jahrzehnt des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, als Goethe sich ausführlich

² Vgl. "Dem Schauspieler Krüger mit einem Exemplar der *Iphigenie*."

³ Von den Erklärern hat dies am deutlichsten Schrempf hervorgehoben, wie denn überhaupt Schrempfs Analyse der *Iphigenie*, trotz oder wegen der mit aller Bestimmtheit an den Tag gelegten Einseitigkeit des Verfassers, noch immer Beachtung verdient. Vgl. Christoph Schrempf, *Goethes Lebensanschauung* (1905 ff.), II, 226 ff.

⁴ Flodoard Biedermann, *Goethes Gespräche*, 2te Aufl. (Leipzig, 1909 ff.), Nr. 942.

mit dem Nibelungenlied beschäftigte. Ähnlich äußerte er sich auch in anderer Gesellschaft, "daß in damaligen Zeiten [d.h., als das Nibelungenlied verfaßt wurde] das wahre Heidentum gewesen wäre, ob sie gleich kirchliche Gebräuche hatten; denn Homer hätte mit den Göttern in Verbindung gestanden, aber in diesen Leuten findet sich keine Spur von irgend einem himmlischen Respekt" (Biedermann, Nr. 1122).

Ein "eherner Himmel ohne Götter und Fatum" ist Goethe unerträglich; er selbst bedarf der wohlthuenden Spiegelung der menschlichen Welt in einer göttlichen. Wie Homer so steht auch der Dichter der *Iphigenie* "mit den Göttern in Verbindung."

Goethe hatte sich zeitig des mythologischen Aufputzes entledigt, der sich in seinen allerfrühesten Dichtungen noch manchmal findet. Später habe er "allenfalls" noch Luna und Amor in seinen "kleinen Gedichten" auftreten lassen, so erklärt er im siebenten Buch von *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Aber die Götter sind ihm gegenwärtig, wann immer sein Herz überschwingt. Schon im Straßburger Lied, da ihm Erfüllung über alles Erwarten vielleicht zum ersten Mal zuteil wird, erkennt er ihre Wirkung: "Und Zärtlichkeit für mich—ihr Götter! / Ich hofft' es, ich verdient' es nicht!" Und am Ende desselben Liedes noch einmal: "Und lieben, Götter, welch ein Glück!" ("Willkommen und Abschied"). Später, wenn er im pindarischen Hymnus sich seines Einsseins mit dem All versichert, da betet er zur göttlichen Natur, zum Allliebenden Vater, Vater Bromius, Vater Ozean, zu Jupiter Pluvius, Phöbus Apollo, zu Musen und Charitinnen.

Es geht uns hier natürlich nicht darum, die Rede von dem "Heiden" Goethe aufzunehmen. Für ihn selbst bedeutet ja, wie wir sahen, "Heidentum" zumeist nicht die Fülle sondern die Leere der Gottheit.

In den *Maximen und Reflexionen* findet sich der Satz: "Wir sind naturforschend Pantheisten, dichtend Polytheisten, sittlich Monotheisten."⁸ Obwohl aus Goethes späteren Jahren stammend, gilt der Satz keineswegs nur für den alten Dichter; denn immer schon ist er alles in Einem, Pantheist, Polytheist und Monotheist.

Es gibt eine griechische Formel, die man wohl als die Urgleichung des deutschen Pantheismus im achtzehnten und beginnenden neunzehnten Jahrhundert bezeichnen kann. Jacobi bezeugt, daß sie auf Lessings Lippen war, als er Goethes "Prometheus"-Gedicht gelesen hatte. Herder nimmt sie in seinen Dialogen über *Gott* wieder auf. Es ist das uralte *ἐν καὶ πᾶσι*, das "Eins und Alles." Die griechische Anschauung, daß das Eine gleich der Allnatur sei, fand man wieder bei Shaftesbury, Rousseau, vor Allem bei Spinoza. Wie für diese Vorgänger, so geht auch für Lessing, Herder und Goethe die Sittlichkeit unmittelbar aus der Verehrung des All-Einen hervor. In jener *Maxime* unterscheidet zwar Goethe den Pantheismus der Natur-

⁸ *Maximen und Reflexionen*, ed. Hecker, *Schriften der Goethe Gesellschaft*, XXI (1907), Nr. 807.

forschung von dem Monotheismus der Sittlichkeit, versteht also den Monotheismus im transzendenten Sinn. Aber die Trennung deutet doch auf eine höhere Einheit, eine letzte Gleichung des Unterschiedenen. Der transzendente Eine, der über allem Sein ist (von dem es ebenso unmöglich ist zu bekennen: "Ich glaub' ihn!" wie: "Ich glaub' ihn nicht!"), muß, um uns nicht zu vergehen, doch auch wieder als Seiender erfaßt werden, der Unnennbare doch noch wieder genannt werden. Die Gottheit muß, um wirklich zu werden, sich offenbaren. Das geschieht, wie Goethe Eckermann erklärt "in Urphänomenen, physischen wie sittlichen . . . hinter denen sie sich hält und die von ihr ausgehen" (Biedermann, Nr. 2657).

Die Dichtenden aber sind Polytheisten. Wir hörten schon, daß eine Spiegelung der menschlichen Welt in der Götterwelt, wie sie bei Homer existiert, "jedem poetischen Kunstwerk wohltue." Wenn spätere Zeiten die Götter "einem unterwerfen oder gar auf einen reduzieren," dann ist dieser "freilich . . . sehr undramatisch . . . weil mit einer Person sich nichts anfangen läßt" (Biedermann, Nr. 1581).*

Es kann nun aber ganz und gar nicht Goethes Meinung gewesen sein, daß die Dichtung im Gegensatz zur Sittlichkeit oder zur Naturforschung sich unverbindlicher Bilder bedienen dürfe, das heißt daß sie minder wahr sei. Die Dichtung hat ihre eigene Wahrheit, und dies ist für Goethe die Wahrheit des Besonderen, des Individuellen. "Die Auffassung und Darstellung des Besonderen ist das eigentliche Leben der Kunst" (Biedermann, Nr. 2180). Gewiß, auch der Naturforscher hat auf das Individuelle zu achten; aber, indem Goethe als Naturforscher nach den Urphänomenen sucht, "Pantheist" bleibt, zeigt sich wie sehr die Richtung aufs Allgemeine auch noch seine entferntesten Studien bestimmt. Überhaupt darf man Naturforschung, Sittlichkeit und Dichtung hier nicht einfach als stoffliche Bereiche verstehen. Wie oft schwingt nicht seine Dichtung in Pantheismus über oder ist vom sittlichen Streben zum Einen beseelt. Wenn das Dichterische (Künstlerische) die Sphäre des Besonderen heißt, bedeutet das, daß er die Welt der vielfachen Gestalten und Schicksale darstellt.

Im vierten Buch von *Dichtung und Wahrheit* hat Goethe, um die Wirkung der biblischen Welt auf seinem Geist anschaulich zu erläutern, die Geschichten der *Genesis* in eigener Erzählung wiederholt und gedeutet. Für den heutigen Leser ist es nun auffällig, daß er bei dieser Wiedererzählung nach der Grundschrift der monotheistischen Religion mehrmals die hebräische pluralische Gottesbezeichnung "die Elohim" verwendet, ja daß er im Fortgang geradezu von den Gottheiten oder Göttern redet, die das Geschick der Erzväter lenken. Wie kommt Goethe zu diesem Gebrauch?

In der Schrift *Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie* hatte Herder die Vermutung ausgesprochen, daß sich in der Bezeichnung Elohim die

* Ähnlich heißt es *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, XV, von Satan (im Gegensatz zu den Titanen, der "Folie des Polytheismus"), er sei "wie der einzige Gott, dem er gegenübersteht, keine poetische Figur."

Erinnerung an einen urtümlichen Polytheismus erhalten habe, und er hatte sich auch sonst ähnlich erklärt.⁷ Der Vorgang Herders wird also für Goethe bestimmend gewesen sein. Dabei mag ihm noch ein anderes Herderwort aus dem gleichen Abschnitt der Schrift *Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie* im Gedächtnis haften geblieben sein. Herder rühmt am biblischen Schöpfungsbericht, er offenbare einen tiefsinnigen "Parallelismus Himmels und der Erde." Ein "Parallelismus Himmels und der Erde," ist das nicht beinahe das gleiche wie die Spiegelung der menschlichen Welt in der göttlichen? Aus der Art der Darstellung der Patriarchengeschichten in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* wird man also schließen dürfen, daß Goethe die Bibel als ähnlich befriedigend empfand wie den Homer: auch hier gibt es Götter und ein Fatum.

Die Beschäftigung mit diesen Geschichten wird zum Anlaß für eine wichtige theoretische Unterscheidung. Es gibt, so erklärt Goethe, zwei Arten von Religion, eine "allgemeine, natürliche," und eine "besondere, geoffenbarte." Die erste, so erläutert er, "ruht auf der Überzeugung einer allgemeinen Vorsehung, welche die Weltordnung im Ganzen leite." Eine besondere Religion dagegen, also "eine von den Göttern diesem oder jenem Volk offenbarte, führt den Glauben an eine besondere Vorsehung mit sich, die das göttliche Wesen gewissen begünstigten Menschen, Familien, Stämmen zusagt." Dies Prinzip der Besonderung wird weiter auseinandergesetzt: "So wie eine besondere, geoffenbarte Religion den Begriff zum Grunde legt, daß Einer mehr von den Göttern begünstigt sein könne als der Andere, so entspringt sie auch vorzüglich der Absonderung der Zustände." Daraus ergibt sich dann die Vorstellung, "daß man die Götter, die man doch immer als Partei, als Widersacher oder Beistand ansah, durch Getötetes herbeiziehen, sie versöhnen, sie gewinnen könne" (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Buch IV).

Im Mittelpunkt dieser Analyse steht der Begriff der Vorsehung. Ob es eine Religion ohne Vorsehungsglauben geben könne, wobei dann der Zufall Gott wäre, das wird gar nicht erwogen. Das Nibelungenlied, das nicht von Göttern und Schicksal weiß, heißt ja darum heidnisch, das ist areligiös. Der Mensch ist religiös dadurch, daß er sein Schicksal als Ganzes, als nicht zufällig erfährt.

Goethe führt weiterhin aus, daß die allgemeine Religion, und das ist gleichbedeutend mit der "Überzeugung, daß ein großes, hervor-

⁷ *Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie*, Erster Teil, II. Dabei pflegt Herder zu betonen, daß der eigentliche Polytheismus in der Bibel überwunden sei. Vgl. z.B. *Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit*, Buch 10, Kap. 5: "Das eine, was dies philosophische Stück [d.h. der mosaische Schöpfungsbericht] mit jenen [asiatischen] Sagen gemein hat, sind etwa die Elohim, vielleicht den Lohen, den Zophesamim usw. vergleichbar, hier aber zum Begriff einer wirkenden Einheit geläutert; sie sind nicht Geschöpfe sondern der Schöpfer." Für Goethe ist der Begriff der Elohim so ansprechend, daß er ihn unbedenklich auch dort verwendet, wo in der Bibel die andere Gottesbezeichnung (Jehovah) gebraucht ist, z.B. bei der Erzählung von der babylonischen Sprachverwirrung.

bringendes und leitendes Wesen sich gleichsam hinter der Natur verberge, um sich uns faßlich zu machen," sich "einem Jeden" aufdringe. "Ja wenn er auch den Faden derselben, der ihn durchs Leben führt, manchmal fahren ließe, so wird er ihn doch gleich und überall wieder aufnehmen können" (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Buch IV).

Wo solch eine Überzeugung ungemildert durch den Glauben an eine *besondere* Vorsehung besteht, da kann sie leicht in die Vorstellung von der Notwendigkeit allen Geschehens übergehen. Diesem Gedanken kann etwas außerordentlich Erhebendes und sogar Befreiendes innewohnen, besonders wenn die Notwendigkeit nicht einfach mechanisch sondern organisch-pantheistisch verstanden wird. Wer sich in der Enge seines privaten Schicksals benachteiligt oder verletzt fühlt, wird durch das Bewußtsein der das All beherrschenden Notwendigkeit versöhnt. Gegen die Unbill des Olympiers beruft sich Prometheus auf "die allmächtige Zeit und das ewige Schicksal, meine Herrn und deine" ("Prometheus" [Gedicht]). "Die große Notwendigkeit erhebt, die kleine erniedrigt den Menschen," lautet ein von Riemer überlieferter Ausspruch Goethes aus dem Jahr 1803 (Biedermann, Nr. 707). Dabei ist es die Anschauung der Natur, die immer wieder zu dem Gedanken einer großen Notwendigkeit hinführt.

Goethe scheint, darin noch in der Tradition der Aufklärung befangen, es für wahrscheinlich gehalten zu haben, daß die allgemeine Religion älter sei als die besondere, obwohl seine Redeweise erkennen läßt, daß sich in ihm doch auch Zweifel an dieser Annahme regten. Verhielte es sich wirklich so, so würde das bedeuten, daß der Mensch über die Natur im Ganzen früher als über seine besonderen Verhältnisse nachgedacht habe.

Es ist das Wesen der besonderen Religionen, die menschlichen Dinge, das die einzelnen erhebende oder zu Boden reißende Schicksal als im göttlichen Plan vorgesehen zu betrachten. Wer allein der allgemeinen Religion anhängt, mag darin etwas Egoistisches sehen. Es ist weit von hier zu jener spinozistischen Uneigennützigkeit, die bekennt: "Wer Gott recht liebt, muß nicht verlangen, daß Gott ihn wiederliebe" (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Buch XIV).

Goethes eigene Entwicklung ging sicher von einer besonderen Religion aus: der christliche Vorsehungsglaube, in dem der Knabe aufwuchs hat ganz den Charakter einer solchen. Die Nachrichten vom Erdbeben in Lissabon hatten ihn zum ersten Mal darin erschüttert, und diese Erschütterung wirkte nach, ob er sich gleich im Augenblick beruhigen ließ. Auf jeden Fall bedurfte der Vorsehungsglaube nun einer besonderen Rechtfertigung.

Gottlosigkeit, "Heidentum" ist das Dasein ohne Glauben an eine höhere Fügung. Die allgemeine Religion bedeutet die Gewissheit einer letzten Notwendigkeit hinter allem Geschehen. Wie ist hiergegen

das Wesen der besonderen Religion, des Glaubens an besondere partiische Götter abzugrenzen? Gegenüber der allgemeinen Gottheit ist die besondere, geoffenbarte, beschränkt, wie aus den Begriffen der Besonderung und Parteilung unmittelbar erhellt. Der Universalismus im prophetischen Judentum und im Christentum scheint zwar über die Beschränkung hinauszuführen, bleibt aber theoretisch in den Schwierigkeiten der Theodizee und praktisch dennoch im Partikularismus stecken. Nun bedeutet aber die Beschränkung der Gottheit zugleich ihre Freiheit. Eine besondere Vorsehung besagt, daß das menschliche Geschehen weder durch Notwendigkeit noch durch Zufall bestimmt ist sondern durch göttliche Freiheit.

Das Wissen um göttliche Freiheit entstammt der Erfahrung der Erfüllung, das heißt der Erfahrung, daß Gelingen in menschlichen Dingen nicht, oder doch nicht immer, Zufall sei sondern in einer inneren, aber nicht notwendigen Übereinstimmung stehe mit menschlichem Planen, Hoffen, Tun: vor Allem mit des Menschen Gebet, das es gewährt und übertrifft. Immer von neuem ist Goethe von solcher Erfahrung überwältigt, und dann wird auch der Dank auf seinen Lippen zum Gebet.^a

Aber der Segen, den die Götter austeilen, ist doch nur durch Sonderung und Parteilung und damit durch Beschränkung. Auch hiervon kündigt Goethes Dichtung:

Denn ein Gott hat
Jedem seine Bahn
Vorgezeichnet,
Die der Glückliche
Rasch zum freudigen
Ziele rennt.
Wem aber Unglück
Das Herz zusammenzog,
Er sträubt vergebens
Sich gegen die Schranke
Des ehernen Fadens,
Die die doch bittere Schere
Nur einmal löst.

(„Harzreise im Winter“)

Weil Erfüllung frei ist, wird sie nicht jedesmal und nicht einem jeden. Immer ist sie nur vor dem Hintergrund der Möglichkeit der Nicht-Erfüllung, des Versagens, des Unglücks. Ist dann aber nicht das Gültige des Göttlichen nur in seiner den Menschen vernichtenden Übermacht?

Was unterscheidet
Götter von Menschen?
Daß viele Wellen
Vor jenen wandeln,
Ein ewiger Strom:
Uns hebt die Welle,

^a Vgl. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Buch I; Biedermann, Nr. 2.

Verschlingt die Welle,
Und wir versinken.
("Grenzen der Menschheit")

Aber so erschütternd auch die Erfahrung der "Grenzen der Menschheit," und das heißt des Unterschiedes, der Getrenntheit der Götter von den Menschen für Goethe gewesen sein muß, immer wieder kehrt er doch dahin zurück, das eigentliche Wesen der Götter in ihrer Freiheit, ihrer Fähigkeit zu antworten, zu erfüllen, zu suchen. Nicht die "unfühlende Natur," die die Sonne "über Bö's und Gute" leuchten läßt, nicht das Glück, das "blind unter die Menge tappt," nicht die Gewalt von "ewigen, ehernen, großen Gesetzen" sind die eigentlichen Zeugen göttlichen Wesens. Gegen alles dies erscheint es wahrhaft doch erst im Wunder, im "Unmöglichen," das der Mensch vermag, im "Wählen" und "Unterscheiden," also in der Freiheit. Gegen Notwendigkeit und Zufall ist Freiheit das "Unmögliche." Sie vermittelt uns die Vorstellung von den "unbekannten höhern Wesen, die wir ahnen," die wir nach unserm Bild entwerfen und doch als unser Vorbild verehren. Ahnen heißt hier nicht vages, unklares Fühlen. Es bedeutet das Vernehmen eines Möglichen, das nur, wenn es in der rechten Art vernommen ist, wahr wird.

Solch Ahnen ist nun allerdings weit entfernt von dem Glauben an eine besondere Vorsehung, wie Goethe ihn bei den biblischen Erzvätern findet. Deren Glaube trägt keinen Zweifel, es ist ein Glaube, "der unerschütterlich sein muß, wenn er nicht sofort von Grund auf zerstört werden soll" (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Buch IV). Alles widrige Geschehen ist ihm nur eine Prüfung der "Glaubensfestigkeit." Wenn wir zur Erklärung von Goethes Vorstellung von den Göttern davon ausgingen, was er selbst über eine besondere Religion ausführt, so ist nun deutlich, warum Goethe, im Ganzen gesehen, viel mehr von den griechischen Göttern als vom biblischen Gott oder selbst von den biblischen Göttern Kunde gibt. Es ist, weil die göttliche Freiheit, so sehr er ihrer im Augenblick der Erfüllung gewiß sein mag, ihm doch nie zur eindeutigen "Realität," zum unangefochtenen Glaubensbesitz wird, weil sie ihm immer neu zu erprobende Möglichkeit bleibt.

Von solcher Möglichkeit kündigt die *Iphigenie*. Den Hintergrund bildet der Tantalidenfluch, das Grauen vor der Grausamkeit der Götter. Im Parzenlied tut sich dieser Hintergrund als Abgrund auf, der alles zu verschlingen droht. Fast erscheint es unglaublich, daß ein Mensch, der da hineingeblickt hat, noch an mögliche Erfüllung glauben kann, nicht ganz in Fatalismus oder doch Stoizismus aufgeht. Ist es nicht sträfliche Verblendung, wenn er dennoch wieder "sein verirrt Aug zur Sonne kehrt, als wenn drüber wär', ein Ohr zu

* Für diesen Absatz vgl. das Gedicht "Das Göttliche."

hören seine Klage, ein Herz wie seins, sich des Bedrängten zu erbarmen?"¹⁰

Wenn Iphigenie dennoch das "Unmögliche" unternimmt und an die Götter apelliert, ja ihr Heil dafür einsetzt, dann bedeutet das offenbar, daß das Tun des "Unmöglichen" selbst ihr die Kraft gibt, "jene zu glauben,"¹¹ sie als mögliche Erfüller zu ahnen.

Alles kommt darauf an, hier die Bedeutung des Möglichen richtig zu fassen. Dächte man, Gewährung von Iphigeniens Gebet hieße, daß bei diesem Einsatz ein endgültiges Scheitern ausgeschlossen wäre, würde man die Bedeutung des Dramas gänzlich mißverstehen. Bedarf es hierfür noch einer Bestätigung, dann mag darauf hingewiesen werden, daß in Goethes Produktion auf die *Iphigenie* ein Drama folgt, das einen entschieden anderen Ausgang nimmt.

Tasso ist, vergleichbar dem Orest, von Wahngebilden verfolgt, die ihn gänzlich zu zerstören drohen. Wie dem Orest Iphigenie, so steht Tasso die Prinzessin gegenüber als eine schwesterliche Seele, die den von seinem Dämon Aufgebrachten zu bändigen und zu heilen sucht. Aber was Iphigenien gelingt, gelingt der Prinzessin nicht. Umsonst versucht sie beim Herannahen der Katastrophe, die Götter um Hilfe anzuflehen. Ihr fehlt das Zutrauen zu ihrem eigenen Gebet:

Mein Auge blickt umher, ob nicht ein Gott
Uns Hilfe reichen möchte, möchte mir
Ein heilsam Kraut entdecken, einen Trank,
Der deinem Sinne Frieden brächte, Frieden uns.
Das treuste Wort, das von der Lippe fließt,
Das schönste Heilmittel wirkt nicht mehr.

(Torquato Tasso, III, 4)

Die reine Menschlichkeit der Prinzessin kann doch Tassos Gebrechen nicht sühnen. Es wäre vergeblich, wollte man den Grund dafür in der Beschränktheit ihres Wesens suchen oder wollte man erklären, Tassos Vermessenheit, sein sich "frei wie ein Gott" Fühlen wäre frevelhafter als Orests Schuld. Das Scheitern im *Tasso* ist so wenig aus einer Notwendigkeit zu erklären wie die Erfüllung in der *Iphigenie*. Die Götter, die das eine frei gewähren, verhängen ohne Zwang das andere. Ihr Göttlichstes aber ist ihre Freiheit zu gewähren.

Weil man dies verkannt hat, hat man die *Iphigenie* getadelt:

Die glückliche Lösung der Verwicklung ist . . . doch nur eine zufällige Gunst der Götter. . . . Die Fabel menschlicher Schicksale, die der Dichter uns vorführt, ermangelt also der typischen Allgemeinheit. Dadurch wird die erbauliche Wirkung empfindlich beeinträchtigt. Wer die Lebensfreudigkeit lehren will, muß von dem schlimmsten Fall ausgehen. Das Trauerspiel ist die einzig mögliche Form für die Darstellung einer optimistischen Weltanschauung. (Schrempf, a.a.O., II, 233 f.)

Es geht aber Goethe gar nicht um die Verkündigung der "Lebensfreudigkeit" oder einer "optimistischen Weltanschauung," die den

¹⁰ Vgl. "Prometheus" (Gedicht).

¹¹ Vgl. "Das Göttliche."

Menschen noch im Unglück seines Heils versichert. Das Allgemeine, um das es Goethe geht, ist vielmehr die Allgemeinheit des Möglichen. Dies Mögliche ist nicht Zufall oder Optimalfall (wofür es keines Beweises bedarf) sondern die Möglichkeit der Erfüllung. Solche Erfüllung steht nicht einfach im Gegensatz zum Scheitern. Scheitern selbst ist nicht ohne die Möglichkeit der Erfüllung und Erfüllung ist nicht ohne mögliches Scheitern. Die Möglichkeit der Erfüllung angesichts der Bereitschaft zum Scheitern, das ist der eigentliche Inhalt der *Iphigenie*. In dieser Möglichkeit offenbart sich das Wesen der Götter.

In jüngster Zeit hat die Hölderlinforschung zu erneuter Beschäftigung mit der Frage nach dem Wesen der Götter geführt. Es mag angezeigt sein, die Untersuchung über das Wesen der Götter in Goethes *Iphigenie* mit einer Erinnerung an Hölderlin zu beschließen. Im Hinblick auf Sophokles sagt Hölderlin:

Viele versuchten umsonst, das Freudigste freudig zu sagen,
Hier spricht endlich es mir, hier in der Trauer sich aus.
(Epigramm)

Ist nicht, so möchte man fragen, in der *Iphigenie* das Freudigste, die Möglichkeit, dennoch freudig gesagt?

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THE ROLE OF MYTHOLOGY IN POETRY DURING THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE

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Since today the interest in poetry concerns its essence rather than its changing modes, the question arises whether the use of classical mythology in the sixteenth century has been a definite contribution to great French poetry. We dismiss as of no great importance the usual allegations that the use of mythology meant ornamentation, fortunate exterior effects, pretext for erotic scenes,¹ secularization of medieval Christian allegory,² periphrastic flattery, philological playfulness, humanistic alexandrinism, and amusing pedantry.

We feel fascinated, however, by the clever scherzando-mythology of amorous complaints or compliments based on the Greek anthology, which assume esprit and gracefulness by sometimes turning a distich into a genuine quatrain made up of Alexandrine lines or into a chanson with only a slight, inconspicuous change.

When the vigilant servant of Hélène de Surgères makes it difficult for Ronsard to call at ease on this, his lady, the poet declares himself reminded of Argus with the hundred eyes, who was appointed by Hera to be guardian of the daughter of Inachus, Io, changed into a white heifer, lest her husband, Jupiter, might repeat his adultery with her. Ronsard uses for his purpose an epigram of Paulus Silentiarius which runs as follows: "I fear the eye of the old woman who stands beside you like the many-eyed herdsman of Inachos' daughter." But he sends Hélène the distich in the following charming French version:

Jamais le chef d'Argus, fenestré de cent yeux
Ne garda si soigneux l'Inchiade pucelle
Que sa rude paupière à veiller éternelle
Te regarde, t'espie, et te suit en tous lieux.³

Pontus de Tyard at a similar occasion would make the more optimistic variation of this theme in the following manner, the watching Argus being replaced by the peacock with the many-eyed feathers:

Du riche oiseau de Junon les cent yeux
Ne peuvent tant veiller la blanche Vache
(Ta race chère, ancien fleuve Inache)
Qu'un dieu facond ne la ravisse aux lieux.⁴

¹ Raymond Lebègue, *Ronsard: L'Homme et l'œuvre* (Paris, 1950), "Mythologie," pp. 137-58.

² Fritz Saxl, *Antike Götter in der Spätrenaissance* (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 4, 22, 30.

³ James Hutton, *The Greek Anthology in France* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1946), p. 373.

⁴ Pontus de Tyard, "Des Erreurs amoureuses," Livre III, No. 5, in *Œuvres poétiques de Jean Dorat et de Pontus de Tyard*, ed. Ch. Marty-Laveaux (Paris, 1875), p. 103.

Bairr discovers the elegant hexameter of Rufinus: "Thou hast the eyes of Hera, Melitta, and the hands of Athene." And a typical French *chanson* spontaneously begins to sing in him:

Tu as les yeux de Junon, o Meline,
Tes blonds cheveux sont d'Aurore les crins.⁵

But we are more impressed by the fact that France, following and outdoing Italy in the use of mythology, discovers, a century earlier than England⁶ and two centuries earlier than Germany,⁷ the secret of Homeric imagination, Platonic symbolism, Ovidian magic, Virgilian plasticity, and Horatian objectivity given to sentiments. We furthermore marvel at the entirely organic, not academic, inclusion of the Greco-Roman myth into the French tradition, at the dignity conveyed to poetic style by the classical allusions and their metonymical circumlocutions, at the beauty springing from the richness and splendor of Greek proper names, and at the depth of meaning inherent in the historically so well understood myths of the Ancients. To synthesize the problem we would say that the French Renaissance has created a genuine modern lyricism: first, by using a style based on the euphony of Greek mythological terms and names, thus separating verse from prose almost in the sense of *poésie pure*; second, by developing classical myth into a grandiose concept of nature; and third, by shading with it in a new and refined manner the psychology of love.

Stressing these achievements, we must keep in mind that there is at issue, nevertheless, a typically imitative poetry which despite its closeness to the Latin and Greek sources wants to be original. How is such a thing possible? Considering for a moment the problem from a merely technical viewpoint one could say: by rearranging, revamping, telescoping, and fusing the source-elements in an unexpected manner. But much more important is the genuine understanding of Greco-Roman myth, for the first time in history, as a profound penetration of seasonal, atmospheric, and astronomical symbolism with its impact on life and death. Conventional clichés suddenly receive new meanings, nay ambivalent and polysemantic implications. Therefore there is made a new application of such a mythology to an organic integration in modern and personal experience. Since the main experience of which the French poet used to sing is love, the great myth of Eros is particularly developed and filled with new overtones of enthusiasm, bliss, and suffering, according to the case. This circumstance makes even imitative poetry so personal, individual, and original during the sixteenth century, that Louise Labé's amorous tragedy, Maurice Scève's cryptic yearning, Ronsard's juvenile and mature love, Pontus

⁵ Hutton, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

⁶ Charles Grosvenor Osgood, *The Classical Mythology of Milton's English Poems* (New York, 1910), pp. x ff., xxiii ff.; Henry Gibbons Lotspeich, *Classical Mythology in the Poetry of Edmund Spenser*, dissertation (Princeton, 1932), pp. 6 ff.

⁷ Ilse Martens, *Die Mythologie bei Mörike*, dissertation (Marburg, 1921).

de Tyard's playing with the snares of Cupid, in short all aspects of love find a proper mouthpiece in the empathetic use of Greco-Roman mythology.

As to the problem of *poésie pure*, Ronsard actually feels distressed for not being able to confer the melodiousness and rhythm of the Greek language to his own French by inserting ordinary euphonic words into his poetry:

Ah que je suis marry que la Muse française
Ne peut dire ces mots comme fait la Grégeoise,
Ocmore, dyspotmé, oligochronien.⁸

But why not invoke in an epithalamion the god of wedlock with his Greek name which exists in two possible French forms: Hymen (not general in the sixteenth century) and Hyménée (general term in the sixteenth century)? Why not combine these words with the vocative-ô placed in rhythmical change before either of them and produce by this simple means the musical effect required by Ronsard: "O Hymen, Hyménée / Hymen, ô Hyménée"?⁹ Then for the mythological hymns which Chamard calls "d'une qualité supérieure"¹⁰ and which reveal the spell that came to Ronsard from Apollonius' *Argonauticon*, a further step was made. Beautifully sounding names were selected and arranged in euphonic groups: Calais and Zetès, Polux and Castor¹¹ (not Castor and Polux). Finally epithets were created which bestow the dignity of the ancients to these hymns, epithets appearing obscure at first sight, because arrived at by long detours. Let us select some examples. Since fistfighting was mainly practiced in Amyclea, hometown of the Dioscuri, Ronsard calls Polux "adroict et fin en l'art Amyclean," and because Polux was famous for his victory at the Olympic games in Elis, he calls him "L'honneur le plus fameux du sablon Eléan."

If we forget about certain exaggerations, there can not be any doubt that Ronsard, like Góngora and Milton later, imparts beauty to his poetry by heaping up such allusions through euphonic suffixes epithets. They produce an arcane and poetically pure dignity, because they cannot be readily grasped in a discursive way. Apollo may be called Cynthian like his sister Artemis, because Mount Cynthus is typical for his home island Delos; he may be called Pythian, because Pythia in Delphi utters the oracles in his name; he may be called Cyrenean because Cyrene, daughter of Hypseus, became the mother of Aristaeus through Apollo; he may be called Patarean and Thymbrean according to his famous shrines in the Greek colonies of Patara and Thymbra in Asia Minor. These arcane epithets actually became

⁸ P. de Ronsard, "Le Tombeau de Marguerite de France, Duchesse de Savoye," *Œuvres complètes*, ed. H. Vaganay (Paris, 1923), IV, 296.

⁹ "Epithalame d'Anthoine de Bourbon et de Janne Royne de Navarre," *Œuvres complètes*, III, 218.

¹⁰ Henri Chamard, *Histoire de la Pléiade* (Paris, 1939), II, 180.

¹¹ "De Polux et de Castor," *Œuvres complètes*, VI, 117 ff.

the euphonic backbone of Ode XX which is a splendid example of oratorical solemnity derived from mythological paraphrase:

O Père, ô Phœbus Cynthien,
O Saint Apollon Pythien,
Cyrenean, Patarean,
Pour qui le trépied Thymbrean
Les choses futures devine.

(*Œuvres complètes*, III, 81)

The endings *ā* and *ē* express pompousness, so also do the localities dedicated to the Muses to whom the Macedonian town of Pimpleia was sacred as well as the Mount Cirra near Crissa northeast of Delphi. Therefore streams and mountains sacred to the nine sisters are referred to by "les ruisseaux Pimpleans" or "les monts Cirrheans." More sprightly the Muses are called according to their horse Pegasus "les Muses Pegasides" and in regard to their sacred spring Aganippé "Aganipides."¹² Such mythological-poetic mosaics can always be used to make poetry more pure, less logical and prosaic when adapted to the circumstances. They appear combined with impressive rhythmical, dramatic, and even realistic aids, with stylistic repetition, chiasm, personification, polysyndeton, hyperbaton, all imperceptibly crowded together into new patterns which were sketched but never developed by the Greeks. Thus a serious and worthy mythological complaint, almost in the style of the much later André Chénier, is intoned by Ronsard at the death of Charles IX, and it can not be denied that the lines sound very genuine, as though accompanied by a death knell:

Les lauriers étaient secs, sec le bord Pimplean.
Le silence effroyait tout l'antrè Cyrrean:
De limon et de sable et de bourbe estoupée
Claire ne courait plus la source Aganippée.

("Panégyrique de la Renommée à Henry III,"

Œuvres complètes, IV, 424)

With the help of a moderate use of the hyperbaton the epithet may undergo poetizations, even if it be a less remote allusion; for then it is by the weird word order that its strictly logical apprehension will be blocked. Bold enjambements lacking, of course, in the classical sources, work in the same direction and allow, for instance, the grouping of the sanctuaries of Venus according to harmonies of front- and back-vowels. Thus strong musical effects are derived from the following prayer to Venus:

Vous de l'eau poissonneuse fille,
Qui dans le creux d'une coquille
Vinstes à Cypre, et qui Gnidon
Gouvernez, et Paphe et Cythère.

("Aux Muses . . .," *Œuvres complètes*, III, 253)

¹² "A Msgr. le Duc d'Alençon," *Œuvres complètes*, III, 171.

Mythology lends itself to the most diversified poetical patterns, to rhetorical global constructions of imposing majesty, to oxymoronic surprises, to surrealistic enigmas. For rhetoric-majestic purposes Ronsard and Du Bellay, following Virgil, compete in calling Venus la Cyprienne; Diana, l'Ephésienne; Juno, la Tritonienne;¹³ and Cybele the Magna Mater, la Bérécyntienne (after Mount Berecynthus in Phrygia where she was particularly worshipped). Virgil in *Aeneid* VI.781-87, had compared Rome in her pride and strength to this Berecynthian mother who as foundress of cities rides turret crowned through the Phrygian towns in her chariot pulled by lions: "qualis Berecynthia mater / Invehitur curru Phrygiæ turrita per urbes" (*Aen.* VI.784-85).

Du Bellay in his famous sonnet takes a still deeper breath and reaches a more awesome solemnity. With the even longer French name Bérécyntienne and the outdrawn analytical epithets and adverbial circumlocutions, he provokes a vibrating tension before finally, at the end of the comparison, naming the ancient city of Rome, so different in her dignity from the modern Rome in which he is loath to live. The poetic center of energy of these four lines definitely remains the solemn expression: Bérécyntienne.

Telle que dans son char la Bérécyntienne
Couronnée de tours, et joyeuse d'avoir
Enfanté tant de Dieux, telle se faisait voir
En ses jours plus heureux ceste ville ancienne.¹⁴

Quite a different mythic exploitation for poetry is the one Ronsard uses in his harvest hymn to Bacchus (1554), where he harps on the legend that Bacchus after the death of his mother Semele was nourished in the thigh of his father Jupiter. But jealous Juno poked fun at the *cuisse-né*, as Ronsard calls Bacchus well imitating Marullus' *femorigena*, and is furious "D'avoir veu son mary estre devenu mère."¹⁵ This is indeed a preclassic oxymoron of the Racinian kind: "Et veuve maintenant sans avoir eu d'époux." One step more and a true superrealistic dream imagery is reached. If, for instance, the name of Apollo who nightly returns his chariot into the sea belonging to Neptune is replaced by the realistic word *soleil*, whereas Neptune's sea is periphrastically rendered by *le sein du vieillard*, oniric elements are ready for the following expression of Ronsard which might provoke the envy of André Breton:

Quand le soleil à chef renversé plonge
Son Char doré dans le sein du vieillard.
(Sonnet LVIII, *Œuvres complètes*, I, 71)

¹³ Walter Henry Storer, *Virgil and Ronsard*, dissertation, University of Illinois (Paris, 1923), p. 101.

¹⁴ Joachim Du Bellay, *Œuvres poétiques*, ed. crit. Henri Chamard, II, *Recueils de sonnets* (Paris, 1910), p. 9.

¹⁵ Alice Klengel, *Pierre de Ronsards Hymnendichtung*, dissertation (Leipzig, 1931), p. 145.

As is the case with all of the Pindaric Odes, the poetic principle of Pléiade mythology is not logical sequence, but beauty, intensity, and boldness.¹⁰ At this point we may remember that Ronsard is always conscious of changing and outdoing the classical patterns of the Ancients as he underscores himself:

Je fis d'autre façon que n'avaient les antiques,
Vocables composés et phrases poétiques,
Et mis la poésie en tel ordre qu'après
Le Français s'égalait aux Romains et aux Grecs.
("Réponse à quelque ministre," *Œuvres*, ed. Vaganay, VI, 340)

Our problem becomes clearer when we consider that classical mythology provides the Renaissance poets with great nature poetry, not an idyllic but a cosmic nature poetry. Unconsciously the Renaissance poets are aware that expansion on nature mythology is the only way of grasping the world poetically in contradistinction from other Renaissance tendencies of grasping it scientifically. But even consciously Ronsard would justify the use of pagan fables by saying: "L'auteur se sert exprès de ceste fausse opinion . . . ; car sans telle invention il eust fallu se montrer plutost historiographe que poète."¹¹ Thus the coming of Spring no longer means naïvely that Winter has left behind his cloak of rain and wind, Earth has donned a new flowery livery, and the quartermasters of Summer have arrived, as imagined so nicely by Charles d'Orléans. Now, the divine bull who abducted beautiful Europa rams Heaven with his mighty horn so that the bliss of vegetation starts raining through the wide open doors of April. To express this frantic storming of the Ram pushed by the Spring against any well-established order, Ronsard chooses the quite unusual trochaic meter colliding with the iambic structure and oxytonal genius of the French language and casts his thought into the presto of short octosyllabic lines:

Toreau qui dessus ta crope
Enlevas la belle Europe
Parmy les voyes de l'eau,
Heurte du grand Ciel la borne,
Et descrouille de ta corne
Les portes de l'an nouveau.
("Avant-venue du printemps," *Œuvres complètes*, III, 78)

It is in Lucretius' spirit of the cosmogonic Eros that Ronsard makes Zephyrus catch the nymph Flora (who in strict classical myth would be his own bride) in order to give this goddess of flowers as a fitting mate to Spring who languished for her and

Si tost que le Printemps en ses bras la reçeut,
Femme d'un si grand Dieu, fertile, elle conceut

¹⁰ Gilbert Highet, *The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature* (New York, 1949), p. 225.

¹¹ *Franciade*, "Argument," *Œuvres complètes*, VI, 377.

Les beautés de la Terre, et sa vive semence
 Fit soudain retourner tout le monde en enfance.
 ("Hymne du printemps," *Œuvres complètes*, VI, 147)

Continuing certain trends of classical myth, the French poets now can distinguish poetically the slightest shades in seasonal changes of which the Middle Ages were entirely unaware. Thus early Summer appears now quite different from Spring as well as from Summer proper. Early Summer is expressed by giving an astronomical constellation mythical plasticity: "Phœbus has mounted the bull," while the flower-goddess Flora tinges the silver, azure, and green of meadows with a slight golden tan. This gilding again is expressed by Pontus de Tyard in a symbolic symphony, echoing the sound group: or (gold):

Qui voit quand Phébus est sur le Toreau monté,
 L'argent, l'azur, le vert et l'or dont Flora dore
 Le dos des prez herbuz, peut penser voir encore
 L'honneur du gay Printemps.
 (*Œuvres poétiques*, p. 180)

Coming back at this point for a moment to the *poésie pure* problem, it must be mentioned that such an aspect of nature given through mythology sometimes is expressed in grandiose, but almost baroque and highly sophisticated fashion, particularly by Maurice Scève. Scève wants to say that during the canicular constellations of Procyon during the hottest days of summer, one could well think that Phaëton dropped again the chariot of the Sun. Later, however, one is shocked to see that under the sign of the Virgo Phœbus against all expectations has ardently fallen in love with this chaste young girl of the Zodiac. The apparent pun is clad in obscure hermetic language, almost of the Paul Valéry pattern. Scève uses the type of contrast, not A, but B, typical also for Góngora, and introduces the concept that under the undue conditions of such late summer adventures of the amorous sun-god, the poor astounded mortals behave themselves paradoxically as though they were under a cold-wave rather than under a heat-wave: they shudder. This is the text:

Non celle ardeur du Procyon céleste
 Nous fait sentir de Phaëton l'erreur:
 Mais cet aspect de la Vierge modeste
 Phébus enflamme en si ardente chaleur
 Qu'aux bas mortels vient la froide terreur.¹⁸

"Scève," says Verdun-L. Saulnier, "réussit le mieux dans un mixte de mythologie et de réalisme," and thus he presents morning as Aurora extinguishing all the starry candles and inviting Day-Apollo to rise from the lower regions to steep in gold the high mountain peaks:

¹⁸ Maurice Scève, Sonnet LXII, *Œuvres poétiques*, ed. Bertrand Guégan (Paris, 1927), p. 25.

L'aube éteignoit étoiles à foison
Tirant le jour des régions infimes
Quand Apollo montant sur l'horizon
Des monts cornus dorait les hautes cimes.
(Sonnet LXXIX, *Œuvres poétiques*, p. 31)

Here we may observe that the mythological scaffolding provided a frame for the new free nature-poetry whose coming into being without a previous Greco-Roman mythology is historically unthinkable. Du Bellay interprets Dusk as Night during the inceptive action of gathering a large flock of wandering stray stars in her fold (*parc*).¹⁹ Neither he nor Ronsard needs the obscurities of Scève²⁰ to lyricize their imagery and keep it none the less from the imitative epic eye of the painter. In his "Hymne de l'Hiver" it is Ronsard who in his way no longer uses drastic mythological paraphrases but simply speaks of Night and Stars and Earth to produce the same poetic realism which always haunted him and made him sigh in his Preface to the Hymns: "Ah, les Chrestiens devoient les Gentils imiter!" He imagines Night as donning the star-spangled black gown woven in her honor by Earth, so that with it she may cover, as with a wide protecting cloak, the weary and tired human beings as they sleep:

... et la Nuit est allée
En son antre vestir sa grand robe estoilée
Que la Terre fila et ourdist de ses mains
Pour couvrir les sourcils et les yeux des humains.
("Hymne de l'Hiver," *Œuvres complètes*, VI, 177)

Ronsard, however, reaches still a greater effect by poetic condensation of what he finds in his classical sources. Thus a thunderstorm is to him Jupiter driving his horses galloping over a flame-covered firmament. The horses with their neighing throw lightning through the holes in the clouds, the seams of which are bursting in hundreds of thousands of places under the impact of the thunderbolts, born out of hoofs and mouths of these horses. But in its almost Goethean lyrical condensation as offered by Ronsard this myth is much more eerie and undistinguishable than it may appear in this prosaic description stressing the details. To this effect there must be added rather the final thundering sounds (*u*). Furthermore, it must be stressed that the Horatian and Virgilian sources do not suggest the galloping hoofs nor do they identify the neighing with lightning or show the bursting of the seams of the clouds. But the hallmark of this true lyricism of Ronsard is again that nothing can be sharply visualized. He actually says:

Tu as beau, Jupiter, l'air de flames dissoudre
Et faire d'un grand bruit galloper tes chevaux,

¹⁹ See Joseph Vianey, *Les Regrets de Joachim Du Bellay, Les grands événements littéraires* (Paris, 1946), p. 46.

²⁰ Scève, Sonnet CCCLII, *Œuvres poétiques*, p. 123.

Ronflans à longs éclairs par le creux des nuaux
 Et en cent mille éclats coup sur coup les desoudre.
 (Sonnet LVII, *Œuvres complètes*, II, 107)

No doubt, it is by the method of putting such decisive lyrical embroidery on a classical myth-nucleus that the culture-minded Frenchmen created their first great nature-poetry which slowly developed into a cosmic lyricism that tried to get along without even the aid of the Ancients. But this goal, normal for Anglo-Saxon poetry, was never fully reached in France.

The proper French genius is always at his best, however, when dealing with the psychology of love, unrequited, desired, imagined, rewarded, fulfilled. The poetic use of mythology, and even nature mythology, for this purpose leaves troubadours and Petrarchists behind as almost meaningless. The burning love poetry of Louise Labé, forsaken by Olivier de Magny, does not utter her cravings so brutally as did for instance the feminine troubadour, the Comtesse de Die. She is aware that the harmony of the world is based on love, Apollo's love for Aurora renewed every day, and Cynthia's love for Endymion renewed every night. Were the love partners of Phæbus and Cynthia absent, chaos would ensue, as is the case with Louise Labé, the tragically abandoned woman, the new Sappho:

Luisant Soleil que tu es bien heureux
 De voir toujours de t'Amie la face:
 Et toy, sa sœur, qu'Endimion embrasse
 Tant te repais de miel amoureux.

 Voilà du Ciel la puissante harmonie:

 Mais s'ils avaient ce qu'ils aiment lointain,
 Leur harmonie et ordre irrévocable
 Se tournerait en erreur variable
 Et comme moy travailleroient en vain.²¹

Maurice Scève who, it is believed, sued in vain the poetess Pernette de Guillet, called her in the more hopeful days "ma lune," as she called him "mon jour." Later when, as Verdun-L. Saulnier made it appear probable, she became the wife of another and unreachable for Scève, her poet called her Délie as Virgil called Delia the Moon-goddess who is reluctant to love. Visionary power, stylistic discretion, lyrical effacing of too much clarity, superior imagery,²² and a wounded sorrow vibrating behind the expressions now reveal Scève's mixed feeling in the most condensed mythological fashion. As the Romans identified the Moon-goddess with the Greek goddess of the World of Shadows, Persephone or Hecate, so now does Scève identify his

²¹ *Poésies de la Belle Cordière Louise Labé, Lyonnaise*, Editions Chamontin (Paris, 1946), Sonnet XXII, p. 48.

²² Verdun-L. Saulnier, *Le Prince de la Renaissance lyonnaise, initiateur de la Pléiade Maurice Scève italianisant, humaniste et poète (ca. 1500-1560)*, thèse (Paris, 1948), p. 306.

Lunà, Delia, Trivia, Dictynna, with Hecate who has condemned him to the life of a departed spirit and made Earth his Hell; but still she remains the beautiful, though unapproachable, goddess of Delos, the chaste Diane who lifts him up to Heaven as the good eternal feminine principle, as a belated *donna angelicata*, as "Das ewig-Weibliche." Most of all, however, her image—nay, she herself—lives in him in a quasi-Platonic mystical sense. She remains infused in his veins, like *Délie-Lune* infuses her pale light into Endymion when he is sleeping so that this beautiful youth has only a vague certitude but not the true enjoyment of her presence. All this is marvelously condensed in six lines:

Comme Hécate tu me feras errer
Et vif et mort cent ans parmy les Umbres:
Comme Diane au Ciel me reserrer,
D'où descendis en ces mortels encombres,
.
.
.
Mais comme Lune infuse dans mes veines
Celle tu fus, es, et seras Délie.²³

Pontus de Tyard in a less renouncing, but also more playful, poem is not ready to leave alone with her husband the *mal mariée*, whom he loves, and he stages symbolically a fight of Phœbus Apollo with Neptune for having his blond young Aurora delivered to him by the oldster as the property of his heart. This is as much the nature-symbolism of a cloudy early morning as it is a Tristan-like complaint for the absent beloved one. Here is this virtuoso interpenetration on two levels of nature and eroticism:

Pourray-je bien sans toy, ma chère guide,
Monstrer, ce jour, face seraine et claire?
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.
.
Ainsi Phébus dolent se print à dire
Ne voyant point l'Estoiile blonde luire
Qui le conduit. Puis adjouta encore:
.
.
.
Ah! n'as tu pas assez longtemps tenue
Entre tes bras jaloux ma blanche Aurore?
(*Œuvres poétiques*, pp. 79-80)

Amadis Jamyn, set afire by love after having seen his beautiful Artemis, can not help comparing himself to Acteon who was dilacerated by his greyhounds after having spied at the goddess bathing herself in a spring. So much is Jamyn himself torn by the greyhounds of imagination, desire, hope, and fear, that he puts the old theme into a melancholy scherzo anticipating the taste of the *Précieuses*:

Le penser, le désir, l'esperance et la peur
Sont les amoureux chiens qui m'assaillent le cœur,

²³ Scève, *op. cit.*, Sonnet XXII, p. 12; and Saulnier, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

Me déchirent les flancs d'une importune presse.
 J'ay beau crier aux chiens: "Hélas, épargnez moy,
 Vostre Maistre je suis"; pour leur response j'oy:
 "On ne voit qu'à tel prix une grande Déesse."²⁴

If Jamyn plays with fire under the image of Acteon "qui vit la beauté nuë," Joachim Du Bellay does so under the image of the Lydian shepherd Gyges, who was able with the help of a magic ring and the connivance of King Candaules, her husband, to see Queen Nyssia or Rhodope in her sleep. To restore her honor, the queen obliged Gyges to kill the king and marry her. Thus Du Bellay, another Gyges, wants only to see Olive unadorned, without asking for the very last favor which Jupiter extorted from Danae when entering her brazen tower through the roof in the form of a golden shower. How much more poetic is this turn, even of a voluptuous craving, compared with the poor and bluntly expressed wish of certain troubadours to be admitted to the dressing-rooms of their ladies.

Je ne souhaite point me pouvoir transformer
 Comme fait Jupiter en pluye jaunissante
 Pour escouler en vous d'une trace glissante
 Cest ardeur qui me fait en cendres consommer
 .
 Je souhaite plutost pour voir ce beau visage
 .
 L'anneau qui fait en Roy transformer un Berger.
 (*Les Amours*, Sonnet XX, *Œuvres poétiques*, p. 246)

Continuing the Danae-motif, Pontus de Tyard on his part, with strange metonymical allusions and echoing effects, complains that the austerity of his lady-love would not even admit of Jupiter's stratagem of a gold rain defying a brazen tower:

Malgré la Tour du Roy trop curieux
 Qui dans l'érain la belle dame cache,
 Au sein aimé l'Amant caché se lache
 Souz le tresor de son or pluvieux.
 .
 Mais trop faible est, or puissant, ta nature
 Pour faire entrer l'amoureuse douceur
 Auprès d'un cœur que la rigueur emmure.
 (*Œuvres poétiques*, p. 103)

Ronsard's most daring (but also most dignified and mythologically so competent) eroticism would ask the last favor from Cassandre using the Danae myth. He wishes to fructify her as a true mythical sower²⁵ with a rich seed of golden rain, and, as a new and better Narcissus, he

²⁴ Theodosia Graur, *Un Disciple de Ronsard, Amadis Jamyn, 1540(?) - 1593* (Paris, 1929), p. 201.

²⁵ Johann Jakob Bachofen, *Urreligion und antike Symbole*, ed. Albrecht Bernoulli (Leipzig, 1926), II, 33.

would plunge into her as his fountain, and all this in an eternal nuptial night which Aurora should be forbidden ever to interrupt. This, indeed, is the Alba-dream of the troubadours on a cosmic level:

Je voudroy bien richement jaunissant
En pluye d'or goutte à goutte descendre
Dans le giron de ma belle Cassandre,
Lors qu'en ses yeux le somme va glissant

Je voudroy bien pour alléger ma peine,
Estre un Narcisse et elle une fontaine
Pour m'y plonger une nuit à séjour:
Et si voudroy que ceste nuit encore
Fust éternelle et que jamais l'Aurore
Pour m'esveiller ne rallumast le jour.

(Sonnet XXII, *Œuvres complètes*, I, 24)

The delicacy of the daring compliment seems balanced by the cosmic myth enshrined in love symbols which contain as a guarantee of a sound eros the element of productive creation as well as of duration even in an erotical play. Myth works here even as the preserver of human dignity.

Bringing this study of sixteenth-century mythology to a close, we may stress that all these mythical allusions, strange to us, were the most natural thing to cultured, humanistic readers in that time. For them there is not imaginable another kind of poetry which would embrace to the same degree vision, boldness, keen and beautiful analogies, rich imagery, sentiment of nature and love, word music, and expressive rhythm.

The Ancients, it is true, had all these elements down to the verbal patterns in their mythological poetry, but they were arranged differently and perhaps less consciously enjoyed. Thus, we may say, the ratio between the ancient and the sixteenth-century French mythology is that of a *mythologie perdue* and a *mythologie retrouvée*. But this refinding does not mean only the transfiguration of beautiful fancies of yore, but a lively adaptation of convincing symbols for the interpretation of life and cosmos in exquisite language. It goes without saying that among the bulk of mythological poems of the sixteenth century, there are many failures, too. We have tried, however, to point out the achievements. What we have separated in this short study for didactic purposes by analytical criticism, in reality is synthetically united in the single poems: *poésie pure*, and a truly cosmic approach to nature and love. It is not thinkable that this threefold aim could ever have been reached without the use of classical mythology. The Moderns have not proved until now that they were able to develop Freudian dreams and the primitive myth of aborigines into poetry as the Greeks had done, developing and making poetical their own once primitive interpretation of the cosmic forces. The French of the

Renaissance showed wisdom in using their symbolic heritage with intelligence and taste. Contrasting the modern oniric-psychic poetry with the mythological one of the sixteenth century, we are tempted to subscribe therefore to Boileau's conviction:

Sans tous ces ornements le vers tombe en langueur,
La poésie est morte ou rampe sans vigueur.²⁰

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²⁰ Boileau, *L'Art poétique*, Chant III, verses 189-90, *Œuvres poétiques*, ed. F. Brunetière (Paris, 1899), p. 213.

NOTAS A LA GLOSA "VIVO SIN VIVIR EN MÍ" DE SANTA TERESA Y DE SAN JUAN DE LA CRUZ

Por HILARIO S. SÁENZ

Hasta cuarenta y tres poesías se le han atribuido a Santa Teresa de Jesús, pero la crítica más circunspecta apenas considera como seguramente suyas sólo siete. Una de éstas es la glosa "Vivo sin vivir en mí," la más famosa de todas las poesías atribuidas a la Santa.

Según el Padre Yepes (así lo nombra Don Vicente de la Fuente en notas a los *Escritos de Santa Teresa*¹ y así lo cita Romera-Navarro,² llevando al lector incauto al borde de confundir a este Padre Yepes con Juan de Yepes o sea San Juan de la Cruz), a quien identificaremos mejor llamándole Padre Diego de Yepes, prior de San Lorenzo del Escorial y obispo de Tarazona, en su *Vida, virtudes y milagros . . . de Teresa de Jesús* (Madrid, 1595), la Santa escribió esta glosa en Salamanca al concluir la cuaresma de 1571. La motivó la fuerte impresión que le produjo "un cantarcillo de cómo era necio de sufrir vivir sin Dios" cantado por una novicia. He aquí la primera estrofa: "Véante mis ojos / Dulce Jesús bueno / Véante mis ojos / Muérame yo luego."³

San Juan de la Cruz también escribió otra glosa del "Vivo sin vivir en mí," en la cual encontramos varias estrofas idénticas o casi idénticas a las de la glosa de la Santa. En las historias de la literatura española corrientes, con la excepción de la de Valbuena Prat,⁴ donde hay una breve mención de la coincidencia de estrofas, no se nos dice nada de la glosa de San Juan de la Cruz. Este descuido es lamentable, especialmente si consideramos que la fama de Santa Teresa como poetisa la debe principalmente a su glosa sobre este tema, de cuyos versos llegó a decir el venerable Palafox que "fué prodigio no quemasen el papel en que se escribían. Y si fué prodigio no quemar el papel en que se vertían, mayor maravilla era sin duda no convertir en pavesas el corazón en que centelleaban."⁵

Los estudios especiales dedicados al santo, aunque mencionan su glosa, no aclaran el problema de las estrofas comunes en las versiones de ambos poetas. Allison Peers hace una breve referencia a la glosa de San Juan en su *Spirit of Flame*,⁶ pero no la incluye en su *Anthology of Spanish Poetry*. El Padre Silverio de Santa Teresa la inserta en su edición de *Obras de San Juan de la Cruz*⁷ y nos remite al P. Crisó-

¹ B.A.E., LIII (Madrid, 1861), 502, 509.

² Romera-Navarro, *Historia de la literatura española* (Boston, 1949), p. 186.

³ B.A.E., LIII, 155.

⁴ Valbuena Prat, *Historia de la literatura española*, I (Barcelona, 1950), 573.

⁵ B.A.E., LIII, 155.

⁶ Allison Peers, *Spirit of Flame* (London, 1946), p. 106.

⁷ P. Silverio de Santa Teresa, *Obras de San Juan de la Cruz* (Burgos, 1929).

gono de Jesús Sacramentado para dilucidar el problema de la confusión de las estrofas. Mas el P. Crisógono no hace esfuerzo alguno por aclarar la confusión, y sin embargo, afirma que la glosa del santo es

superior a la que sobre el mismo asunto compuso Santa Teresa, y cuyas estrofas han venido confundiendo malamente. De más perfecta hechura las de San Juan de la Cruz, brillan también por lo ceñido de la expresión y lo elevado de las ideas, que corren mansamente por una versificación fácil y aliñada que contrasta con los prosaísmos de la glosa teresiana.⁸

Ante estas alabanzas se hace imperativo el esfuerzo para aclarar la confusión para que así podamos juzgar mejor los méritos de las glosas de los dos santos, tan superlativamente ensalzadas por los Padres Palafox y Crisógono.

Dámaso Alonso nota (como podemos ver en *B.A.E.*, LIII, 509, 510) que a Santa Teresa se le atribuyen dos glosas y a San Juan una sobre el mismo tema. También observa la coincidencia de varias estrofas en las composiciones de los dos autores. Siguiendo a Baruzi, dice que "parece que en el texto de Santa Teresa se han interpolado posteriormente algunas estrofas de su compañero en la reforma carmelita."⁹

Según Baruzi, y gracias al manuscrito de Sanlúcar de Barrameda de las obras de San Juan de la Cruz, está asegurado el texto del "Cántico Espiritual" y nos orientamos de modo muy probable en lo que se refiere a sus otras poesías. En la lista que sigue al "Cántico" encontramos "Vivo sin vivir en mí." En el verso final de la tercera estrofa el copista había escrito "que bivo porque no muero." El *bivo* aparece raspado, y entre líneas se ve la corrección *muero* con letra que corresponde a la de San Juan de la Cruz. Hay que notar que con esta tercera estrofa empieza la serie de seis (de las ocho que tiene la glosa de San Juan) que, con pequeñas variantes, vemos también en la poesía de la santa. Estas seis estrofas no aparecían, según Baruzi, en un ejemplar conocido por la Madre María de San Alberto, carmelita descalza de Valladolid. Es lástima que Baruzi no nos dé más informes sobre este ejemplar. Basándose, pues, en dos detalles, interesantes, pero no conclusivos, Baruzi se inclina a creer que las seis estrofas son de San Juan y que, a causa de una interpolación, fueron introducidas en la poesía de Santa Teresa.¹⁰

A esta conclusión creo que podemos llegar examinando las composiciones de ambos santos. Los dos escribieron varias glosas a lo divino basadas en temas amorosos de la poesía trovadoresca. Aunque los críticos no han hallado los tres versos glosados, "Vivo sin vivir en mí / Y tan alta vida espero [San Juan dice "Y de tal manera espero"] que muero porque no muero," el tema es frecuente en los cancioneros

⁸ P. Crisógono de Jesús Sacramentado, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica y su obra literaria* (Madrid, 1929), II, 230.

⁹ Dámaso Alonso, *Poesía de San Juan de la Cruz* (Madrid, 1942), pp. 112 y sig.

¹⁰ Jean Baruzi, *Saint Jean de la Croix* (Paris, 1931), pp. 49-51.

del siglo XV. Dámaso Alonso cita varios ejemplos. El siguiente del *Cancionero Geral de Resende* es muy semejante: "E con tanto mal crecido / Ya no vivo porque vivo / Y muero porque no muero." El P. Crisógono da como otra fuente probable de la letrilla los siguientes versos de Juan de Meneses: "Porque es tormento tan fiero / la vida de mi cautivoque no vivo porque vivo / y muero porque no muero."¹¹

El tema va seguido de trece estrofas en la primera glosa de Santa Teresa y de cuatro en la segunda. De estas la segunda y tercera son, con dos o tres cambios insignificantes, la primera y segunda de su primera glosa. Las diecisiete estrofas quedan así reducidas a quince.

La glosa de San Juan sobre el mismo tema consta de ocho estrofas de idéntica estructura a las de la santa, y de éstas las seis finales corresponden, con pequeñas variantes, a las seis últimas de las trece de la primera glosa de Santa Teresa. Si estas seis estrofas son de San Juan, las de la santa serían nueve, de siete versos cada una, o sea un total de sesenta y tres versos. La de San Juan tendría cincuenta y seis.

Es de notar que en la colección de poesías atribuidas a la Santa no hay ninguna tan extensa como sería su primera glosa con trece estrofas. Aun reduciendo el número a nueve (siete de la primera glosa y dos de la segunda) sería ésta su poesía más larga, con la excepción acaso de la glosa "Vuestra soy, para Vos nací," de doce estrofas iguales a las de "Vivo sin vivir en mí." He dicho *acaso* porque en algunas ediciones faltan las estrofas tercera, séptima, undécima y duodécima.¹²

Por otra parte, si las seis estrofas de dudosa filiación fuesen de Santa Teresa, la glosa de San Juan se reduciría a las dos primeras estrofas, catorce versos, quedando así truncado el desarrollo del tema. De sus restantes glosas, la más breve, "Sin arrimo y con arrimo," tiene veintisiete versos además de los del tema.

Hay otro detalle importante que viene a reforzar la tesis de que las seis estrofas discutidas son de San Juan de la Cruz. En las primeras siete estrofas de su primera glosa, la Santa sólo se refiere a Dios en la tercera persona. Empezando con la cuarta estrofa y terminando con la séptima, se dirige en la segunda persona de singular a la muerte y a la vida alternadamente. Tampoco se dirige a Dios en las dos estrofas nuevas de la segunda glosa, y en la última de éstas habla a la muerte en la misma forma familiar.

En cambio San Juan usa esta segunda persona para hablar a Dios. Esto lo vemos en su segunda estrofa y en todas, menos la segunda, de las seis estrofas en cuestión. En ningún caso habla el santo a la muerte o a la vida.

Recapitulando los argumentos aducidos en favor de la atribución de las seis estrofas a San Juan de la Cruz vemos: (1) La corrección de *bivo* por *muero* hecha en la tercera estrofa (primera de las discutibles) al parecer de puño y letra de San Juan en el manuscrito de Sanlúcar

¹¹ P. Crisógono de Jesús Sacramentado, *ob. cit.*, p. 230, nota.

¹² Vide B.A.E., LIII, 517, 518, notas.

de Barrameda; (2) En una de las versiones de la poesía de la santa, la de la Madre María de San Alberto, faltan las seis estrofas; (3) La comparación de la extensión de las glosas de ambos santos con sus otras composiciones poéticas me hace creer más probable que la Santa sea la autora de nueve estrofas (en lugar de quince) y el santo de ocho (en vez de dos, lo cual dejaría la glosa bastante imperfecta); (4) La atribución de las seis estrofas a San Juan la veo también justificada por la secuencia en el uso de la segunda persona para dirigirse a Dios, que vemos en la segunda estrofa de su glosa y en cinco de las seis susodichas.

Ahora, ¿fué la poesía de San Juan o la de Santa Teresa la que primero glosó el tema? Esto no se sabe de cierto, pero la crítica, tal vez algo caballerescamente, se inclina a dar la prioridad a la de la Santa, en la cual pudo inspirarse la de San Juan. De mayo de 1572 a diciembre de 1577 vivió éste en Ávila, donde fué vicario y capellán de las monjas de la Encarnación y, por algún tiempo, confesor de la Santa, cuyas obras escritas antes de 1577, todas o en parte, probablemente leyó San Juan. Bien pudo, pues, haber leído su famosa glosa, escrita en 1571, y, atraído por el tema, tan de acuerdo con sus anhelos espirituales, la imitó.¹⁸

Tampoco me parece improbable que la Santa, que en su glosa habla directamente con la vida y con la muerte, como obstáculo la primera y liberación la segunda para unirse al Amado, viera en la versión de su compañero en la reforma carmelita, donde se dirige no a la vida o a la muerte, algo terreno todavía, sino a Dios mismo, un grado más alto de sublimación mística que la cautivó y la llevó a añadir a su primera glosa, sin intención de plagio, las seis estrofas del Santo. Pero se me preguntará ¿por qué no incluyó las otras dos primeras? Yo creo que la razón es clara. Si leemos la séptima estrofa de la primera glosa de Santa Teresa, la última antes de las seis añadidas, que termina "Pues a El solo es el que quiero," seguido este verso del estribillo "Que muero porque no muero," y las tres primeras estrofas de San Juan, vemos que no es posible la conexión lógica de las estrofas de la Santa con las de San Juan hasta la tercera de éste, la cual empieza "Estando ausente de ti."

Aunque la gloria de poeta la deberá principalmente San Juan a sus tres poemas escritos en la lira de Garcilaso (Subida del Monte Carmelo, Noche oscura del alma y Cántico espiritual) y a su Llama de amor viva, creo que los argumentos expuestos más arriba justifican la esperanza de que en las nuevas historias de la literatura española o en nuevas ediciones de las ya escritas se dedique algún espacio a la glosa del Santo para que con la de su espíritu gemelo, el de Santa Teresa, comparta la merecida admiración de estudiantes y maestros.

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¹⁸ Vide M. Bonnard, "Les Influences réciproques entre Sainte Thérèse de Jésus et Saint Jean de la Croix," *Bulletin Hisp.*, XXXVII (1935), 129-48.

REVIEWS

The Literature of the Anglo-Saxons. By GEORGE K. ANDERSON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. ix + 431. \$5.00.

As long ago as 1932 in a review of some books on Old English in *Speculum*, F. P. Magoun asked whether the time was ripe for a history of Old English literature. It was and is. Mr. Anderson's answer to this query is an elaborate book of fourteen chapters with copious notes, four maps, and an index.

Chapter I (The Anglo-Saxons) is a brief introductory account of the invaders of Britain, the Roman occupation, the Anglo-Saxon conquest, and the nature of early Anglo-Saxon society. The ten pages of notes on this chapter contain much bibliography. My comments here and all I have to say on subsequent chapters and notes are given in a spirit of promoting the usefulness of the book and of aiding the author in any subsequent edition. Note 1: *Our Forefathers, the Gothonic Nations* is the correct title. Vol. I was translated by Jean Young from Schütte's *Vor Folkegruppe Gottjod* (Copenhagen, 1926). Vol. II apparently has no Danish original. Kemp Malone's review is unfavorable (*MLN* 50.106-08). Schütte argues once more for the term "Gothonic" in *Philologica: The Malone Anniversary Studies* (Baltimore, 1949), which contains seventeen papers on Old English matters and a full list of Malone's numerous articles and reviews. Note 3: A good place to put such discussion as that in Chapter II.1. Note 7: Add E. Schröder, "Hengist und Horsa" (*ZDA* 77.69-72). Note 21: Add D. P. Dobson, "Mount Badon Again" (*Antiquity* 22.43-45) and P. K. Johnstone (*Antiquity* 20.160). Note 29: Add articles by A. S. Cook (*Speculum* 1.375-97) and P. F. Jones (*Speculum* 3.335-48).

Chapter II is a brief foreword to the literature. Note 1: Add Kemp Malone, "Anglo-Saxon" (*Word Study* 23.1-2), which is a short history of the word and its meaning. Note 5: Add K. Malone, "Lift Patterns in Old English Verse" (*ELH* 8.74-80). He has a good treatment of OE versification in A. C. Baugh and others, *Literary History of England* (New York, 1948), Book I, Part 2, Chapter 3. On J. C. Pope see R. E. Past (*MLN* 64.310). Note 11: Space forbids the elaborate comment I could give. Brooke is outdated; so are the dry bones of *CHEL*, the others mentioned here, and M. Williams, *Word-Hoard* (New York, 1940) not mentioned. The best treatment to date is Malone's in A. C. Baugh and others. It is now available in Vol. I, recently reprinted (1950). The *Oxford History of English Literature* announces a forthcoming volume on Old English literature by J. C. Pope. I hope it will be better than some that have appeared in that series.

Chapter III (The Old English Heroic Epic Poems) treats *Widsith*, *Beowulf*, *The Fight at Finnsburg*, *Waldere*, *The Battle of Brunanburh*, *The Battle of Maldon*. This chapter suffers too much from sweeping generalizations and guesswork (pp. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 75, 81, 88). Note 2: Some of the books cited here are outdated, and some, like Routh's, offer little to the scholar and are misleading to the layman. Note 5: Malone's articles on *Widsith* are listed in his bibliography in *Malone Anniversary Studies*. Add Caroline Brady's article (*Speculum* 15.454-59), which is valuable for bibliography. Note 6: Best treatment of *thulas* is by Malone in Baugh and others, *Literary History of England*, Book I, Part

1, Chapter 4. Note 9: On the text of the Junius MS, see J. R. Hulbert (*JEGP* 37.533-36). Krapp edited the poems in *The Vercelli Book*, which is correctly stated on page 356, note 13. Herben's article is here called "useful," but at the top of page 345 its theory is "unconvincing." For an enumeration of theories of how the *Vercelli Book* reached Italy, see E. E. Ericson (*N&Q* 171.138). Note 11: M. Heyne's edition, revised by Schucking, I use in the 10th and 13th editions (Paderborn, 1913 and 1929) for a good conservative text, notes, and vocabulary. Wyatt and Chambers' *Beowulf* was reprinted in 1920 with additional notes. Olivero's (cited at top of p. 100) contains the Wyatt and Chambers text and a good Italian prose rendering. Malone's "Beowulf" (cited on p. 99) is a critical analysis of the poem. Batchelor's "The Style of *Beowulf*" deals mainly with the Christian element. On analogues, add H. B. Woolf (*MLN* 62.261-62) and L. Whitbread (*MLN* 57.281-82). On scenery, add R. M. Estrich (*JEGP* 43.384-89) and H. B. Woolf (*MLN* 57.113-15). On weapons, add S. M. Kuhn (*JEGP* 42.82-95). Note 22: Add Marie Hamilton, "The Religious Principle in *Beowulf*" (*PMLA* 61.309-30). Note 24: Add Malone, "Readings from the Thorkelin Transcripts of *Beowulf*" (*PMLA* 64.1190-1218). Note 30: Add H. Kokeritz (*MLN* 58.191-94) and Malone (*MP* 43.83-85). Note 32: Add Malone (*ELH* 10.257-84). Note 36: Add H. B. Woolf (*MLN* 53.109-12). Fragments of Cotton Otho A XII survive in the British Museum. Hearne got his text of Maldon from John Elphinston, not the MS itself. The latter's transcript is folios 7-12 of Rawlinson B 203 in the Bodleian, which Gordon used as a basis for his text. See E. V. K. Dobbie, *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems* (New York, 1942), which gives a text, good treatment, and a good bibliography. Finally, on the mention of Unferth (p. 70) and the so-called digression on the swimming match, see the recent valuable article "Unferth" by H. B. Woolf (*MLQ* 10.145-52). The translation of the passage of Beowulf's fight with Grendel (p. 71) would have profited from C. S. Brown, "Beowulf's Arm-Lock" (*PMLA* 55.621-27). H. W. Splitter (*MLN* 63.118-21) would not have helped, I think.

Chapter IV (The Old English Christian Epic) deals with the so-called Caedmonian Cycle, the signed poems of Cynewulf, and "miscellaneous" poems, such as *Judith*, *Andreas*, *Guthlac A* and *B*, *The Dream of the Rood*, *The Phoenix*, *Physiologus*. A strange bunch of bedfellows to be called epics! Here, also, there are too many loose generalizations (pp. 117, 125, 126, 128, 130, 133, 136, 137, 141, 143). Note 6: The references here are enough. What little of value is in Chapter VI could be relegated to this note, and the bibliography cited there I can best answer by reference to my forthcoming study entitled "Medieval Drama, 1933-1950," which will deal with what is done and undone in the field. Note 19: Add B. J. Timmer, *The Later Genesis* (Oxford, 1948). On the Milton problem see Hanford's *A Milton Handbook*, 4th ed. (New York, 1946), pp. 250-52. Note 20: The quotation from Legouis is not only harsh but unintelligent. Note 28: Add K. Mittelberger (*Speculum* 13.426-32) and Claes Schaar, *Critical Studies in the Cynewulf Group* (Lund, 1949). Note 49: Add H. R. Patch (*PMLA* 34.233-57) and W. O. Stevens, *The Cross in the Life and Literature of the Anglo-Saxons* (Yale Studies in English 23.1904). Margaret Schlauch treats the antecedents in Latin poetry and rhetoric (*Essays and Studies in Honor of Carleton Brown* [New York, 1940]). Note 53: Add F. Cordasco, "The Old English *Physiologus*" (*MLQ* 10.351-55).

Chapter V (Miscellaneous Old English Poetry) deals with *Deor's Lament*, *The Wanderer*, *The Seafarer*, *The Ruin*, *The Wife's Lament*, *The Husband's Message*, *Caedmon's Hymn*, *Doomsday*, *The Address of the Soul to the Body*,

the Exeter Riddles and Gnostic Verses, and various minor poems. Note 1: Add Whitbread's articles on *Deor* (MLN 55.204-07, 58.367-69, 62.15-20; JEGP 41.368-69); Malone (MP 40.1-18). Note 15: For sources of *Caedmon's Hymn* see A. C. Cook (*Speculum* 2.67-72). Note 22: Add Carleton Brown, "*Poculum mortis* in Old English" (*Speculum* 15.389-99), which solves a crux in Exeter Gnostic Verses. Note 25: Add Erhardt-Siebold's articles (PMLA 63.3-6, 64.884-88; *Malone Anniversary Studies*, pp. 9-17). Other articles on riddles in *Malone Anniversary Studies* are by N. E. Eliason (p. 18) and A. Taylor (p. 1). A. Taylor, *The Literary Riddle to 1600* (Berkeley, 1948) is valuable. Note 44: Add articles by Magoun (MLN 58.33-34), Meroney (MLN 59.157-60), and Wardale (JEGP 39.107-14). Note 47: On runes see, A. G. Brodeur (University of California Publications in English 3.1-15). Germanic runes are no longer derived from the Greek alphabet; see A. Nordén (*Berichte zur Runenforschung*, 1.26). Note 50: Add P. W. Sowers, "The Wayland Scene on the Franks Casket" (*Speculum* 18.104-11), which gives much bibliography and a photograph of the front of the casket (left: The Revenge of Wayland; right: The Adoration of the Magi). Note 63: For light on Longfellow and *The Grave*, see H. B. Woolf, "Longfellow's Interest in Old English" (*Malone Anniversary Studies*, pp. 281-89). Note 64: Add Kenneth Jackson's *Studies in Early Celtic Nature Poetry* (Cambridge, 1935) and *Early Welsh Gnostic Poems* (Cardiff, 1935), which are useful for comparative purposes.

Chapter VII (Anglo-Latin Literature) deals with Gildas, Nennius, Aldhelm, Bede, Alcuin, etc. Note 3: There is a 3rd edition of Bright's book (Oxford, 1897). Note 4: Add P. K. Johnstone, "Dual Personality of Saint Gildas" (*Antiquity* 22.38-40). Note 19: Add A. S. Cook (*Speculum* 2.363-73) and Erika von Erhardt-Siebold (*Speculum* 7.252-56, 10.276-80). Note 31: There is a poem composed in a mixture of Greek, Latin, and Old English in praise of Aldhelm, which is in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge MS 326, containing Aldhelm's prose *De Virginitate*. It is printed in Dobbie, *Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems*, p. 97. Note 33: Add M. L. W. Laistner, "Was Bede the Author of a Penitential?" (*Harvard Theological Review* 31.263-74). With reference to Bede manuscripts, add Olga Dobiasche-Rojdestvensky's description of the Leninograd MS of Bede's history (*Speculum* 3.314-21), which is valuable for the photographs of the page that has at the bottom the Northumbrian version of *Caedmon's Hymn*, next oldest to the version in the Moore MS (Cambridge). Beeson mentions the Leningrad MS, but gives no reference to this article. Possibly he used M. L. W. Laistner and M. H. King, *A Handlist of Bede's Manuscripts* (Ithaca, 1943). Note 37: Add here the article by J. P. Elder (*Mediaeval Studies* 9.141-50). Note 51: Add the article by L. Whitbread on Bede's *Versus de Die Indicii* (PQ 23.193-221). Note 57: Add Arthur Kleinclauz, *Alcuin* (Paris, 1948), a standard biography of Alcuin. Note 79: It seems worthwhile to call attention to Ernst R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948), an epoch-making book, which argues against the present idea of studying vernacular literatures in isolation and ignoring or underrating their debt to Medieval Latin literature. See Laistner's valuable review (*Speculum* 24.259-63).

Chapter VIII (The Work of King Alfred) deals with the Alfredian translations and certain works "within Alfred's sphere." Note 7: On the D version of the *Old English Annals*, see Magoun, "Territorial, Place, and River Names in the *Old English Annals*, D text (Cotton Tiberius B IV)," (*Harvard Studies and Notes in Phil. and Lit.* 20.147-80). On the E version, see B. J. Whiting,

"The Rime of King William" (*Malone Anniversary Studies*, pp. 89-96), which treats the entry for 1087 (wrongly dated 1086, on p. 294) in the Laud (Peterborough) version. On version F, add Magoun, "Annales Domitiani Latini" (*Mediaeval Studies* 9.235-95), who uses this term to designate the Latin portion of Cotton Domitian A VIII, which closely parallels the OE version in the manuscript. On the Parker version, add Robin Flower and Hugh Smith, *The Parker Chronicle and Laws* (C.C.C. MS 173), A Facsimile, Early Eng. Text Society, Original Series, 208 (London, 1941). The article by Tatlock (listed p. 298) comments on a commonly misunderstood passage in the Peterborough version. Note 9: *The Proverbs of Alfred*, as stated here, belongs to the twelfth century, and therefore the discussion (p. 290) is out of place here. It is properly treated in Middle English. Missing in the references in this note is H. P. Smith, *The Proverbs of Alfred Studied in the Light of the Maidstone Manuscript* (New York, 1931). Note 18: Add at the end Magoun, "Some Notes on King Alfred's Circular Letter on Educational Policy Addressed to His Bishops" (*Mediaeval Studies* 10.93-108). Note 19: S. H. Kuhn's article on Bede (*JEGP* 46.168-76). Note 26: Add A. C. S. Ross, *The Terfinnas and Beormas of Othhere* (Leeds, Eng., 1940). The latest discussion of Alfred as a geographer is the article of R. Ekblom (*Studia Neophilologica* 14.115-44). Note 30: The most convenient Latin text of Boethius' *Consolatio* is the Loeb Library volume edited by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (London and New York, 1918), with a good introduction and an English translation. Patch's and Barrett's books are good sequels to Stewart's outdated book. Familiarity with recent Boethius studies would correct such statements as are on pages 261, 273, 285, and 304, note 38. See E. K. Rand (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 15.16 ff.); A. P. McKinlay (*ibid.*, p. 18); F. Klingner, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* (Berlin, 1921); V. Schurr, *Die Trinitätslehre des Boethius* (Paderborn, 1935); W. Bark (Harvard Theological Review 39.55-69, and *Speculum* 21.312-17); and H. R. Patch (*Speculum* 4.62-72, 22.443-45, 23.287). Note 57: Add Simeon Potter, "King Alfred's Last Preface" (*Malone Anniversary Studies*, pp. 25-30) which is a good corrective to statements on pages 285-90 and in notes 57 and 58. Note 71: R. M. Lumiansky is making a study of the manuscripts of the OE *Dialogues of Gregory* and preparing a new edition to supplant the defective one of H. Hecht cited here.

Chapter IX (Aelfric and His Works) gives a satisfactory treatment and cites very adequate bibliography in the notes. I can add only M. Dubois, *Aelfric, Sermonnaire, Docteur et Grammairien* (Paris, 1943). Chapter X deals briefly with Wulfstan and various homiletic writings. Note 1: On Wulfstan add R. J. Menner (*MLN* 63.1-9). Note 9: Add R. Willard (*Malone Anniversary Studies*, pp. 65-78) and R. J. Menner (*ibid.*, pp. 56-64), which are useful for bibliography not cited here. Note 13: Add R. Willard (*Speculum* 12.147-66) and see his excellent review of M. Forster (*Speculum* 9.225-31). To the note on the *Lorica Hymn* (p. 363) I add F. J. H. Jenkinson, *Hisperica Famina* (Cambridge, 1908). Chapter XI is a brief note (3 pages) on secular didactic writings and Chapter XII (6 pages) deals with prose fiction. Chapter XIII is a short account (13 pages) of scientific writings. Note 1: Forsey's article cited is very important since it gives the Latin text of the *Preface*, illustrations of the MS, and a translation in English. F. N. Robinson's review of Crawford's study in *Speculum Religionis* is important (*Speculum* 5.236-37).

Chapter XIV (Retrospect) is a brief review of "what is available in Old English for reading, study, delight, and profit," speculation about what has

perished, profitable paths for possible scholarly investigation, and a criticism of the teaching of Old English (bottom of p. 406 and p. 407). I can sympathize with the author's point of view in this last, because I, too, was a victim of the purely linguistic approach to Old English where literature was neglected. For over twenty years I have taught my course as Old English language and literature. It has been my practice to give a course of lectures on the literature so that my students might be properly introduced to the subject and know their way about in the books and articles in the field. A purely linguistic course has no business in an English department. It might be proper in a department of comparative linguistics. I may say in conclusion that my lectures are finally growing into a book, for which there still seems to be some room.

MILLETT HENSHAW

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The Permanence of Yeats: Selected Criticism. Edited by JAMES HALL and MARTIN STEINMANN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. Pp. vi + 414. \$5.00.

While Yeats's posthumous fame was rising, his academic champions and critics were not silent. By the end of 1949, Yeats had been made the subject of about five hundred essays and fifteen full-volume studies, running to perhaps ten thousand pages of critical commentary. James Hall and Martin Steinmann have worked through this mass of material and selected from it twenty-four essays that pleased their fancy. These, together with an invaluable bibliography and the editors' own moderate and very sensible introductory essay, make up *The Permanence of Yeats*.

Among the critics represented in the collection are many who have been in the habit of snarling at one another. But under the pacifying spell of their common subject here, all conduct themselves urbanely and with solemn fairness. Their good behavior seems to arise out of their unanimous protestation of high respect for Yeats, who exacts from each of the twenty-four critics either "affection and love" as Delmore Schwartz put it, or at least a certain awe. The word "permanence" in the title of the collection states this unity exactly: all the critics agree that Yeats is a fixed star among English poets. But all unity ends here, for the various formulas offered as keys to the secret of Yeats's power are not consistent or compatible. It is necessary to relieve these formulas of their nuances and ornamentation and to reduce them to summary and label.

More than half of the essays originated in the old *Southern Review* or its surviving sister, *Kenyon Review*, a large representation that is not undeserved. Yeats received his first important American homage in *Southern Review* in 1942, and his American reputation of the moment is largely the creation of the critics for whom the two journals have spoken. From the same source has come the most awesome formula for describing the nature of Yeats's individual talent, that is, Yeats as a "metaphysical" poet. His talent, according to the argument, lay in the power of his imagination to "master" the antithetical essence of things. Yeats remolded the English lyric as his instrument for "assimilating incongruity" to use Cleanth Brooks's phrase. Did the Victorians not automatically link the words "paradox" and "morbid"? Yeats's destiny was to "escape from the Victorian poetical," "passing from Campion to Donne," passing from "anaemia"

to "tension," from "dream-weary" beauty to "beauty like a tightened bow." The argument terminates with the judgment that Yeats was a very great poet, perhaps the greatest of the past century, perhaps among the three or four greatest in the language. Such is the view which all other views honor as the basis of argument, and as the point from which dissent is taken.

The first dissenting formula expresses distress on the subject of Yeats's "mask." Wilson, Blackmur, Daiches, and Beach agree that Yeats grew in poetic strength as he became older, and they concede that the source of his late-won strength was his increasing willingness to "come to grips" with incongruities. But they feel that his growth was paid for in isolation, "loss of humanity," coldness, even in a decay of good sense. In the words of the editors of the collection, they are "certain of, and at the same time embarrassed by, Yeats's status as a major poet." Doubting the real value of those metaphors for poetry that Mrs. Yeats's ouiji-board brought, this formula turns up one of the most-worried bones of contention in all modern criticism: did Yeats develop his talent because of, or in spite of, his strange obsession with the occult, "so ineluctably associated with suburban villas and clearly unattractive faces."

A second dissent focuses on the "romantic" strain in Yeats's artistry, using the word in the pejorative sense. Mizener, for example, finds the late Yeats to be the same as the earlier, though more "cunning" in building an incantation. D. S. Savage, the most *wütend* of all the critics represented here, takes the similar position that Yeats was absorbed in the "alleviation of life" both first and last; he sees Yeats not as the master of incongruity but as mastered by it, as "obsessed" by paradox, as an Oscanian after all. But a very great poet, of course.

A third dissent, slightly different, sees Yeats as a fabulous craftsman, gifted with rare technical grace and inventiveness, but beyond that merely a solemn clown or Pantaloon. Thus Schwartz sets before the ideal critic whom we await the difficult task of "elucidating the greatness of the writing without forgetting the inferior quality of the emotions," echoing Auden's famous line: "You were silly like us; your gift survived it all." Auden's essay first confesses that he is unable to enjoy Yeats or other "fellow-artists living or dead," then proceeds to the most acute and loving description of Yeats's technical mastery contained in the collection.

A final permutation of dissent appears only casually in the collection, and still awaits full exploitation: it would rescue the reputation of Yeats's early verse. The observation is not intended to be satirical; the history of taste has seen stranger ghosts than the return of Usna's children. Bentley's essay performs such a rescue for Yeats's plays, but it is generally expected that each critic shall take another swat at "Innisfree." The early poems are still mostly friendless.

The great enigmatical figure of Yeats is a decisive test of the capacity of contemporary criticism, whose leadership at this moment is in the hands of the same men who constitute Yeats's special advocates. Their composite treatment of Yeats will probably bring very few laggards over to their side. The much-mentioned faults of this criticism are somewhat unfairly exaggerated in a collection of this sort. Repetition, for example, is unavoidable here; the famous concern with poem *qua* poem leads the critics to return always to a certain six of Yeats's poems, which are scrutinized and rescrutinized until one would imagine that not the tiniest crumb of idea has been allowed to escape. The reader may also be made vaguely unhappy by a querulous tone in the essays, suggesting that the critical pen was taken in hand in response to some secret, feverish, inner

compulsion, perhaps only casually related to the figure of W. B. Yeats. This tone is made shriller here where so many critics are singing in chorus. The collection also demonstrates that in its proliferation of offshoots, contemporary criticism loses some of the vigor of the parent stock and runs to a leggy and unlovely growth; but then, of what critical school could not the same be said? For those who wish to make the search, other faults of a more particular sort are here. One can find much evidence, for example, of the *ad hoc* explication. One instance of it has become a standard citation in the academic halls, namely, Schwartz's commentary on the misprint of "soldier" for "solider" (or was it the other way around?) in "Among School Children."

At the same time, it would be a mistake to argue that the achievement of these critics on their favorite subject has not been extensive and valuable. Without their work, Yeatsian criticism would still be floundering in the morass in which they found it fifteen years ago, when the emptiness of the "escapist" indictment against Yeats had not yet been exposed. Granted that one finds no satisfying final answers here, can anyone doubt that not only Yeats's reputation, but critical theory in general, are "permanently" enriched in these essays?

MALCOLM BROWN

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Goethe's Faust as a Renaissance Man: Parallels and Prototypes. By HAROLD JANTZ. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. xviii + 198. \$3.50.

Genetically, Goethe's *Faust* and *Götz* belong together. Regarding the latter Carl Lessing wrote his brother (April 27, 1774) that Goethe has the advantage even over Shakespeare in depicting fully the customs of the era concerned, whereas Shakespeare pictured merely the customs of his own age. Now Jantz comes forward with a view of *Faust* which amazes us only because it has not been presented before, and with evidence which should henceforth make us cautious when considering *Faust* or *Faust* as relating largely to the period of its composition. Jantz takes pains to point out that he does not wish to throw out the child with the bath by breaking with previous scholarship (p. xv) and looking on *Faust* exclusively as representing a man of the mid-fifteenth to the early seventeenth century, but his statement (on p. 58) leaves no doubt as to where he lays the emphasis:

With this superabundance of parallels and possible sources the eighteenth century cannot in any way compete. Its few analogues tend to be of limited scope and applicability, only rarely shedding any significant light on the larger issues of the drama. By contrast, the many analogues from the Renaissance become all the more impressive when we observe that they frequently offer pertinent and applicable explanations of crucial problems in *Faust* and, what is more, reveal previously hidden lines of unity among its various parts.

This study, forsaking the impact of the *Faust* tradition and interpolations from the 1770's and thereafter, chooses to look at Goethe's *Faust* through the eyes of the Humanistic tradition. It is a fresh and stimulating approach to which all Goethe scholars will owe a heavy debt, viewing it, as Jantz himself does, as an addition to Goethe scholarship rather than the sole means of solution.

CURTIS C. D. VAIL

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Johann von Tepl: Der Ackermann aus Böhmen. Edited by KEITH SPALDING. Oxford: Blackwell's German Texts, 1950. Pp. xlviii + 118. 6s.

Probably most medieval German scholars agree with the editor's assertion (p. v) that "The *Ackermann aus Böhmen* remains the finest German prose text of the fifteenth century, the best example of the Early High German language and the clearest instance of the impact of Humanist thought on mediaeval tradition in Germany." Hübner has shown that form came before new values were attached to them; or in the famous dictum of J. Huizinga: "Zuerst kam die neue Form, ehe es zu neuem Geist geworden ist." In his letter of dedication (discovered by Heilig in the early 1930's) Johann von Tepl's statement of purpose demonstrates clearly that he wrote his dialogue simply for the new form's sake. Thus, as Spalding points out, the *Ackermann* was more a playful exercise in style than a philosophical treatise or a personal confession. From the Schoolmen, the Meistersinger, and students of Italian Humanism grouped about Johann von Neumarkt, the author drew the main formalistic features of his work, namely, *flores*, *sententiae*, and *equivocatio*.

After a succinct, authoritative introduction (40 pages) treating the date of composition, historical backgrounds, the author, form, substance, language, sources, manuscripts, and early prints, Spalding presents the text in thirty pages. In general the superiority of MS "H" is indicated, although it is not accepted as the archetype. The editor steers a middle course, accepting H and H+ readings for which a case has been made, but rejecting H readings not supported by other manuscripts and not postulated by special considerations. Whenever the *a* branch goes its own way, it is ignored. This procedure takes Spalding away equally from Bernt-Burdach, who relied chiefly on the *a* branch, and Hübner, who has promised an edition based on H. Hübner's caution is preserved in principle, but Hammerich's improvements are also taken into consideration. The orthographical standardization is more extreme than that of Hübner (*daron* for *dar an*, *num* for *nu*, *immer* for *iemer*, *da* for *do*, etc.).

In the notes (47 pages) we find summaries of each chapter and discussions of all the important ideas and expressions in the text, as well as variant readings, sources, and interpretations chiefly of Bernt-Burdach, Hübner, and Hammerich. Frequently Spalding's textual criticisms are more convincing, if less ingenious, than those of Bernt and Burdach.

Nevertheless, the solutions of many unclear passages remain to be found. Examples are *unbeschewelich* (XVI, 22), *stumpfer pickel* (XXII, 41), *muffeln* (XXVIII, 32), *hauptman von berge* (XXIX, 30), *krachen* (XXXI, 16), and *temmer* (XXXIV, 33). In the expression *Dein klage ist on done vnd on reime* (II, 12) Spalding rejects the explications of other scholars, yet fails to hazard a guess as to its meaning. Does this not merely signify "senseless," as in our similar colloquial expression "without rhyme or reason"?

A glossary of twenty-four pages contains the important vocabulary items but excludes easily recognizable conjunctions, prepositions, articles, and auxiliary and modal verbs. Where a word bears different meanings in different passages, chapter and line references are included in the entry. From the student's point of view the glossary would have been more accessible at the very end of the book instead of between the text and other material.

The letter of dedication appears in Appendix A in both Latin and English. Approximately a dozen lines from each of the important manuscripts as well as longer passages from the early printings comprise Appendix B. A comprehensive

bibliography rounds out the volume.

Of the many editions of the *Ackermann aus Böhmen* this inexpensive little book is doubtless the best available for class use. Medievalists in general, however, will find the work a valuable addition to their libraries.

JOHN LANCASTER RIORDAN

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German Pronunciation and Phonology. By JETHRO BITHELL. London: Methuen and Company, 1952. Pp. xx + 514. 60s.

In this imposing volume Mr. Bithell has completed an initial step in the publication of a copious *German Grammar*. It is, as the writer states, a fitting companion piece to Priebisch and Collinson's *German Language*, which embodies the spirit of 1876 and ignores seventy-five years of subsequent research in linguistics.

In a brief attempt to modernize his thinking, Mr. Bithell sums up the concept of the phoneme (pp. 42-45) in the manner of the London school and characteristically fails to show evidence of progress in structural analysis. Because the discussion continually jumps from one language or dialect to another, the question of structure is easily obliterated. Note the mixture of terminology, orthography, phonology, and phonetics.

Some qualitative sub-members of the cardinal vowels do not occur in German. The short vowel of Engl. 'up' [ʌp], 'hut' [hʌt] is an [a] sound, while *a* in S.E. 'man' [mæn], though often classed as a sub-member of [a], is more correctly an independent sound between [a] and [e], as the ligature serves to suggest. (p. 71)

The first two chapters deal with (1) sounds, symbols, alphabets, and (2) the production and classification of sounds. The third chapter is entitled "Historical Phonetics," and its contents may be summarized in the typically macaronic statement: "The most important *Lautwechsel* are due to: (1) Verner's Law; (2) i-Umlaut; (3) Rückumlaut; (4) Brechung or a-Umlaut; (5) Ablaut or Vowel Gradation; (6) Auslautsverhärtung; (7) lengthening of vowels; (8) shortening of vowels" (p. 157). Among these topics, the "graphic" representation of Verner's Law is false, because it fails to stipulate the necessary contexts of sounds involved. In this chapter it is evident that the author is a victim of what has been called "mentalistic" psychology. We are told, among other things, that "letter-words are formed in the mind" (p. 168)—whatever this means.

It is to be taken for granted that Mr. Bithell is an old-fashioned purist; how else would he be judged from the following conclusions?

The effort to pronounce *h* in *gehen*, *stehen* etc., is not likely to make headway, simply because it runs counter to the vital law of inertia (p. 188) or economy of effort. For the aspirate is an effortful sound; that is perhaps why only Scotsmen, who have greater articulatory vigour than our slothful southrons, manage to stress it in certain combinations (*h-wen*, *h-wy*, etc.). (p. 150)

Speaking of the "parasite vowel" (*svarabhakti vowel*) as a sign of "careless local pronunciation," the author also finds it "curious that in Dutch this parasite vowel is recognized as correct" (p. 178). And two other phonetic curiosities, assimilation and dissimilation, are both explained as resulting from the "law

of inertia." The examples are copious and interesting; the reasons given for peculiarities of sound are fraught with neo-grammarian eclecticism.

Chapter IV deals with syllabification, accent, pitch, and rhythm, and the final chapter is entitled "Orthography and Orthoepy." The redeeming feature of these chapters, and of the book as a whole, is the presence of numerous examples, so that the book may qualify as a general reference work on the lexical level—if one is prepared to accept Thomas Mann as an authority on German dialects (pp. 97 and 194), and is cautious enough to note that "Rilke, an Austrian, rhymes *trank—bang*" (pp. 423 and 461)—which, it is implied, is a bad thing.

A subject index and an index of words and names, which have been appended, furnish valuable references. The bibliography is extensive, but inadequate. In general, the book constitutes a shocking confession to Americans, who are accustomed to regard their British cousins with respect and awe because of their penetrating empiricism. The reviewer can only admire the tremendous display of knowledge to be seen in the book at hand, but he cannot condone the tacit adherence to a state of learning which has long since been superseded.

CARROLL E. REED

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The Poems of Aimeric de Peguilhan. Edited and translated with Introduction and Commentary by WILLIAM P. SHEPARD and FRANK M. CHAMBERS. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Studies, Humanities Series, No. 24, 1950. Pp. vi + 254. \$4.50.

In presenting this edition of the poems of Aimeric de Peguilhan, Frank M. Chambers confronted a double problem; for in addition to the exacting textual criticism underlying any editorial study, he had to incorporate the notes gathered by William P. Shepard (late of Hamilton College) in preparation for a projected edition abandoned because of ill health. The present editor carefully acknowledges his indebtedness to the Shepard notes and previous publications, as well as to discussions pursued over a period of years relating to the general plan and to interpretative detail. But he accepts full responsibility for determining the selections retained, modified, or discarded; and, except for the completed translations of the first nineteen poems, the authority for the final work is essentially his.

After a general appraisal of the literary qualities of the poet as exemplifying the "monotony and triteness" of Provençal poetry, and an evaluation of the Provençal Vida and critical works by other scholars, the editor proceeds to a meticulous biographical study. He identifies patrons by equating internal evidence to historical documentation, thus establishing Peter II as the *King of Aragon*, Ferdinand as the *Infante of Castile*, the Emperor William IV as the *Marquis de Monferrat*, and Beatrice as the daughter of Azzo VI; he disagrees on grounds of plausibility with Jeanroy's substitution of William for Conrad, and on the same basis he reduces the accepted two Spanish sojourns to one. From such internal evidence and from probability the terminal dates of approximately 1175 and 1225 are determined, and these serve to eliminate some doubtful poems. There is little critical material which is new, and few controversial points are indubitably settled. However, these studies are undertaken only to

establish biographical dates and data, and are not a central feature of the investigation.

A section on style, metaphors, and ideas includes some contemporary judgments, notably Dante's, but no ideas. A detailed study of versification, tabulated according to genre, rime, and syllable count; an index of rimes and a comparison with other poets to suggest reciprocal influence; full notes and variants with classification of manuscripts; a glossary of words not contained in Levy's dictionary; and a bibliography (from which, however, Chabeneau-Anglade, *Jehan de Nostredame*, to which frequent reference is made, is missing) combine to produce a useful instrument for study. Tasteful prose translations, as artistic and scarcely more prosaic than the poems, contribute adequately to literary appreciation.

LURLINE V. SIMPSON

University of Washington

The Mind of Proust. By F. C. GREEN. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1950. Pp. 546. \$4.50.

The purpose of Professor Green's book is succinctly stated in the first paragraph of the introduction: "The real biography of Proust, that is to say, the history of his spiritual and intellectual life, is to be found neither in his correspondence nor in the impressions garnered by his friends, but in *A la recherche du temps perdu* which he describes as 'le livre où j'ai mis le meilleur de ma pensée et de ma vie même.' I do not propose, therefore, in this study which is an attempt to interpret Proust's great novel, to discuss the external facts of his life." This is a distinct departure from the form of most Proustian criticism.

There will undoubtedly be critics who will quarrel with Mr. Green's premise that the external facts of Proust's life are of little or no importance in the understanding of his mind and art, but all but the most prejudiced among them must admit that this is an extraordinarily fine presentation, the product of a subtle and sensitive mind writing on a subject he loves and knows thoroughly. Surely there is no need to justify Mr. Green's approach. "L'homme n'est rien; l'œuvre c'est tout," wrote George Sand, expressing admirably the same idea. Whatever their point of view, Proust specialists will find in the present book a wealth of ideas and interpretations, some congenial, some provocative. The general reader will find an admirable introduction to Proust, or an incentive to reread his work. It will also be possible for a dilettante to claim quite a close knowledge of Proust on the basis of having read Mr. Green's book.

Step by step, from *Du côté de chez Swann* through *Le temps retrouvé*, Mr. Green takes his reader into the complex world of Proust, showing how ordinary experience is transmuted into a work of art. For Mr. Green, the unique quality of Proust is that without sacrificing anything of the individual quality of a novel he has effected a fusion of "the material for a hundred essays, books of maxims and memoirs" (page 77). As it happens, this is one of several points on which Mr. Green crosses swords with previous critics. He contends that in France criticism of the novel as a genre is generally based on the standards of classical drama and that those critics who find that *A la recherche du temps perdu* resembles a collection of memoirs more than a novel are looking at it from this point of view. It is precisely because Proust develops the real nature of his

characters through a continual change of approach and of perspective rather than by presenting them in opposition to a clear-cut dramatic situation that he is an original rather than a traditional novelist whose methods are formed by conscious or unconscious imitation of the methods of classical drama.

The important question of whether or not there was a change in Proust's artistic doctrine during the course of *A la recherche du temps perdu* finds Mr. Green at odds with Alain, J. Benda, and Albert Feuillerat. These critics hold that in 1913 Proust intended to base his novel entirely on the revelations of the subconscious, and that by the time of writing *Le temps retrouvé* he had changed his mind and admitted a large degree of importance to the conscious intelligence. In several pages of cogent reasoning Mr. Green disputes this view, and he quotes in substantiation an early letter of Proust discussing the original version of *A la recherche du temps perdu* in which he states that "tout cela [the experiences of involuntary memory] n'est que le support du livre." Mr. Green is very convincing.

It would be misleading to suggest, by pointing out the areas of divergence between Mr. Green and other critics, that *The Mind of Proust* is a polemical work. It most certainly is not, and such discussions arise only at intervals when Mr. Green finds it desirable to set off his own view more clearly by contrast to the opposing view. In the main he adheres faithfully to his internal analysis of the novel, stressing not only the points just mentioned but others equally fundamental, such as the relationship between the philosophy of Bergson and that of Proust. Mr. Green discusses this affinity in considerable illuminating detail, making clear at the same time the differences between the philosopher and the novelist and the evolution of Bergsonian ideas in the developing artist. This evolutionary approach to the discussion of the important themes of Proust is one of the most original and attractive features of Mr. Green's method. Instead of grouping under separate headings details relating to such topics as "Bergson and Proust," "the unconscious memory," "intelligence and intuition," "homosexuality in Proust," all of these matters and others are discussed as they arise and in the relative proportions they assume in the successive stages of the novel.

With so much to commend it, it is regrettable that Mr. Green or the Cambridge University Press could not have provided a more careful reading of the proof. There are quite a number of typographical errors, each of small importance in itself, but it is annoying to find them in what is on the whole a well-written and well-printed book. Some of these errors seem to be due to a faulty transcription of the *NRF* 1919-1927 edition of Proust to which Mr. Green refers. No useful purpose would be served by a complete list of errata, but a few typical examples may be given: page 39, "fairé" for "faire"; page 64, "this to be a day" for "this is to be a day"; page 80, "ma mère" for "mon père" ("ma mère" does not make sense); page 104, "à coté" for "à côté"; page 106, "pourvoir" for "pouvoir"; page 112, "avant . . . une intelligence" for "avait une intelligence"; page 138, "je suis d'ailleurs résolu" for ". . . résolue"; page 196, "recrée" for "recréée"; page 218, "Cousin Bette" for "Cousine Bette" (or is Mr. Green translating here?).

In addition to these errors there are one or two slips in diction which make Mr. Green seem to say something he does not mean. On page 114 one reads "There is no man, he [Elstir] says, however wise or distinguished who has not in his youth spoken words or committed follies he would not like to forget." The triple negative needs reduction, and the sentence will have its intended meaning if the last "not" is deleted or changed to read "now." On page 214 the correction of "he tries to retrace the the probable development" is obvious.

Mr. Green has supported his interpretation with frequent quotations from *A la recherche du temps perdu*. He has translated the longer of these (those requiring ten or more lines of text) into English for the benefit of readers who are interested in Proust but who cannot read him in the original. These translations serve a useful purpose, but one wonders why the criterion of length was applied in determining whether a quotation should be translated or not. Surely those of Mr. Green's readers who do not read French would need and welcome translations of the short quotations just as much as those of the long ones.

But these are minor matters, and it would be pedantic to dwell on them. Certainly they do not detract from the essential value of an excellent book which in all likelihood will assume an important place among the growing number of studies devoted to Proust.

A. E. CREORE

University of Washington

Fifty Spanish Poems. By JUAN RAMÓN JIMÉNEZ. With English Translations by J. B. TREND. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951. Pp. 97. \$2.50.

Professor Trend has performed a genuinely fine task in editing and translating a selection from the many volumes of verse by Juan Ramón Jiménez, the oldest of the distinguished contemporary Spanish poets. The attempt to put modern Spanish (or French) poetry into English may be considered a despairing effort to translate the untranslatable. This delicate, vague, and evanescent art, compounded of memories of moonbeams, roses, and tears, shadows forth rather than expresses. It depends so greatly on "verbal magic" that the translator must summon up courage before beginning. Professor Trend has taken courage and succeeded; in fact, he has often performed miracles. "Me acuerdo de la tierra / que, ajena, era de uno" (No. 20) he renders with "My thought flies to my country; / though others owned it, it was mine." "Hervidero / de almas de azucenas" (No. 27) becomes "A seething spring / and the ghosts of white lilies." Such renderings show that the translator has comprehended the inmost meaning of the original (often not at all easy to grasp), and that he has felt the emotion and transmuted it into English in his own poetic words. No more could be asked of him. If, infrequently, he has fallen short, as when he wrote "you have proved yourself to be worthy of your name" for "te has ido elevando hasta tu nombre" (*Cielo*, No. 21), it is only that no one can always soar to the occasion.

In most of the poems he has not tried to reproduce the rhyme or assonance of the original, where it existed. With this loss he has gained freedom of expression. It is the modern mode. What can one do, technically, with poems, *La verdecilla*, *La espada* (Nos. 1 and 13) in which each line ends in an *e-e* assonance? Nothing, obviously, in an English version, except to omit rhyme entirely. The loss is inevitable, and one can only compensate it by a scrupulous choice of words. In doing the sonnets (as Nos. 15, 16), Trend does sometimes reproduce the scheme with rhyme or near-rhyme, and very creditably.

The fifteen-page preface, fortified and deepened by the translator's personal acquaintance with the poet, is an admirable introduction to his difficult talent. The entire volume is a valued addition to the growing body of aids to the English understanding of Spanish literature.

S. GRISWOLD MORLEY

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